Essays in Islamic Philosophy, Theology, and Mysticism

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PART I

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AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ISLAMIC INTELLECTUAL TRADITION

Methodology and Intent

The essays in this collection embrace three Islamic intellectual domains -- theology, philosophy, and mysticism -- and embody a number of methodological approaches to Islamic studies.

In these essays, I intentionally underplay the role of cultural causes in the development of Muslim thought by emphasizing the logic of the arguments embedded in the primary texts. Too often, the body of Muslim thought is viewed as either a by-product of the so-called Arab or Persian mind or a result of the encounter between non-Muslim and Muslim cultures. Using those approaches, many orientalists miss the beauty of the original theoretical and intellectual contributions of Islamic thought. While the study of intellectual history in its cultural contexts is a significant and legitimate distinct discipline, I do not consider it an adequate substitute for technical analysis of philosophical texts.

Studies of Western and Islamic philosophy frequently exhibit a disturbing discrepancy. For centuries, scholars of Western philosophy have focused on the conceptual imports of Western philosophical texts -- without ever claiming that the texts are products of English, German, or French minds. When these scholars study Islamic or another non-Western philosophy, however, they assume the pose of an anthropologist or a social historian searching for foreign influences. Any implicit presupposition that Near Eastern thoughts could not be original -- but had to be borrowed from the Greeks or other non-Near Eastern sources -- contradicts the factual history of the culture. The civilizations of the Near East developed religion, technology,

philosophy, urban centers, and other facets of culture earlier than the Europeans.

Further, such attitudes betray narrow scholarly lenses. The history of ideas, a respected field of study, investigates causal chains--for example, the development of the idea of being, or the pragmatics of the light motif used as icons in different mythologies. Professional philosophy, however, does not analyze "causal connection," between ideas, focusing instead on technical concepts and arguments that are not necessarily based on uncommon aspects of a culture.

The corpus of any thinker, Islamic or Western, has been influenced by a predecessor. The pre-Socratics affected Plato; Plato, in turn, influenced Aristotle and Plotinus; Aristotle and Plotinus left an impact on all medieval thinkers, who influenced everyone who followed. Nonetheless, very few essays out of thousands written on Aristotle's philosophy mention Platonic text as a major source of Aristotelian philosophy. Articles written on Avicenna, however, attempt (often quite desperately) to trace every one of his ideas to an intellectual ancestor--be it Aristotle, Augustine, the Jewish tradition, the Christian fathers, or Alexander of Aphrodisais. There is a manifest tendency, sometimes to the point of obsession, to force every Muslim thought into the artificial Greek-into-Arabic syndrome.

To illustrate the shortcoming of this methodology, I offer a critique in this volume of one example of this approach, namely H.A. Wolfson's celebrated work on the internal senses. His monumental contribution to the study of Islamic, Christian, and Jewish theology, and his research on the works of specific thinkers such as Philo, Crescas, and Spinoza deserve intellectual respect. Nevertheless, I find two objectionable tendencies in Wolfson's corpus: his claim of non-originality in such thinkers as Avicenna and his criticism of M. Goichon who is receptive to original Muslim scholarship. In recent years, a number of scholars -- including Henry Corbin, Fazlur Rahman, George F. Hourani, Muhsin S. Mahdi, Charles E. Butterworth, Michael E. Marmura,

Hossein Ziai, Lenn E. Goodman, Herman Landolt and Seyyed Hossein Nasr -- have attempted to free scholarship in Islamic philosophy from this reductionalist straitjacket.

I seriously recommend that we study modern Islamic philosophy through modern lenses rather than those of classical antiquity. Western philosophers access classical Islamic philosophy, from al-Kindi (d. 870) to Averroes (d. 1198), through Latin or Hebrew translations of the texts. However, during the period climaxed in 1492 by the final expulsion of Muslims from Spain, Islamic philosophy developed along three new paths. Many scholars of the classical age of Islamic philosophy who make armchair conjectures about the later period miss these paths.

First, ontology changed from the Peripatetic categories of substances and accidents to the metaphysics of processes, with more emphasis on the ontological roles of time and motion. This change began with S. Suhrawardī's rejection of the Aristotelian categories and culminated in the existent-process metaphysics of Mulla Ṣadrā.

Second, due to the influence of ibn ᶜArabī and al-Ghazālī, Islamic epistemology gradually absorbed sufficient intentional and phenomenological epistemologies to enrich modern Islamic philosophy beyond the Aristotelian.

Third, many modern philosophical activity centers in Iran came under the protection of Shīᶜite clergy. After Avicenna a large number of Muslims wrote on philosophy, among them:

> (i). Three major thinkers: ibn ᶜArabī, who emphasized a phenomeno- logical notion of being and its unity; Shihab al-Din Suhrawardi (d. 1191) the initiator of the modern school of illumination and the critique of Aristotelian logic; and Nasir al-Dīn Ṭusī(1274), the astronomer, mystic, theologian, and perhaps the first formulator of "soft determinism"; other links between these three and later thinkers include: Quṭb al-Dīn Shīrāzi (d. 1310), Quṭb al-Dīn Rāzī (d. 1364), Mīr Sayyed Sharīf Jurjānī (d.

1413), and Sa'in al-Dīn ibn Muhammad Turkah Isfahani (d.1427);

(ii) Philosopher-mystics. Two great mystical poets: Jallāl al-Dīn Rūmī (the author of *Mathnawī* and *Divān-i Shams*) (d.1273), Mahmud Shabistarī(the author of *Gulshan-i Rāz*) (d. 1320); the list of philosopher-mystics in period include Bābā Afḍal Kāshānī (d. 1268), ᶜAbd al-Razzāq Kāshānī (d. 1330), ᶜAbd al-Rahmān Jāmī (d. 1492), and Azzizad-Dīn Nassafī (ca. 13th C.).

(iii) Ibn Khaldūn (d. 1406) who investigated history as a science of dialectical interactions between culture, economics and environment.

(iv) The Golden Age of Modern Philosophy in the School of Isfahan. The significant figures in the city of Isfahan who formed the major modern philosophical tradition: Sheikh Bahā' al-Din ᶜAmilī (1622), Muhammad Bāqir Dāmād, known as Mīr Damād (d. 1631-2), Mīr Abul al-Qāsim Findiriskī (d.1640-1) Mullā ᶜAbd al-Rarzzāq Lāhījī (d. 1661), Mullā Muhsin Faiḍ Kāshānī (d. 1680), Āqā Hossien Khwānsārī (d.1687), Qāḍī Saᶜīd Qumī (d.1692), Mullā Rajab ᶜAli Ṭabrīzī (d. 1670), Mullā Shamsa Gīlānī (ca. 1600), and the most celebrated member Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, known as Mullā Ṣadrā (d. 1641).

(v) The Late Phase of Modern Philosophy. (v-1) Aḥsā'ī and The Shaikhi School of Kirman. These followers of Shiekh Aḥamd Iḥsā'ī (d. 1826) emphasized an inner dialogue with a hidden teacher, Neoplatonic eschatology and a reemergence of illuminationism. They established a school in Kirmān beginning with Seyyed Kāzim Rashtī (d. 1843), Jaᶜfar Kashfī (d. 1851), Shiekh Muhammad Karīm - Khān Kirmānī (d. 1870), Sheikh Zaynal- ᶜAbidīn Khān Kirmānī (d. 1942), and finally with Sheikh Abū Qāsim Ibrāhīmī (d. 1969) (v-2).

(vi) The School of Khurasan. Because of their sacred Shīʿa shrines, the city of Meshhad in the province of Khurasan and the city of Qum had been the two major centers of Shīʿa philosophy and theology. The most celebrated philosopher of Khurasan is Hādi Sabzāwārī (d. 1878) who was educated in Isfahan; others include Āqā Mīrzā Āshtīyānī (d. 1953).

In sum, there is little doubt that Islamic philosophy terminated after western philosophers lost their contacts with the Muslim intellectual tradition.

Many orientalists who are primarily classicists or Arabists, like Richard Walzer, are unfamiliar with either sufism or Persian culture. Consequently, finding the modern Islamic texts non-Aristotelian, they misjudge them as non-philosophical, even terming them theosophy. Such a label degrades the worth of modern scholarship in Islamic studies and is a disservice to the Muslim philosophers. Post-Avicennian Islamic thought, being more in line with the process ontologies of Henri Bergson and Alfred North Whitehead, and with the epistemology of Martin Heidegger, is consonant with the spirit of recent philosophy. For example, the notion of knowledge by presence (*ʿilm-i ḥudhūrī*) in S. Suhrawardī and Mullā Ṣadrā resembles Whitehead's notion of prehension, Bergson's view of duration, and the epistemic aspect of Martin Buber's "I and Thou." Like these Western concepts, it cannot be reduced to a derivation of traditional Peripatetic epistemology.

Islamic philosophy has changed and grown in the last seven centuries. Specialists in the Greek residue of Islamic thought or the Islamic genesis of the Latin-Hebraic tradition may be uncomfortable with modern Islamic philosophy. Their main research interests are elsewhere and their technical background not especially useful in deciphering its texts. Their reaction would be similar if they read German Idealism or French existentialism. Scholars who understand modern and contemporary Western philosophical systems -- especially those who are familiar with

phenomenology and process philosophies -- should investigate later Islamic philosophy.

By encouraging analytical inquiry, I hope philosophy written by Muslims will once again find its proper place in the Western curriculum. In the medieval period, Muslim philosophy was well integrated with its Western counterpart. Aquinas alone mentions Avicenna about five hundred times! The contemporary intellectual interaction of the Western and Islamic cultures promises enrichment for both traditions. In the twenty-first century, more than ever before, the fate of Westerners and their 1.5 billion Muslim fellow global citizens are deeply intertwined. Perhaps through intellectual dialogue the two cultures may look for global cooperation in the difficult times of the next century.

Three Domains of Intellectual Tradition

Islamic intellectual literature may be divided into three categories: theology (*kalām*), philosophy (*falsifa*), and mysticism (*ʿirfān*). Aside from its pedagogical utility, this division derives from the contents of both the literature and these disciplines. In the Western tradition, similar tripartite classifications are observed. For example, in medieval philosophy differentiation is made among affirmative theology, where God is known by positive attributes such as omnipotence; negative theology, where God is not limited by features such as being contingent; and symbolic or allegorical theology, where the person-God relationship is clarified by reference such as "a wave and the sea," or "a light ray and the sun." Islamic theology is written in the language of affirmative theology in medieval scholasticism. Islamic philosophy uses the method of negative theology to clarify the notion of the Necessary Existent as the God of religion. Sufism or Islamic mysticism employs allegories and symbols to display the phenomenon of the God-person encounter by mystical icons.

From Aristotle on, both Western and Islamic inquiries have been classified primarily according to the concepts being examined. With respect to subject matter, the religious, philosophical, and mystical disciplines of the Muslim intellectual tradition are different. Theology focuses on God; philosophy constructs a meta-scientific structure about the world of experience and intelligibles; and sufism aims at a non-alienating encounter with being and its unity (*waḥdat al-wujūd*). Consequently, the tripartite division of Islamic intellectual tradition proffered in this essay is justified.

Theological Perspectives on the Ontology of the Divine

For Muslim theologians, as with other monotheists, specifically Zoroastrians, Jews, and Christians, God is the Necessary Being, the creator of the world, and the object of worship. As a totally transcendent entity, God creates the world purely out of His grace without any necessity external to His nature. Ethically significant theorems follow from this axiom of God's transcendence. An example: since God and the world are totally distinct, any type of identity, as implied in Al-Hallāj's sufic statement "I am reality-God" [*ana al-Ḥaqq (aletheia)*] contradicts the very core of monotheism.

Through His covenants, commandments, and directives given to prophets and saints such as Noah, Abraham, Moses, Jesus, and Muhammad, God prescribes the correct religious law (*Sharīʿa*) to humanity. The implicit assumption about the correctness of conduct for creatures is the criterion of living in harmony, in accord (*ittiḥād*) with the dictum of laws prescribed by the Divine. Indeed, every norm is prescribed by the transcendent Divine. Although a minority of Muslims (the Shīʿites) advocate Divine justice and free will for creatures, according to the majority (the Sunnites), God's justice is due only to His mercy. Demanding justice from God -- as expressed in the dilemma of Job, for

example -- is blasphemy in Sunni Islam. In sum, the religious monotheistic perspective depicts a world of a transcendent God with two main concepts: creation (*khalq*) by the Divine and creatures living in harmony (*ittiḥād*) with the divinely ordained laws.

The Necessary Existent of the Philosophers

Focusing on the realm of worlds made of intelligibles and sensibles, philosophy cannot and does not begin with God. Being infinite, God is not material and not a sensible entity. Being simple (*basīit*) and without constitutents, He has neither genus nor differentia and, therefore, cannot be conceived. Thus, neither the intellect (*ʿaql, vous*) which receives the intelligibles (*maʿqulāt*) nor the senses (*iḥsās*) which receive the sensible-moveable matter can directly receive God. It is in the context of seeking a principle (*aṣl, arche*) or an explanation (*logos*) for the world that philosophy postulates God as the sustainer (*dāranda*), the efficient, or the essential (*dhāt-i hu*) cause of the world.

Those who emphasize His features as the cause of the world resort to the cosmological argument to prove His existence. The ontological argument is proffered by those who define God as That Whose Essence is existence. For Avicenna, for example, the two primary notions to the mind are being (*wujūd, hastī*) and modalities (necessity, contingency, and impossibility). Concatenating being with necessity leads to the notion of a necessary being. Ultimately, by the second version of the ontological argument, the necessary being is identified with the unique or The Necessary Existent (*al-Wājib al-Wujūd*), Who is God, That Whose essence is none other than being an existent. In sum, most classical Muslim philosophers find God either by the cosmological or the ontological argument. Thus, one difference between the two paradigm cases of theology and philosophy is the former begins with God and the latter does not.

Another point of difference concerns God's production *(ḥudūth)* of the world. Theologians generally preach that God created the world in time. For philosophers, the world has an atemporal genesis. In the philosopher's cosmogony, God's priority to the world is either logical, essential, or due to nature -- not temporal.

Philosophers question the temporal sense of creation in two ways. First, philosophers raise the meaningfulness of the notion of nothing. As the Epicureans claim, nothing is created out of nothing. Because nothing is not and cannot be, the idea has meaning only as a privation of being. Also, nothing cannot be the name of a non-logical designatum and, consequently, creation out of nothing is questionable because the word nothing is only syntactically meaningful.

Second, philosophers question the notion of the absolute beginning of time. Like a fish searching for the meaning of water, we can never existentially understand atemporality because every experience happens in time. The notion of the beginning of the first duration is at first view confusing. As Aristotle states, "x has a beginning, if there is a time when x did not exist." If one substitutes time for x in this sentence, we arrive at the absurdity that there was a time when there was no time. Only contextually, in terms of a set of events (which already presupposes time) can we understand time. For example, given a duration, then another duration may precede, be simultaneous with, or succeed the aforementioned duration.

The dilemma of time implies several theological problems. One may inquire how an immutable entity like God can directly create contingent entities with specific temporal indices? Does such a creator-created relationship imply a temporal attribution to the immutable Divine? Muslim philosophers have attempted many schemes to account for God's immutability and the causation of contingent entities. Mīr Dāmād, for example, proposed the following ingenious tripartite structure of the world: the realm of meta-time (*samad*) consisting of God and intelligibles, in so far as they are reflections of the Divine; the realm of perpetuity (*dahr*)

for universals, as mediator between the other two realms; and the realm of time (*zamān*) containing contingent bodies generated by entities in *dahr*. By this scheme, Mīr Dāmād sought to preserve God's immutability and causal status.

Most Muslim philosophers, not accepting a literal interpretation of temporal creation, resort to some kind of emanational cosmogony. As al-Ghazali observed, such philosophical views of God are not in harmony with the religious doctrine of God.

On the subject of the God-person relationship, philosophy and theology again differ. Philosophers often reject the autocratic vision of God, in which justice is due only to His mercy. Agreeing with the rationalistic ethics of the Muʿtazila, most philosophers and some theologians reason that God's justice is a consequence of His nature. In this context, individuals are free and thus responsible for their acts, and can base moral choices on reason. A later philosophical view understands individuals to be free only if they accept the life chosen for them in a deterministic, kismet-type of theodicy. In this model, salvation may be reached in several ways: when persons leave their own limited perspectives and transcend to a God-type of perspective; or, in agreement with Plotinus, when there is no "otherness" with the God-Reality (*Ḥaqq*). In this model, many philosophers resort to the active intelligence as the mediator figure for a union with God. By engaging in atemporal experiences like mathematics, individuals relate to God or have God-like experiences through the use of their intelligence (*ʿaql, vous*), not the soul (*nafs, psyche*). In conclusion, the philosophical mode of God-person relation tended toward co-eternity and union. Consequently it is different from a religious perspective.

The Sufic Vision of the God-World-Self

Naturalistic sufis focus on the ethical ethos of human existence. Their main agenda is to overcome alienation born of the existential authenticity of being with God-nature. Consequently natural

sufism seeks incarnation (*ḥullūl*), where God is the inner essence of being. The great architect of this model, ibn al-ʿArabī, focuses on our primary, immediate prehension of being and apprehension of its unity, or the unity of being (*waḥdat al-wujūd*). In an incorrigible state, we presuppose our existence; it is, after all, the Cognito, the transcendental ground of experience. But this self is based on God's existence as the inner essence (*dhāt*) of our being. This perspective agrees with the *Cogito* argument given by Augustine and Descartes, which begins with the discovery that the existence of the subject who thinks cannot be questioned.

Upon further reflection and discovery, that finite mode of the subject of this experience can be sustained only by its infinite ground, the infinite God Who is the inner essence (*dhāt-i hu*) of persons. Since union is the ultimate aim of the mystical journey, and since substances cannot blend with one another, mystics abandon the substance-event theory of Aristotelian categories. Instead, they embrace the process theory of emanation, introduced by classical Zoroastrianism (ca. 1200 B.C.) and developed fully in Neoplatonism. In this theory, the One, the Necessary Existent, like the *Ein-Sof* of the kabbalah, is the cause from which the material world emanates through intermediaries. In the language of this theory, like waves of water, a process can merge into another process. The sufic theory of annihilation (*fanā'*) of the ego-self (*nafs*), yet persistence (*baqā'*) of the self through its union with the Divine, is one illustration of this idea. This theory is sustained by the mystical model of emanations from God and incarnations of God-like states by a mystical ascent.

Islamic theology, philosophy, and mysticism exhibit sharp distinctions in their treatment of the relationship of God to the individual and to the world. In short, theology advocates creation-harmony, philosophy finds co-eternity-union, and sufism sees emanation-incarnation as the resolution to questions on the relationship.

Distinctions in Epistemic States

There are sharp distinctions in origin, form, content, and purpose among the religious revelation (*wahy*) ordained by God to the prophets, scientific knowledge (*ʿilm*) in philosophy which corresponds to its Greek counterpart (*episteme*) [Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book VI], and the gnosis (*ʿirfān*) that embodies both an external pretension of being and its unity (*waḥdat al-wujūd*) and an eternal growth.

According to religion, revelations come from God. They are prescriptions, in form and in content, to guide the voluntary intentions of the believers as well as their social acts. In addition, for the community of the faithful (*ummā*), they provide an agenda for living in accordance and harmony with God's rules.

The philosophical view of scientific knowledge uses the two tools of analysis of concepts and deductions that focus on validity of arguments. In logic, Muslims focused on the nature of concept (*taṣawwur*) and the validity of correspondence (*taṣdīq*) of its expression. The basics of Islamic epistemology were largely derived from the discussions found in Aristotle's *On the Soul* (*Peri Psyche, De Anima, Nafs*), with minor but important variations from the Greek texts in several areas.

First, in addition to the five external senses, Aristotle mentions the internal sense, common sense. Muslim epistemologies were influential in extending the list of internal senses beyond common sense to other concepts such as imagination (*khīyāl*), memory (*ḥāfidha*), and prehensible memory-estimation (*wahm*). Because Islamic epistemologies were concerned with intentional notions such as inner enlightenment, the extension of experiences to internal senses provided fertile ground for the development of Islamic epistemology related to the ethics of self-realization.

Second, Muslim epistemologies reformulated Aristotle's references to the active intelligence (*nous poietikos, al-ʿaql-i al-faʿʿāl*) into the intelligence of the moon or the mediator figure for the reception of intelligibles. Later, this naturalistic element in turn

became an important vehicle for the spiritualization of Greek naturalistic ethics.

Third, as followers of a monotheistic creed, Muslims sought to spiritualize a dimension of Greek naturalistic epistemology to account for the insights of the prophets, saints, and mystics. Accordingly, they focused the notion of sacred (*qudsī*) on a soul (in Nasir Khosrow), on intelligence (in Avicenna), or on spirit (by theologians) and imagination. In this sense, analogous to the use of the Holy Ghost (*Ruḥ al-qudus*), the sacred is used to account for the prophetic imagination, mystical insight, and archetypal dreams. As one result of this concept of the sacred, an instrumental theory of knowledge emerges. This instrumental theory views knowledge as unrestricted to conscious states-of-sense experiences about bodies and to the analysis of intelligible concepts.

Mysticism in modern Islamic thought received very significant support from al-Ghazali and developed four tendencies which were dormant in the classical period.

First, non-Aristotelian and mystically grounded epistemic concepts began to appear in philosophical texts. These include knowledge by presence (*ʿilm-i ḥuẓūrī*), revealment (*kashf*), authentic-encounter-taste (*dhawq*), existential exuberance (*shawq*), archetypal recall (*dhikr*), and hermeneutic reflection (*ta'wil*). In a Platonic sense, knowledge began to take a normative flavor. For example, the path of self-realization began to be seen as both an epistemic and a normative ascent, analogous to the path in Plato's allegory of the cave.

Second, the texts established a distinction between the phenomenological and mind-dependent realm (*dhihnī*) and the realm of existents independent of the mind (*ghaiyr-i dhihnī*).

Third, following the celebrated case of the flying man argument in Avicenna, philosophers focused on the Cartesian *Cogito* and the use of the incorrigibility of the transcendental self as the subject of experience to prove their epistemological position.

Finally, in reaction to harsh Avicennian criticism of Porphyry's epistemology, an emphasis on the identification of the knower with

the known emerged. Mystics consider the pragmatic dimensions of expressions (and their iconic functions) to be the attainment of mystic states (*aḥwāl*) and stations (*maqāmāt*). The vehicle of the mystical theory of knowledge is *tarīqa,* the mystical path of self-realization. As illustrated in Plato's allegory of the cave, this process of self-realization is a therapeutic, epistemic, and normative ascent. Knowing is associated with a special Heideggerean sense of truth (*alethea*), making one true or better. The ultimate purpose of the mystical journey is neither a discursive, descriptive knowledge of facts, nor an analysis of concepts, nor the performance of religious ritual. Instead, mystical gnosis transforms an alienated individual (*faraq*, *tafrīq*) to a state of union (*waṣl*). In such a state, there is an immediate prehensible (*ḥudhūri*) encounter of being and the unity of being (*waḥdat al-wujūd*).

Three Mediator Figures: the Prophet, *Logos,* and Love

In Islamic contexts, a gap exists between the finite worshiper and the infinite Divine God. Each of the three perspectives--theology, philosophy, and mysticism -- provides its own mediator figure to link individuals with the Ultimate being. Functioning as the pivotal agent, the mediator figure in each of these domains has a very different role.

In theology, Gabriel, prophets, and saints are messengers of God to man. Their function is to assist man in the right path (*al-sarāt al-mustaqīm*).

In philosophy, reason (*ʿaql, vous*) is the way (*logos*) that clarifies the logical structure of the argument at hand and allows the inquirer to check the truth of premises. In addition to clarifying the logic, reason reformulates problems by dialectical reflection for the philosophical basis of the inquiry.

Finally, in mysticism, the mediator figure is the mystical sage, a Christ-like inner teacher. Often love (*ʿishq*) functions as this

mediator figure due to the so-called problem of self-reference. In this context, Wittgenstein remarks that no one can ever see his or her eyes directly is relevant. In the same manner, as long as the individual operates within the self-ego perspective, he or she cannot reflect on the self as an object of experience. By claiming that an aspect of the mystical love experience is annihilation of the self (*fanā'*) and persistence as a dimension of another (*baqā'*), mystics overcome this dilemma. Only with such a perspective is a person able to transcend the egotistical-self and relate to the spiritual dimension of the self. Thus love, due to its effect of selflessness, becomes prerequisite to any self-knowledge and, to self-realization.

ISLAMIC THEOLOGY

BASIC DIMENSIONS OF ISLAMIC THEOLOGY

This section focuses on (i) the basics of Islamic theology, (ii) its formal (*kalām*), philosophical (*falsafa*), and mystical (*taṣawwuf*) dimensions, and (iii) recent reform movements.

The Meaning of 'Theology' and the Tripartite Context of Technical Islamic Theology.

'Theology', a term of Attic Greek origin, signifies metaphysics, or "the logic[cal study], of God [that is, the non-movable, non-sensible substance]," (see Aristotle's *Metaphysics* 1025b3–6a32). Theology has a central place in Greek and Islamic traditions. Both Aristotle and Avicenna classify inquiries into the following groups: speculative (whose subject does not affect the inquirer), practical (whose subject affects the inquirer), and productive (which concerns making useful products). Speculative sciences are physics (studies bodies), mathematics (in imagination refers to bodies but not in definition of its subject matter), and metaphysics (whose subject is unrelated to bodies). Metaphysics itself is divided into three types: ontology (studies being qua being), etiology (studies cases), and theology (which studies God). Aristotle's *Metaphysics,* Book Lambda, and Plato's *Timaeus*, The *Ilahīyyāt(s)* of Avicenna, include paradigm cases of theology. Theologians clarify most religious controversies by employing this sense of metaphysics. For example, *The Guide of the Perplexed* by Moses Maimonides

(1135–1204) and *Summa Theologica* by Saint Thomas Aquinas (1224–1274). "Popular" theology taught to Muslims differs from the sophisticated technical scholarship found in, "scholastic types of theology," known as *kalām* [lit.' "the word," or *logos*], philosophical theology, and mystical theology.

I. Salient Dimensions of Popular Islamic Theology.

The fundamentals of "popular" theology concern: the source of authority; minimal and essential articles of faith; major differences among recognized sects; and the principle of tolerance towards other monotheists.

The Source of Authority.

Formal authority in Islam lies in The Qur'an and the *Sunna* which is the tradition. The *Sunna* in its primary use refers to the *Ḥadīth* of Muhammad. *Ḥadith* means "an account" or "a narrative". In its primary use, it refers to the "account of Muhammad", specifically to his sayings, acts, and his silent approvals gathered from the contexts. Since Muhammad is the messenger of God (*rasūl Allāh*) to the religious and the perfect human to the sūfis, he is also both the theological and the mystical paradigm --the paradigm to imitate. Consequently, his tradition (*sunna*) as expressed in his *Ḥadīth* depicts ideas, standards, and "moral metaxioms", from which by analogy (*qīyās*), one can derive guidance in legal decisions. For the mystics, the *Ḥadīth*, along with account of the lives of other prophets such as Abraham, Moses, Jesus, and sometimes earlier mystics point to ideal behavior of the perfect human (*al-insān al-kāmil*). This muslim praxis of imitation is analogous with Christology of the imitation

of Christ --as illustrated in *The Following of Christ*, written by Gerard Groote (d. 1834) and practiced by St. Francis of Assisi (d. 1182). This imitation aims towards a spiritual state of union in which the disciple urges to incarnate the mediator figure as a token of God Itself. In Islamic tradition, the *Ḥadīth* literature is a science, where each significant item is made of a content (*matn*) and a documentation for its support (*sanad, pl. asnād*). Of all the various Ḥadiths, six have survived to meet the test of legitimacy. These are the collections of al-Bukhari (d. 870), Muslim (d. 875), Abu Dawud (d. 888), al-Tirmidhi (d. 892), al-Nasa'i (d. 915), and Idn Madja (d. 886). The Shīʿa select those Ḥadiths based upon their own perspective and proffer additional ones such as *al-Kāfi* by Muhammad ibn Yaʿqūb al-Kulini (d. 939).

In practice the local clergy, religious scholars, and jurists assist the faithful to live in conformity with the divine ordained Islamic law (*sharīʿa). Sharīʿa* literally means the (correct) path covering the ethics of all external relationships between persons and God as well as societal relations among persons. It includes topics such as performance pf religious rituals and interpersonal facts such as contracts. Ethically, *sharīʿa* divides all acts into five levels of moral norms: obligatory, meritorious, indifferent, reprehensible, and forbidden. In this sense, *sharīʿa* is not concerned with the inner (*bāṭin*) intention (*nīya*) of the agent. The latter is the subject matter of the mystical dimension of religion as well as the jural -- that is non-utilitarian -- interpretation of *fiq*. Although persons are obligated to obey it, the *sharīʿa* itself does not establish any prescription against the violators. This distinction between the "desirable practice", and the "actual expected practice", sharpened when religious scholars distanced themselves from the secular governments of the Umayyads and the Abbasids. As a universal religion, the *sharīʿa* is sufficiently flexible to account for various phases of Islam, such as Africanized Islam as well as adaptation of Islam to Indonesian and Albanian cultures. What does this existential fact prove? The Muslims hold that being a universal

religion, Islamic prescriptions are like a set of meta-axioms adaptable to all societies. Its "social game" type of religious behavior is universal because it is true and appeals to different communities with different perspectives who have the same God. In addition, schools of jurisprudence (*fiq*) were developed in Islam which focused on legal disputes such as those related to inheritance, property and contract.

Originally, *fiq* designated independent thinking which was not totally a verbatim equivalent to the knowledge of the Qur'anand specific traditions of the precedent (*āthār*). In contrast, *fiq* refered to deliberations related to one's reasoned opinion, *ra'y*. Later, the expression *fiq* evolved to mean jurisprudence covering evry aspect of Islam. four schools of Law were developed: (i) the Hanafī school, which was popular in the Turkish Empire, Central Asia, South Arabia, and the Indian mainland. The founder of this school is Abu Hanifa (d. 767) who advocated the exercise of free opinion; (ii) the school of Shafiʿī which was popular in Egypt, South Arabia, Indonesia, East Africa and Syria. The founder of this tradition is Muhammad bin Iris al-Shafiʿī (d. 820) who developed the most elaborate legal school in Islam allowing for rational interpretation of texts, analogy, and innovation as legitimate instruments of legal reasoning. Moreover, he teaches that there is no essential contradicion between reasoning and the sacred sources of authority; (iii) the Mālikī school popular in the Maghrib, Upper Egypt, and West Africa. It was founded by Malik ibn Anas (d. 795) who emphasizes the "living tradition" based on the *sunna* of Medina; and (iv) finally, the Hanbalī school which in the early stages of Islam was popular in Iraq, Egypt, Syria and Palestine and is now focused in Arabia. It was founded by Ahmad ibn Muhammad bin Ḥanbal (d. 855). Being the most conservative of all legal schools, it rejects innovations (*ijtihād*), mystical hermeneutics (*ta'wīl*) or phenomenological interpretations, and the practice paying homages to tombs of the Imams and saints.

But even at the popular level, a minimal set of theological disputes surface. (1) A preliminary controversy is whether the Qur'an is eternal or was created in time. (2) Another query focuses on the criteria for deciding "correct" interpretations of the authoritative sources, to which three answers have been proffered:(i) the communitarian, Sunnī position is that Islam is a dynamic religion which provides mechanisms for adaptation by the consensus of the community (*ijmāᶜ*), and a tradition of exercising independent judgment (*ijtiḥād*); (ii) the Shīᶜa proffer a special class of "infallible," "sinless" Muslims, i.e., the prophet, Mūḥammad ibn ᶜAbdullāh (570–632), his daughter Fāṭīma bint Muḥammad (d. 632), his cousin and son in law ᶜAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib (d. 661) and their direct progeny, including Mahdī, the hidden Imām, are the ultimate authorities in Islam. Moreover, through the mediation of the hidden Imam, i.e. Mahdī, certain high clergy such as the Ayatollāh–Imāms, or the Isāmᶜīlī guardians share a similar privileged status of having political and spiritual powers; (iii) Finally, a religious group known as the Khawārij held that any virtuous believer, without a need for an intermediary, is virtuous due to her/his belief and her/his acts.(3) Another problem relates to appraising the sacred texts. Are they absolute literal truths, "moral ideals" for popular consumption, or only archetypal and pragmatic models to be applied for suitable contexts? Specific implications of this theological topic have political relevance in the process of contemporary modernization of Muslim society and its fundamentalist reaction. For example, what is the place of women in society including the army? Can the salient features of Islamic economics be coordinated in the modern international banking community?

The Major Principles and Pillars of Islam.

All Muslims follow the Islamic principles (*uṣūl)* of

a) the unity (*tawḥīd*) of God (2:163):

> And your God is one God! there is no god but He; He is the Beneficient, the Merciful.

The *waḥdat-al-wujūd* (unity of being) school of mysticism takes the principle of *tawḥid* to express a monistic monotheism, which means that nothing exists but god. Some Muslims contrast God as the hidden (*maḥjūb, bāṭin*) reality (*al-Ḥaqq*) with the external world of appearance (*zāhir*) as the shadow of this light.

b) the chain of prophets (*nabowat*) (2:151):

> Even as we sent a messenger from among you to convey Our messages to you and cleanse you, and teach you the Book and the wisdom, and what you did not know;

c) the day of judgment (*qiyāmat*) (4:136):

> O believers, believe in God and His Messenger and the Book He has revealed to His Apostle, and the Books revealed before. But he who believes not in God and his angles and the Books and the prophets and the Last Day, has wandered far away.

and d) the resurrection (*maᶜād*) (41:39):

> It is among His signs that the earth you see all barren and desolate begins to stir and sprout when We send down rain upon it. Surely He who gives its life will also give life to the dead. Indeed He has power over every thing.

to which the Shīᶜa add the Imāmat and Justice (of God).

The secondary or derivative doctrines held by all Muslims and known in the West as the so–called "pillars of Islam" are:

(i) testimony in being a witness to an absolute monotheistic God, to Muhammad as his prophet [and for the Shīᶜa in ᶜAlī, as The Prince of the Believers].

In the perspective of mysticism, "being a witness" implies a state of resignation (*Riḍā*) to the *kismet* ordained by God. Pointing to an empathetic perspective, it proffers a state with no alienation between God as the inner essence (*dhāt*) of the world and His mode, that is the human person.

(ii) performance of the daily prayers (4: 103):

> If you are late in performing your service of prayer honour God by remembering Him, standing or sitting or lying on your sides. And when you have security perform your act of prayer befittingly; and praying at fixed hours is prescribed for the faithful.

In the perspective of mysticism, prayer is a sign for intimacy (*uns*), that is a state of nearness to the primordial source of our being, a return to the origin of the self.

(iii) fasting during the month of Ramaḍān with a few exception, e.g. for travelers (2:185):

> Ramadan is the month is which the Qur'an was revealed as guidance to man and clear proof the guidance, and criterion (of falsehood and truth). So when you see the new moon you should fast the whole month; but a person who is ill or travelling (and fails to do so) should fast on other days, as God wishes ease and not hardship for you, so that you complete the (fixed) number (of fasts), and give glory to God for the guidance, and be grateful.

A mystical depiction of fasting points to a conscious awareness of the fact that life and nourishment are icons of God's blessings and gifts (*barakat*). It points to a de-mechanized living experience, and to experiencing the existential states of needs, control and dependence.

(iv) pilgrimage to Mecca unless there is an exception, e.g. sickness,(2:158);

> Perform the pilgrimage and holy visit ('Umra, to Makkah) in the service of God.
>
> But if you are prevented, send an offering which you can afford as sacrifice, and do not shave your heads util the offering has reached the place of sacrifice. But if you are sick or have ailment of scalp (preventing the shaving of hair), then offer expiation by fasting or else giving alms or a sacrificial offering.

The pilgrimage to Mecca has many mystical significances. To begin with, one leaves the temporal earthly goods and travels with simple clothing. Turning one's attention away from the body and from the earthly goods, pointing to a center -- a pole of worship. A pilgrim experiences authentically the existential return to the archetypal origin of the self.

(v) paying the so–called 'poor tax' (2:43),

> Be firm in devotion: give *zakat* (the due share of your wealth for the welfare of others), and bow with those who bow (before God)

and for the Shīᶜa financial support of the descendants of the prophet.

The poor tax, mystically points to the communitarian, communal depiction of persons as societal self and against the vision of a person as an isolated ego-self. Wealth which is the result of personal labor is possible when the human animal functions as a member of polity, an *ummāh*, a community of believers.

(vi) being in a state of struggle to spread Islam (*jihād*) (9:29):

> Fight those people of the Book who do not believe in God and the Last Day, who do not prohibit what God and His apostle have forbidden, nor accept divine law, until all of them pay protective tax in submission.

The phenomenon of *jihād* has many mystical meanings. For example, it implies that the moral space of "submission to one God" transcends the right to privacy of practicing one's belief. Consider the following query: does a person have a duty to prevent another fellow human being from a mistake such as drunk driving? If so, then in the manner, a person has also a moral obligation to convert the non-believer into a monotheist with the aim of helping the former to be blessed by the peace of belief in the true God. Notice that, in principle, there is no *jihād* against other monotheists. It is not a "holy war", but an excursion for spreading a global humanistic message of monotheism which for a muslim is peace.

Two Major Islamic Sects: the Sunnī and Shīᶜa Variations.

The majority of Muslims belong to the *Sunnī* tradition, the orthodoxy, who adhere to the consensus (*ijmāᶜ*) of the community on religious affairs as the source of authority including the selection of the Caliphates. For example, consider a controversy over a new issue; if Muslim reformers–scholars (*mujtahidūn*) study the authoritative sources like the Qur'an, Sunna, and employ accepted methods such as that of analogy (*qiyās*), arrive at a decision, and the consensus of the community has also been reached on the decision in question, then it becomes binding on all Muslims. Specifically the Sunnī uphold the succession of the first four Caliphs in Islamic history: Abū Bakr (632–634), ᶜUmar ibn al–Khaṭṭāb(634–644), ᶜUthmān ibn Affān (644–656), and ᶜAlī

(656–661) based on the consensus of the community. Sunnī constitute about 85 per cent of all Muslims, and Shīᶜa about 15 per cent.

The *Shīᶜa* sects [lit. the *shīᶜa* i.e., the party of ᶜAlī] claim that according to the accounts of more than one hundred companions of the Prophet, Muḥammad, at a site named Ghadir Khumm, when he was coming to Medina from his last visit to Mecca, explicitly chose ᶜAlī to be his successor. Moreover, the Shīᶜa as stated previously, identify the legitimate legal political authority with what they take to be the sinless, spiritual authority, i.e., Muḥammad and his descendants, or the high clergy who receive special insights from the hidden Imām. A major significant event of Shīᶜa history occurred in the year 680 when Ḥusain, the youngest son of ᶜAlī, and seventy two of his followers were massacred on the plains of Karbalā by Shimr, a general of Yazīd, the Umayyād Caliph. This event was interpreted by majority of Shī ᶜa to imbed martyrdom, sacrifice, and a receptivity to a perspective of being in an eternal revolution as an important element in the charismatic dimension of the spiritual and political leader with important political implications for the entire Muslim world. Afterwards, the mystical interpretations enriched the religious dimension of the Imām, projecting Imāms to be isomorphic to the mediator figure, who assists the traveler in the process of self realization, the way (*ṭarīqa*) of the mystics, harmonizing it with the religiously ordained path (*sharīᶜa*). Hence, it attributed to prophets and Imāms icons of esoteric meanings, hidden spirituality, and spiritual gnosis; supposedly only through assistance of a religious master and a hermeneutic phenomenology (*ta'wīl).* God as manifested to men can be discovered by the faithful.

Recent works on Shīᶜa texts by Wilferd Madlung and others point to another dimension of the theological doctrines of the Shīᶜa sects. Early Shīᶜa theologians like Muḥammad b. al–Nuᶜmān and

Hishām b. al–Ḥakam (d. 795–6), held that God is immanent in space after He created space; they rejected the Sunnī position that God knows all event from eternity for two reasons: first, if events were known from eternity, they would be determined, men would not be responsible for their acts and God would not be free to effect them; second, events that have not been yet realized are non–existent phenomena, and only actual existents can be objects of knowledge. Al–Nuᶜmān's solution was that God's knowledge of entities is concomitant with His willing and creating them but not prior to their actualization. Some early Imāmī thinkers, following Imām Jaᶜfar al–Ṣādiq's (d. 765) doctrine of God's will (*bada'*), went so far as asserting that since untreated events are not known by God, God's attributes such as His will (*bada'*) are capable of changing as reactions to new situations. The major aim of these thinkers was to preserve man's responsibility for his acts in the light of Divine justice and providence. Other minor variations from the Sunnī include: the principles of *taqīya* as a practical defense of dissimulation—to hide one's religion in order to avoid danger and for the persistence of the faithful in a hostile environment, and the allowance of *mutᶜah*, a temporary marriage specified for a fixed period of time. Variations among the Shīᶜa exists, as for example, the Ismāᶜīlīs , who take Ismāᶜīl (d. 754), a son of Imām Jaᶜfar al–Ṣādiq (d. 765), to be the appropriate Imām, not Mūsā al–Kāẓim (d. 799). The Ismāᶜīlī have evolved a sophisticated Neoplatonic type of theology with emphasis on the following concepts: the Neoplatonic theory of emanation; a distinction between the external (*ẓāhir*) dimension of religion and the esoteric inner (*bāṭin)* doctrine; and combining philosophy, religion, and science in an integrated perspective depicting an eschatology of being, from Adam to the present Ismāᶜīlī leaders.

The Principle of Tolerance.

Muslims consider themselves the continuation of other Abrahamian religions which embrace the Jews and the Christians, Moses and Jesus also being the prophets of Muslims. Thus Islam tolerates co–existence with those who are called the people of the [holy] book, i.e. the Jews and the Christians and with other monotheists such as the Magus, even though the Jews and the Christians supposedly had altered their sacred books (5: 15).

> O people of the Book, Our apostle has come ot you, announcing many things of the Scriptures that you have suppressed, passing over some others. To you has come light and a clear Book from God.

Later, Zoroastrians were included in the latter group. This principle has very important political and social implications. It implies that an Islamic state should protect such minority non–Muslims as citizens, they are free to worship their religions and do not need to be converted to Islam, and Muslims are allowed to communicate with them. Moreover, Muslims can relate peacefully with other non–Muslims and to mingle in non–Muslim societies without the necessity of either feeling that they are in "exile," or that they have an obligation to subvert non–Muslim monotheist society and transfer it to a Muslims state. In fact Muslim men can marry women of other monotheistic creeds.

II. The Content of Technical Theology.

Theoretical theological controversies in Islam, focus on: (i) The analytic of the concept of God; (ii) the ontological and the cosmological proofs of God's existence; (iii) the cosmology of the relationship between God and the world; (iv) the ethics of the theodicy of God's order with respect to free will; determinism,

fate, good, evil, punishment and reward; (v) the pragmatics of the language of religions, and the peculiar function of the faculty of imagination special to the prophet, mystics and to the prophet–statesmen; (vi) the relationship between 'reason' and 'revelation'; and finally (vii) the politics of the application of Divine rule to the community. Hundreds of texts have been devoted to different perspectives on these topics. Only paradigm cases of Muslim contributions to theology are outlined in the following precis.

(i) According to standard Muslim theology, God is absolute, unique, is neither begotten, nor begets as Christianity claims (112:1–4).

Say: "He is God the one the most unique,
God the immanently indispensable.
He has begotten no one, and is begotten of none.
There is no one comparable to him."

As a total unity all the divine predicates of God, e.g. power, wisdom, love, etc. are logically implied from His essence; as a self–dependent entity, God necessarily exists. God is transcendent from the world which means that it is logically possible that the world does not exist while God exists; thus the world has no (necessary) effect on God. But God, due to His Grace, is immanent in the sense that no dimension of the world or human experience is outside God's direct decree (2: 115)

To God belong the East and the West. Wherever you turn the glory of God is everywhere: All-pervading is He and all-knowing.

Highlights of the History of Formal Theology.

Islamic theology began immediately during the reign of the last two Caliphs. Salient features of the tradition are outlined in this section.

(1) *Khawārij* (the secessionists). Initially, this group first followed ᶜAlī but then when he allowed an arbitration between him and Muᶜawīyah in 657 at Ṣiffīn, they protested and "went out" of the party of ᶜAlī. The khawārij rejected the Sunnī view that the ruler must belong to the Quraysh family as well as the Shīᶜa claim that he must be a descendent of the prophet. Instead, they held that "right action" as well as "faith" are the only essential attributes of a true Muslim. In this tenor, they viewed themselves as an egalitarian, virtuous authority of Islam, who call for Jihād and try to kill whomever they consider to be sinful. The extensive practice of this dictum finally led to their extinction with the exception of the Ibāḍīs, the followers of Abad Allah ibn Ibāḍ who established states in Oman and North Africa. Subsequently, many Muslims followed the pragmatic program of Murjitites which left the judgment of the sinner to God.

(2) *Muᶜtazila* are a group of theologians who choose a "middle position" on the question of whether or not those who are Muslim by faith but commit sin are still Muslims. In addition, this group, supposedly initiated by Wāṣil b. ᶜAtā' (d. 748), a student of al–Ashᶜarī, held that in spite of some Qur'anic passages which might question God's justice (for example Qur'an 32:13-14),

> Had We intended We could have given every soul its guidance; but inevitable is My word that I will fill up hell with men and jinns together.
>
> So now suffer. As you forgot the meeting of this your Day of Doom, so have We forgotten you. Now taste the everlasting punishment for your deeds.

God is basically just and furthermore, that He is a mere Unity, an Essence, without an eternal power of speech. An interesting corollary of these assumptions is that the Qur'an is created in time and is not eternal. The promises for both rewards and punishments are fulfilled on the judgment day (*qīyāmat*). For them good and evil are not irrational or blind by–products of fate as part of a

deterministic theodicy applied to man. In contrast, a person has free will, can construe a rational depiction for both good and evil , and thus is responsible for his/her acts. Human reason harmonizes with revelation. Consequently, they were among the first Muslims who upheld a rationalistic ethics in theological disputes.

3) *Asha^{c}rites*. Representing a school of classical Sunni thought, led by Abu al–Ḥasan al–Asha^{c}rī (d. 935) was one of the pioneers of "occasionalism" which depicts the world as a series of occasions which are effects of God's will. This view has several important theological implications. First, against the Mu^{c}tazila, Al–Ash^{c}arī rejects rationalist ethics and held that man is incapable of understanding the logic of both good and evil as these are derived from God. God relates to the world due to His generosity. Second, occasionalism overcomes the need of explaining interaction between mind (a non spatial mental entity) and body (an extended physical substance). This problem invalidates the dualistic mind–body ontology of the French mathematician and philosopher Rene Descartes (1596–1650); as expected, one solution offered was the occasionalism of another French philosopher Nicolas de Malbranche (1638–1715) which is similar to al–Ash^{c}ari's doctrine. This view holds that there is no interaction between mind and body since every event is directly caused by God following His definition. Third, occasionalism solves the problem of a need to epistemically justify, for example, existence of unobserved contingent causal laws between various events. Abu Ḥamīd al–Ghazālī Ṭūsī (1058–1111) developed this type of al–Ash^{c}arī's doctrine which rejects philosophers' claim to justify causal inferences. Later in Europe, David Hume (1771–1776) presented the same objection to shake the foundation of the philosophical theology of continental rationalists.

Concerning proof of God's existence al–Ash^{c}arī held that God is The Necessary Existent, because a series of contingent existents for their actualization need one member to be necessary; otherwise a vicious infinite regress is implied. God as a creature of temporal

entity, must be atemporal and unchanging; otherwise He would have been temporally produced and thus not be God. God must be a unity, for if there were multiple Gods, there would be a possibility of conflict of will among God(s) and (a) God would not be the cause of the set of contingents due to the single will. God is alive, omnipotent, and omniscient (2:255).

> There is no God but He, the living, eternal, self-subsisting, ever sustaining. Neither does somnolence affect Him nor sleep. To HIm belongs all that is in the heavens and the earth; and who can intercede with Him except by His leave? Known to Him is all that is present before men and what is hidden (in time past and time future), and not even a little of his knowledge can they grasp except what He will. His seat extends over heavens and the earth, and He tires not protecting them: He alone is all high and supreme.

His willing an entity implies creating the entity in question. Against the Mu[c]tazila, al-Ash[c]ari argues that God also sees and hears without an implication of either temporality, anthropomorphism, or injustice of God. The Qur'an as God's speech is eternal. When God asserts for X, "Be !" then X is created (16:40).

> Yet when We will a thing We have only to say: "Be", and it is.

If the Qur'an were created—as the Mu[c]tazila argue—then God would need to have spoken to His own speech which is absurd. God has eternal speech and eternal will and cannot do evil for the following reasons. An agent can do evil only if it transgresses its limit and the bound which is ordained for it. Since nothing limits God, God can not do evil. But it is nonsense to claim that God can do impossible tasks, for example, for Him to be a perfect God and lie at the same time. But God who produces the good is better than the good itself, in the same manner that if there were positive agents of evil, they would have been better than evil. But the evil which is created by God is for another entity and not for Himself. Faith in God implies a belief in God. If a believer sins, she/he is

simply still a believer as long as she/he believes, but is also a sinner because he/she sins. The only sins which make her/him an unbeliever, are the sins of polytheism and unbelief. God only abhors disobedience, not unintentional mistakes.

In a remark attempted to attack the Shīᶜa, Ashᶜarī notes that Abū Bakr and not ᶜAlī was the proper successor of the Prophet Muḥammad because both ᶜAlī, and al–Abbās (the uncle of Muḥammad who was also considered for the position) themselves swear allegiance to Abū Bakr. If one disagrees with this particular case when a minority accepts the majority's decision, then one would deny the entire mechanism of soundness of the consensus of the community on any matter and thus the entire communitarian basis of an Islamic society.

(4) Aḥmad Ibn Taimiyya (1262–1327), another creative Sunnī theologian, focused on criticism of not only Jews and the Christians but also of other Muslims including the philosophers, mystics, and most other theologians. He criticized the other Sunnī thinker such as al–Ashᶜarī for his denial of free will because such a view, Ibn Taimiyya claimed, negates the usefulness of religious prescriptions and dismisses religion as the foundation of ethics; man for him is a genuine agent with free will. A stronger criticism is directed towards the Muᶜtazila's identification of God with His essence; this maxim negates the most significant dimension of religious experience, which is the personal aspiration of the relation of love between God and persons.

Emphasizing devotional theology, Ibn Taimiyya is skeptical about the use of rational theology for the believer. Like Judaism and Christianity, Islam for him is primarily a prophetic religion with emphases on revelation to guide mankind; the method of natural religion or natural theology which sets human reason as the source of truth is totally mistaken in religious contexts. Even though scientific empiricism is applicable to visible particular entities, hidden truths of religions are to be studied only through the medium of revelation as well as performance of supererogatory

acts. Ordinary language, understood by members of a community of the faithful is sufficient for religion, whereas the technical language of the philosopher, which gives the appearance of coherence and exactness, is in fact infested with ambiguities in its premises and confusion in its deductions. This becomes evident when we consider the notion of God. Ibn Taimiyya held that God is absolutely eternal, self caused, as He is the efficient cause of the world and the only source of moral command for persons. There is no knowledge of God as He is revealed to us except God's revelations; at best, we should focus on textual exegesis of God's revelation. The peripatetic philosophers, using logical and causal analyses, mistakenly treat God as an impersonal principal, who has not created the world and has no knowledge of the particulars. These doctrines flatly contradict the only source of truth we have, that is, the revelations.

In addition, philosophical methodology, restricted to logic, that is, clarification of concepts and valid education of arguments is inapplicable to theology for the following reasons. Conceptual analyses and definitions at best are merely formal and syntactical constructions of the belief of the logicians and as definitions qua definitions have no informative or factual contents; in the same manner deductions are useless for facts. Valid deductive schema are of logical forms; they indulge in the game of manipulation of universal and abstract concepts, without any specific existential import for the actual world which consists of God and particular existents. With regard to contents, philosophical concepts like body or the categories do not apply to God, which is the most important entity. Thus its methods are blind and its contents are empty.

Moreover philosophers' own arguments are not even internally valid, for they commit category mistakes of attributing properties exclusive for one type of entity to another entity. For example, take Neoplatonic doctrine of emanation being forged into monotheistic cosmogony. Emanation implies change, that is, emanation of the First Intelligence from the One Who thinks of Itself; this model

implies a change in The One. By contrast, the God of monotheism does not change. Here philosophers mistake categories of temporal processes for a transcendent atemporal entity. In fact philosophers are worse than the Jews and the Christians; at least, the latter believe in the basics of monotheistic creation. He extends his criticism to the theoreticians of sufism such as ibn ᶜArabī who teach monistic mysticism; they are especially guilty as they write against the absolute transcendence of God. For example, ibn ᶜArab ī places universals in God, which implies that God's perfection needs the concretion of the universals. Thus he, and other theoreticians of mysticism emphasizing similarity, mistakenly identify God, who is perfect, transcendent, and totally dissimilar, to the created, either in the realm of total nature or with the mind dependent phenomena of human's existential intentional experiences. An example of this non–sense is the doctrine of mystical union either in its sense of connection or incarnation of God. It presupposes a possibility that man on his own effort can relate to God. Moreover, mystics like ibn ᶜArabī, commit another grave mistake. They magnify the significance of their supposedly "mystical insights," and "naturalize" what belongs only to the prophet, whose authority lies in revelation and not in mystical insights. This spiritualization of a psychological phenomenon is wrong, both logically and morally. The depiction of unity of being violates the total independence of God from the universe sacrificing God's transcendence at the expense of His immanence. Practically the monistic mystics are more dangerous than the philosophers. After all who reads the philosophers? A few self–glorifying or confused intellects. Mysticism on the other hand appeals to the masses who either cannot understand the dry arguments of the philosophers or are bored with such nonsense. Mysticism, due to its mass appeal. should be controlled and censored.

Ibn Taimiyya proceeds to criticize the Shīᶜa; he considers them to be like the Jews who claim the special status for themselves, since the Shīᶜa indulge in the myth of the uniqueness of the Imām,

his infallibility, his special tie with God, a position which ibn Taimiyya assigns only to the prophet (5:20, 9:30–31). In addition, their construction of shrines and lack of defense of Islam from non–Muslims point to their folly. Christians are accused of the same folly in their belief in the Trinity, modification of the Bible and anti–monotheistic practices. In sum, ibn Taimiyya stands as a tower of defender of extreme orthodoxy in Sunni Islam, and a pillar of conservative theology.

Philosophical Theology.

Islamic theology extends beyond the traditional theological schools to both Islamic philosophers and mystics for several reasons. Firstly, often, it is difficult to separate the theologian from the philosopher. Many Muslims such as Abū ᶜAlī ibn Sīnā, known as Avicenna (980–1037), Naṣīr al–Dīn Ṭūṣī (1201–1274), and Shihāb al–Dīn Yaḥyā Suhrawardī (d.1191) who wrote on philosophy, also wrote on many other disciplines such as mathematics, music, linguistics, medicine or theology. Secondly, the standard Muslim philosophical texts began with definition of first philosophy, analysis of concepts, contingent existents [bodies, souls and intelligence] and finally the Necessary Existent which is God. Islamic metaphysics, i.e. *Ilāhiyāt* , means theology in the same manner that Aristotle's theology is found in book *Lambda* of his *Metaphysics* which is the prototype of all monotheistic metaphysics and theologies.

(i) Avicenna wrote about two hundred and fifty works; his works were translated into dozens of languages. Moreover, St.Thomas Aquinas, the most important Christian theologian used many of his central themes and quoted him over five hundred times. Avicenna's major contribution to medieval theology is that as the philosopher of "being," he places the study of being logically prior to the study of God. Instead of "God," Avicenna initiates his

metaphysics on "being" as the primary notion in the soul, and on the set of logical modalities (necessity, impossibility and contingency) as the primary structures of being. It follows that the realm of entities consists of impossible beings (which have no existence), contingent beings (which exist if they are caused), and finally the Necessary Being (which is the unique Necessary Existent and God). This deduction of Necessary Existent from Necessary being is the second version of the ontological argument repeated later by St. Anselm (1033–1109), René Descartes and others. Avicenna's careful cosmological depiction of God, outside of Aristotle's categorical scheme, provided a theoretical model for later monistic Sufis. If God were a substance and the only substantial changes are generation and destruction, then mystics could not depict a union or a connection between two substances, namely person and God. In this tenor, Avicenna, unlike Aristotle, holds that God is not an individual substance because a substance is a composite of a substratum and an essence; the constituents of the composite are the material causes of the composite; thus, if God were a composite, then It would not be self–caused and thus not a necessary existent. It is, instead, the beholder of the world and the ground of other existents which are contingent due to the following account.

Since The Necessary Existent is absolutely perfect (*fauq al–tamām*), It is not only the source of Itself, but the source of all other entities. Thus the world is emanated from It. Due to Its nature as the Absolute Good (*al–Khair al–Maḥḍ*), for Avicenna, Necessary Existent is not even "free" to create the world. He is the only existent which is categorically necessary; others are conditionally necessary, that is, the Necessary Existent is the ultimate cause of realization of all other existents.

In addition to the analytic features of The Necessary Existent, Avicenna reflects on moral and pragmatic dimensions of God. He explains why a union (*paiwand*) with The Necessary Existent is the highest happiness and the greatest pleasure. Physical pleasures, he

argues, like food and lust have their limits, whereas a person encounters unlimited pleasure in his spiritual search. It is in this relation that a finite being encounters not only the unlimited but her/his own remote final cause, and in a sense the essence of himself/herself. This desire for imitation (*taqlīd)* of a higher being, is an inborn cosmic love; thus the love of the Absolute Good is embedded by nature in human in her/his search for perfection.

Avicenna was careful to distinguish popular religious aspirations from other experiences of the mystics. For example, he differentiates between the religious devotee who performs the rituals of faith (as a duty), the ascetic who denies physical pleasure (in principle), and the mystic who seeks the help of the master to ascend via a process of self–realization for an ultimate mystical union with the Necessary Existent. In some passages, he does not degrade religion to a second status type of experience. For example, Avicenna alludes to an isomorphism between different types of languages, when he mentions that the common theme of the mediator figure is expressed differently, each according to a context: the sage for the mystics, Gabriel for the religious and the active intelligence for the philosopher. This analogy implies that religious language is one mode of expression of the archetypal perennial truths expressed in a medium suited to each context: mysticism, religion and philosophy.

Al–Ghazālī correctly accuses Avicenna of avoiding several problematic topics, especially the problem of resurrection of the soul. Often the philosopher notes that the reader should consult the Qur'an on this topic. In examining his cryptic "*Treatise on Destiny,*" George F. Hourani shows that Avicenna implies that hell and heaven are in fact intentional states experienced in this life based upon one's own spiritual and moral perspectives. In an attempt to solve the problem of evil, he differentiates between a primary function of an entity, for example, sunshine as the source of energy, and the secondary side effects, for example, sun burning the head of a bald man. God's will applies to the good received in

the primary function of entities; their secondary effects are necessary accidents of their own nature.

(ii) Naṣīr ad–Dīn Ṭūsī, a Shīᶜa theologian developed the refinements of Avicenna's theology in his work. Their system was challenged by al–Ghazālī in its Avicennian form; later, the existent philosophy of Ṣadr ad–Dīn Shīrāzī (d.1641) finally broke the serious influence of the peripatetic on Shīᶜa theology and established his philosophy which gives primacy to existents not to being. Without doubt, Ṭūsī is the most versatile of all Muslim thinkers. He is the author of approximately one hundred works, including commentaries on Euclid, comprehensive texts on logic, astronomy, mathematics, practical ethics, philosophy, theology, mysticism and extensive commentaries on Avicennian theodicy. He also was an official in the court of Hulagu Khan (1217–1265) and used his influence to overthrow the last Sunnī Caliph who was in Bagdād.

Ṭūsī advocated an early if not the first version of so–called "soft determinism" in accordance with the Shīᶜa Ḥadīth, that it (the world) is neither an absolute determinism (like the Ashᶜarī), or pure free will (like the Muᶜtazila). Accordingly, the universe is the best of all possible worlds, which could not have been otherwise. Every entity has an assigned "rule" in it as its "*kismet*" or "destiny". For persons, the self conscious belief in free will means that the will of the human agent is used as a factor when we explain a set of causes which collectively determine its proper effect. Persons are often ignorant of the mechanism which determine their own will and other causes; psychologically they feel that they are free or that there are accidents. In principle however, there are always laws which could have been employed to predict future events. Ṭūsī follows Avicenna in avoiding controversial topics. For example, when he notes that if God knows future events, then these events are determined and man is not free. Ṭūsī remarks that God, if omniscient, also would know what He wills and does not will in the future. Thus, whatever

answer one gives to this puzzle, it applies to God as well as to persons. As a mathematician, Ṭūsī adds refinements to the problem of infinite regress used in standard forms of cosmological arguments and arguments about possible divisions of matter into atoms. He makes a distinction between syntactical series, like natural numbers in which members are defined recursively, and series applied to concrete entities which could be named "ontic" series. In manner similar to Aristotle's acceptance of "potential" but not "actual" infinity, he labels syntactical infinity as permissible and ontic one as vicious. He uses the vicious infinite regress to prove God's existence, while rejecting the legitimacy of the concept of an actual infinite body. Like Avicenna, he notes that "matter as experienced" is open to a series of division which terminate due to our finite ability to divide indefinitely, whereas a mathematical mapping of matter, which is only a syntactic entity, can be divided indefinitely. There is no actual infinite (vicious) regress in either of these divisions. Thus the position of the atomistic theologians is totally mistaken. Ṭūsī holds that an absolute syntactical existence is a mental notion, not a reality external to mind. God, In Himself, as the Necessary Existent for him is an absolute unity from any perspective with no attribute that can be added to it. A remarkable similarity exists between his views and the theodicy of the German philosopher, mathematician Gottfried Leibniz (1646–1716) both on the topic of freewill and the impossibility of material substances.

Mystical and Devotional Theology.

An original dimension of Islamic contribution to theology is its mystical writings of philosophers as well as the works of al–Husain ibn al–Manṣūr al–Ḥallāj (d. 922) Abu Yazīd Bistāmī (d. 874), Abū Ḥamīd Al–Ghazālī, and Muḥyi al–Dīn Moḥammed ibn cAlī ibn cArabī (1165–1240). The salient features of Islamic

mystical theology includes the experiential dimension of the relation between man and God, the pragmatics of mystical symbolism, and the ethics of incarnation of the Divine. (i) God and man. Most mystics hold the doctrine of the unity of being in its devotional sense which is the antithesis of alienation. Ontologically, the entire world of existent entities is integrated as a single theophany inseparable from the Divine. Sufis appeal to the mystical passages in the Qur'an. God is thoroughly immanent in all of the world (2: 115),

> To God belong the East and the West. Wherever you turn the glory of God is everywhere: All-pervading is He and all-knowing.

including in human beings to whom God is closer than (his/her) jugular vein (50:16)

> We created man and surely know what misdoubts arise in their hearts; for We are closer to thim than his jugular vein.

All entities return to Him as their source (96:8).

> Surely your returning is to to your Lord.

Human beings were created by the very breath of God (15:29).

> And when I have fashioned him and breathed into him of My spirit, bow before him in homage.

Epistemically some like Ghazālī take the experiential phenomena to be a mere apparent shadow like reflection of the hidden Reality. Others like ibn al–ᶜArabī, depict the world in different stages or layers of Divine presence. There is no possibility of experiencing the noumenal God, i.e., God as He is in Himself. In this sense one speaks of Reality–Truth (*al–Ḥaqq*), similar to the Avicennian concept of "being", which is the very core of the primordial reality in itself. This is different from God as He is manifested to persons. Each mystic receives God as manifested in a theophanic mode of God; by knowing

herself/himself and receiving nature, he/she can have a gnosis of God as manifested. This epistemic mode is not a discursive, conscious type of knowledge such as sense perception or analytic equations, but a gnosis type of wisdom displayed by the creative imagination, shown by pragmatics of peace, and an attitude which reflects in a non–alienating perspective which is produced by the spirit of unity of being. Worship is a reception of testimony to God's immanent presence, as the mystical interpretation of "testimony" as a major pillar of Islam. Pragmatics of mystical signs and the ethics of mystical worship are another teaching of the mystics. The world being a grace of God (7:57),

> Indeed it is He who sends the winds as harbingers of auspicious news announcing His beneficence, bringing heavy clouds which We drive towards a region lying dead, and send down rain, and raise all kinds of fruits. So shall we raise the dead that you may think and reflect.

Each entity, being either a substance like a leaf, or an event like blossoming of flowers, or a light with respect to the sun, is an icon of Divine grace; the very existential experience of the mystic itself is a microcosm of the magnanimity of the Divine macrocosm. God in Himself, that is a noumenon, is not knowable, but God reveals Himself in the world relative to the perspective of each mystic. Thus, there is no ordinary mundane experience. Every sensation, every thought, every dust is a cryptic sign of the Divine and a cause for joy. Gnostic awareness of mystical theology results in an exuberant joy which according to some mystics like al–Ḥallāj and Abū Yazīd Bistāmī implied a symbolic incarnation of the Ultimate Reality associated with God.

What then is the correct language of theology? In the metaphysical poetry of Rūmī and Shabasterī, or the illuminationist metaphysics of Suhrawardī, the perennial and archetypal depiction of the Divine Grace is best expressed by the icons of an allegorical language of symbolic theology. As al–Ghazālī points out, deductive logical systems used by philosophers to rationalize

theology, fails on its logic; the proper path is an esoteric mystical devotional theology, not speculative theology. Al–Ghazālī points to this mode as a state of existential exuberance (*ḍawq)* and a state in which the person's moral and spiritual characters are subject to transformation. Intellectual understanding of abstract principles without mystical insights cannot assist the person in an encounter with the Divine. Mystical theological doctrines were extended to poetry which blended with the Muslim oral tradition that affected the entire genre of Muslim literature.

III. Recent Theological Movements.

Islam is a communitarian religion with a political agenda. Consequently, far from having a fossilized theology, it contains many mechanisms for reform, innovation and adaptation. Recent theological movements reflect on that nature of Islam in the light of modern events. These include confrontation of classical Islam with Western colonial power which was previewed in the time of the Crusaders, modern eschatology, especially military hardware, and fundamental challenges to the core of the religious law expressed in changes in family structure, dress codes, and anti–monotheistic literature and movements. Salient among these modern thinkers were: Jamāl al–Dīn As^{c}adābādī [also known as Al–Afghānī in the West] (1839–1897),

Muḥammad ^{c}Abdū (1849–1905), Muḥammad Iqbāl (1878–1938), and Moḥammed Ḥousain Ṭabātabā'ī (b.1903). The first three of the above mentioned thinkers are examples of Muslims with European education, who have first–hand experience of the western world with its science, technology, as well as its social problems. Their attitude depicts a politico–theological confrontation with the West on the basis of Islamic rationalism.

In its true classical Islamic spirit, As^{c}adābādī's theology is integrated with his political response to the challenge of European Christian civilization. Analyzing Europe's development in its historical settings, he proffers on theological grounds a pan–Islamic movement which revives the Caliphates and establishes the Islamic force as a world power. As a political realists this grand plan in reality is transferred to a call for an Islamic nationalism which stands independent of Western economic domination. He supports this program by three appeals: first, the urgency of immediate political and economic independence; second, a recognition of the ultimate superiority of Islam over other religions, as Mu^{c}tazila assert, lies in its rationality; third, the pragmatic result of a religious life includes not only the spiritual dimension of man and the special status of religious community, but also special inner qualities necessary for achieving peaceful bliss. The latter include modesty, honesty and truthfulness which frees man from the consequences of hedonism and materialism.

Like many modern reformers, As^{c}adābādī was a major organizer of a group of reform movements such as Egypt's Salafiyya and the Muslim Brotherhood. One of As^{c}adābādī's protégés was (ii) Muḥammad ^{c}Abdū, a philosopher, a scholar (*^{c}Ālim*), a Professor at Al–Azhar University, a journalist, and a Mufti (Chief Judge) who proposed large–scale social programs for long term social reform. He taught theology, the science of unity, wrote a number of works including legal opinions, for example, permitting eating of animals slaughtered by Jews and Christians, legalizing loans for interest, as well as reforms for women's rights. His theology focused on a close connection between reason and revelation. The latter according to him, was an intuitive knowledge given by God to the prophet for the education of masses and not necessarily for exegesis by a few elite. Following the Mu^{c}tazila, ^{c}Abdū felt that the Qur'an was created in time, and theology is a rational science. Also, like As^{c}adābādī, he objected to passive mysticism and invited Muslims to hold fast to the principles of

their religion while focusing on reform, and innovation of practices open to learned reexamination and modernization. Muḥammad Iqbāl considers Islam as an intellectual, moral and experiential phenomenon which places man as a dynamic instrument of God in realization of the open infinite possibilities of the world. Iqbāl held that Islamic intellectual tradition transforms Greek models of abstract knowledge into empirical investigation of concrete facts as illustrated by the Qur'an's attention to the actual specifics. True worship implies an awareness of the factual reality of concrete existents using the empiricist inductive mode of knowledge. Thus the natural knowledge of how God reveals himself in the world is compatible with the idea of a transcendent God.

The next thinker, Tabātabā'ī is the representative of an Iranian Shīᶜa Mullā, who was trained and remained in Iran. During this century, the theological schools of Qum and Meshhad have been, along with al–Azhar, the most active centers of training analytic theologians who are especially trained in the philosophy of Ṣadr al–Dīn Shīrāzī and are also trained in western classical and contemporary thought. Ṭabātabā'ī distinguishes between three Shī ᶜite perspectives; its formal [e.g. the extensional and the intentional study of], the intellectual [e.g. logical arguments on theology and cosmology]and the mystical aspects [e.g. gnosis and the method of unveiling]. A person should realize that even though the objects giving her/him non–spiritual pleasure are made for her/him, she/he is not made for them. Her/his uniqueness as a human person is to reflect on the true meaning of Islam which means a Gnostic submission to one God by imitation of the model of the paradigm sage, who is the Shīᶜa Imām, and the perfect human of all time (*insān al–kāmil*). Since this unique feature is the essence of a person, differentiating her/him from other creatures, submission to one God, that is being a Muslim, is the essence of a person. The word 'essence' is used here to signify "the cause of completion (Gr.*telos*) of an entity". The knowledge of Islam, for Ṭabātabā'ī, in accordance with Shīᶜa theology begins with the knowledge of

God [for example His Essence and theodicy], proceeds first to knowledge of the prophet, and then to the eschatological return of a person, and finally to the knowledge of the Imām. In spite of its status as a minority creed and its major locations in Iran, Pakistan and Iraq, the present schools of Shīʿa theology share a spiritual and a political power beyond its relative status as a minority Muslim religion.

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ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY

GREEK BACKGROUND: BASIC CONCEPTS OF NEOPLATONISM

Two meanings of 'Neoplatonism'.

In its primary use 'Neoplatonism' refers to the philosophy of Plotinus and later developments of his thought in his followers. The thought of Plotinus itself, however, is a development of the philosophy of Plato, and there is accordingly a secondary use of 'Neoplatonism' signifying developments of the philosophy of Plato (429-347 BC) by later pagan, Jewish, Christian, and Muslim thinkers who found an affinity between Platonism and theism and/or mysticism. These 'Neoplatonists' or "followers of Platonic philosophical tendencies" defend Platonic theses against non-Platonists, especially Aristotelians.

For the Neoplatonists, for example, in the simple sentences "John Smith is good" and "Athens is beautiful," the designata of the predicates are metaphysically prior to designata of the subjects. 'Good' and 'beauty' as forms/ideas/universals are, through their imperviousness to change and their total intelligibility, types of ultimate reality, whereas 'John Smith' and 'Athens' as concrete entities/particulars have, through their mutability, an inferior ontological status *(Phaedo* 78c-e). Sensible movables such as the bodies of particular persons may change from good to bad, but the idea/form/universal of 'The Good', that is, goodness-in-itself, is never bad. Particulars cannot be defined and are referred to only through their universal predicates; scientific laws are universal generalizations about forms. Consequently, particulars derive their epistemic and ontic status from eternal and immutable universals. In contrast, Aristotelians held that the designata of the subjects in

the above sentences are "first substances" which are prior to the designata of the predicates "good" and "beautiful," which refer to accidents *(Categories* 5. 2a34-2b6). Accidents are such realities as quality, quantity, relation *(Categories* 4), and they depend on substances in order to exist. An accident like blue, for example, is realized only by the mediacy of a concrete entity, such as a blue flower.

The metaphysical debate focuses on two controversies. In Christian circles the so-called problem of universals investigates the status of ideas/forms/universals. Are they real in themselves, mere names of a group of particulars, or mind-dependent? Platonists take the so-called realist position, attributing independent existence to universals. In contrast to the conceptualists, Platonist hold universals to be independent of mind. Against the nominalists, Platonists hold that universals are not mere names of particulars and do not depend on particulars for their realization.

Another controversy, over the so-called "essence-existence" distinction, was popular among Jews, Muslims, and those Christians like Aquinas who were influenced by them. The question concerns the priority of one of the two aspects of existing things. For example, in the case of the particular man Socrates, which is prior, his essence or his existence? The first aspect is found in the answer to the question "What is Socrates?" By his essence he is a man, a human being. The second aspect focuses on the fact that Socrates exists. Platonists obviously hold that essences, being universals, are metaphysically and epistemically prior to particulars.

In epistemology Plato made a sharp distinction between the agent's subjective, phenomenological, states of belief which may be false, and knowledge which is objectively true. Platonists postulated a continuum of epistemic warrentedness from its lowest from of sensory imagination to opinion about bodies, deductive knowledge of axiomatic systems like numbers, dialectical

recognition of forms like humanity and finally direct intuition of the Form of the Good *(Republic* 6. 509-511). The latter was often associated with the God of monotheism or the One of the mystics.

Platonists rejected ethical and aesthetic relativism and held that The Good, and The Beautiful are forms and causes of goodness and beauty in particulars.

Finally later Platonic theists place the eternal truths of religious scriptures in the mind of God instead of making them either co-eternal with God or derivations from God. Similarly, there is an integration of Plato's "philosopher-king" with the prophet of monotheism, depicted as the perfect man, and the ideal ruler for the religious community, who by a prophetic imagination receives the first principle for the politics of the good state. These doctrines are the prominent themes of many later philosophers, such as Philo Judaeus (fl. 20 B.C.-A.D. 40); Plotinus (205-270 A.D.) and the school of Alexandria; Iamblichus (d. 327-337 A.D.) and the Syriac school; and Plutarch (50-120 A.D) of Athens, who inherited Plato's academy. In the medieval period many Christian thinkers such as Augustine (354-430), Marius Victorinus (c. 300 A.D.), and Boethius (480-524) are strongly influenced by Plato. Many Muslim philosophers embrace Platonic themes. Among these are Shehab ad-Din Suhrawardi (d. 1191) and Aziz ad-Din Nasafi (d. 1141).

In its primary sense, 'Neoplatonism', refers to the doctrines found in Plotinus' cryptic and condensed lecture notes collected by Porphyry, called *The Enneads*. The theses in this work were developed by followers such as Porphyry (A.D. 232/3-c. 305), Proclus (A.D. 401/412-485), and Iamblichus. While much of the technical arguments of Neoplatonism are known only to specialists, one of the most important themes of Neoplatonism, the theory of emanation and return, is widely appreciated outside philosophical circles. This theory holds that the entire universe is an emanation from an ultimate entity named "The One" and persons can ascend towards a union with The One in a state of "no

otherness." It is easy to understand why medievalists rejected Aristotle's theory of the co-eternity of God and the world, because for them God was the creator. It is however surprising why medievalists accept the Neoplatonic theory of emanation and try to harmonize it with the doctrine of creation found in the Bible and the Qur'an, with which it is in fact not compatible.

Careful examination reveals that emanation and return is compatible with the doctrine of the unity of being which is the essential core of the Jewish Kabbalah, Christian mysticism, and Islamic sufism. In mystical union, there is no alienation between persons and God. Consequently Neoplatonic themes were the essential core of mystical dimension of medieval philosophy, and its anti-substance theory became the ontological framework of the systems of many later metaphysicians who had mystical tendencies.

Summary of Fundamental Themes.

No summary of Neoplatonism can do justice to various readings of the same passages, decipher the prima facie contrary positions asserted in the same text, or translate its cryptic technical vocabulary into a readable prose. Consequently, only a reading of its most salient features is presented here. Its fundamental doctrines include the following theses. (i) The One is most important entity in the system, a non-physical pure simplicity, not a limited existent. It emanates the first complex entity, The First Intelligence which by a rational principle, a *logos,* emanates The Soul. The lower reflection of the Soul emanates and is the sensible material world which is in time. Theorizing thoughts, willing options, actings, and makings are either the same process or are different perspectives of the same primary emanations. (ii) The eschatological order is not only ontic but also moral. Moral principles includes controlling bodies, an ultimate ascetic aversion

to them; the higher dimension of the soul seeks freedom through contemplation of and no otherness with The One.

A pedagogically helpful but literally incorrect analogy may be used to distinguish Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus. In Plato's system, reality is like a horizon, a line separating the sky (representing the realm of the intelligible forms) from the earth (which stands for concrete entities). For Aristotle the ultimate realities are individual substances, well exemplified by the plants and animals of the physical world. These are generated or corrupted but never blend with one another. For Plotinus three analogies illustrate the specifics of his system. First, matter is analogous to a mirror and differentiation in material constituents is like images in the mirror, deriving their reality from their source which is the incorporeal soul. Second, The One is analogous to a non-physical sun from which, without being affected, there are increasing lesser reflections or rays, while from each ray there is a lesser reflection—The Intelligence, The Soul and the sensible images [V.3, 12]. Third, The One is analogous to an eternal source, an overflowing spring of water, which, although having no origin, is nevertheless the source of everything else. From it emanate rivers which flow in different directions [III.8,10,5-11].

Metaphysics: The Primary Hypostasis of The One, The Intelligence and The Soul; Production of Matter as Reflection of The Soul. Metaphysics, for the ancients and medievals investigates questions of being, causality, priority, and universality, questions which lead the metaphysician to go beyond the limits of sensible bodies. Metaphysics involved the classification of beings. In Plato the primary division of being was according to "the greatest kinds," while in Aristotle, the Stoics and the entire medieval Jewish, Christian, and Islamic tradition—following Aristotle—it was according to the categories or "highest predicates." A continuous controversy questions whether categories are only logical instruments or are ontological structures. Neoplatonists differ on this view. Plotinus takes them to

be purely ontological structures, while Proclus takes them as logical instruments. Following Plato *(Sophist* 254D-257A), Plotinus explicitly postulates five ontological greatest genera: Being, Rest, Motion, Same, and Other. But in fact the most important division of reality for him contains The One and the separation of reality into the Intelligible and Sensible realms. For Aristotle the categories include substance (both primary and secondary) and the nine accidents: quantity, quality, relation, place, time, posture, possession, action and passion. For the Stoics they are subject or substratum, quality, state, and relation. Plotinus, choosing an ontological reading of Aristotle's categories holds that Aristotle's application of the same category of substance to both realms is absurd as there is no place in the Aristotelian categories for the Intelligible. He also criticizes other categories. For example, relation he asserts, is not a logical sign but the states of relation are rational principles [VI. 1.,9, 7-10]. Aristotelian categories can be either reduced to one or are combinations of several others which can be applied to the world of senses. In a similar manner, Plotinus rejects the Stoic doctrine of the four categories of subject or substratum, quality, state, and relation by two arguments. First, he holds that the Stoics hold the categories to be subsumed under a super genus of "being an entity or something" which includes both incorporeal as well as corporeal beings. He finds this mixture unacceptable, for both existents and non-existents are classified under the same name [VI.1, 25, 6-12]. Moreover he holds that the first two categories for the Stoics are basically material entities—which cannot pose as the fundamental categories of being—and dismisses the other two categories.

Plotinus needs to reject not only categories but two principles which follow from them. The first core of Aristotle's view, what he calls the first substance, or a concrete particular, is the basis of realization of all entities. Simply stated, an accident like the quality red is not an eternal form existing in itself, but is realized by the mediacy of an apple that is a red apple. Unless there is this apple,

this redness does not exist. This procedure places the sensible entities as the ground of realization of the universals, turning the Neoplatonic system on its head.

Another principle following from the doctrine of the categories which Plotinus needs to reject is the position that the only type of substantial changes is generation and destruction; no substance can blend or be united with another substance. In contrast, for Plotinus' metaphysics of processes, entities descend from The One and also ascend towards The One. Here we have a genuine process metaphysics which allows immanence of The One in the world and a mystical union in which there is no otherness between the Soul and The One. In Aristotle's system, such a corresponding reference to a union between the human soul and the Prime Mover would be absurd. This is why the medieval mystics rejected Aristotle's system and embraced the metaphysics of processes of emanation and return which they found in the Neoplatonists.

It should be noted that Plotinus uses the expression 'one' in the following two sense: The One which is beyond being, and the one which is a unity predicated of each individual form [VI.6, 5,35]. While the entire cosmos is emanated from The One in the first sense, the one in the second sense is prior to all individuals and prior to numbers [VI.6, 9, 11] . In the same manner that the Platonic Form of the Good is the source of other Forms, the One, as the first of three hypostases—that is realities—emanates the other two, that is The Intelligence and The Soul. Unlike the Platonic Form of the Good, The One of Plotinus is not a form, nor an individual existent like a conscious God or an apple. As The First, It cannot be a being. It is beyond existence; It is omnipresent in every entity as its ultimate cause, both as the efficient cause and the final cause, which for him is the cause of completion or perfection. Nothing is good for the One. It is not even good for Itself, but It is a good to others [VI.9,6, 38-41]. It does not think in the sense that an entity thinks of another entity, because for The One there is no otherness. Unlike the God of monotheism,

Plotinus' One does love itself but not its product because love implies need [V.5,12,40-49].

The One emanates The Intelligence, which is analogous to Plato's realm of forms. Sometimes this emanation is referred to as the one turning to itself, even though as a simplicity The One cannot be the object of any knowledge. The Intelligence contains an infinity since it is a multiple unity and emanates The Soul [VI.7,14,1]. There are different senses of the term 'soul'. In one sense, there is The (World) Soul, as Cosmos is an entity in itself [IV.8, 6, 7]. In another sense, there are individual souls of celestial and earthly bodies. Each individual soul has two layers, that which recollects its upward origin and that which reflects lower in its sensible images. Matter itself is a reflection of the soul in its lowermost form. In the soul, multiplicity pervades over simplicity. But all souls communicate by non-sensory means and thus integrate into one soul. Plotinus holds to the incorporeality, substantiality, and immortality of souls as well as to the reincarnation of souls passing from one body to the other [III.4,15, 2]. For Plotinus the world of actual existents is identical with the world of cognitive knowledge of The Intelligence *(nous)*. As an imitation of the world of true being, the sensible world is beautiful and is the best possible realm of existent matter—a mirror of reality. The basic procession of order of being is by an involuntary and overflowing type of emanation which embeds the agent in the patient without affecting the agent. There is a set of *logoi* or intellectual principles, by which an entity emanates the next level without modification of itself as itself. Production of an entity is the result of knowledge by prior contemplation of true realities. In the case of emanation of The Soul from the Intelligence, the rational formative principle flows from The Intelligence [III.2, 19]. Plotinus notes the soul's desire to govern as well as its will for isolation. Even in its embodiment the soul in a sense is in the celestial realm. But souls as a consequence of their separation are morally different from one another [III.2,18,1].

Matter emanates from the soul because of the soul's desire to belong to itself. But matter-qua-matter as pure potentiality is unknowable and indeterminate. same manner Rumi refers to the God-Ultimate Being as the light of reality (*nūr-i ḥaqq*), which has no opposite (ḍīd) and thus cannot be known by the process of contrast and negation. (*Mathnawī*, 1133.) In one poem he asserts that "The Light" is that God, whose particles, i.e., the forms and laws of the order of nature, move in ecstasy without having a material ingredient (*Shams*, 5444). In another poem he invites the mystic to join in the ecstasy of dance with the light of intelligence, i.e., the active intelligible. It is remarkable that in Islamic mysticism the disciple seeks to identify himself with "Ḥaqq" as in the celebrated case of Hallāj, who asserted, "I am Ḥaqq." Heidegger's insight into the phenomenological dimensions of the Platonic dialectics is corroborated by the extensive use of light analogy in Plato, Plotinus, and the Islamic mystics. In all three systems the Ultimate Being is associated with the Sun. In the allegory of the cave, the ontic levels of ascent correspond to the process of illumination. In the us was not intere: ed in any political theory, and his concept of the mediator figure was not a political leader but an ascetic sage. Islamic tradition does not uphold pure asceticism as a positive program, since monasticism is prohibited in the Muslim religion. There is a remarkable difference between the ascetic life of Plotinus and the lustful, socially active life revealed in Ibn Sīnā's autobiography. Obviously in Plato there is a prominent message that philosophizing takes place in the context of that living thing from which all goodness, order and happiness comes. How can one ask of the nature of the pleasure of the intelligence is when it receives the First Truth, and that Truth from which all beauty, order and glory result?

The similarity of the three systems in question is remarkable in the light of the passage of seven centuries between Plato and Ibn Sina. The similarity extends beyond the last stage of

self-realization to the specifics of the process of dialectics, as follows: constituents. Beauty is due to participation in an immaterial form or principle which integrates it into a unity [I, 6, 15-20]. But beauty applies to immaterial entities too, such as beautiful ways of life, well-ordered characters and virtuous activities. Ugliness in the soul is due to its mixture and inclinations towards matter. Thus, true self-control and courage of the soul is its avoidance of bodily pleasure and lack of fear of death. In this manner the soul is purified, becomes a form, bodiless, belongs to the divine and becomes Godlike. Unlike Plato, Plotinus holds that The Primary Beauty is formless [VI.7,33,37- 38]. But Beauty is not ultimate, for the love of the Good is free from the violent passion associated with Beauty. The final goal is to assimilate one with the Good, as infinite love demands infinite object [VI.732.24-29]. Bodies hinder communication of other bodies but this is not true of incorporeal beings, which are hindered only from communication with other beings by otherness and difference. Thus the state of our encounter with The One implies that in such a state we are no longer soulless and have no otherness [VI.9, 8,30-40].

Ethics and Theodicy: Providence, Fate, Love, and Happiness. Events in the world cannot be attributed to mere chance and accidents. Because the Universe is produced by the Intelligence, it has an intelligent order. Moreover, every existent in the universe is a necessity and according to the world order which is just and wise [III.2,12,13]. Thus if any part seems imperfect when viewed in itself, in the larger macrocosm that part, because of the exact way that it is, contributes to the cosmos being the best of all possible composites [III..2 3]. Providence exists only if there are other entities; otherwise it would have no field of action. Consequently existence of imperfect entities are necessary because of the existence of the Good. Evil is necessary because it is falling short of the Good. [III.2 5 [27]]. In addition to evil, inferior beings like animals still lie inside of the natural plan [VI.7, 7,1]. Sense experiences, too, are less noble than contemplation, but the soul

and its works are in harmony with each other and a unity emerges out of the opposites. Thus, even though providence does not directly produce evil, it takes it into account—along with chance circumstances—in the light of the universal order. Thus neither moral nor wicked acts are caused by providence, but they are realized according to providence [III.3,5,50]. Plotinus mentions the absurdity of someone censoring a play because not all its characters are heroes. What happens to the play if the inferior characters are eliminated [III.2, 11]? It is indeed, the author of the play who assigns roles to characters, but this assignment is partially due the fact that the role of good or evil is applicable to particular persons. In this sense they are responsible for their acts. In this universe the punishment of the wrongdoers is the corruption of their soul.

But the Soul can be our salvation. Plotinus notes that the knowledge of the One by the soul is proximate by its attempted union with the One, which is an ecstasy, a flight of the alone to the alone. This kind of knowledge has pragmatic use. as only reasonable souls can be free. The person who is able to contemplate, is a knower and takes part in the process of production (V,8,7,33-35). There is an upward contemplation, where contemplation ascends from nature to the soul, and then its Intelligence; in this mode the contemplation becomes united to the contemplators [III.8, 8, 1]. This follows the nature of the Intelligence in which the object and the subject of knowledge are related. Our goal is contemplation since in its ascent it is unlimited [III.8, 5, 30]. Moreover all actions aim at contemplation since the agent is motivated by contemplating the result of actions in his mind [III.8, 6, III.8,7 18-22]. Each person is primarily a soul using a body [VI.7, 5, 10]. By love too, the individual soul, has a possibility of uniting with a higher realm. Each individual soul has a love which in its noble state implants the desire appropriate to the individual soul in question [III.5, 4,5], as well as a longing of the Soul towards pure beauty [III.5,5, 14]. Since all souls are related,

so the love of individual souls is not cut off from the love of the Universal soul, but is in fact included in it and leads it to the Good.

But Plotinus is not against the body as body is, in a way, the result of the contemplation of the soul and thus one must attend to bodily needs and constructively discipline the body [I.4,4, 25-30, 16. 13-29; I.4, 14]. The pain of the body does not affect the noble part of the contemplative soul [I.4. 13. 5-12; III.2, 15. 47-62]. But the happy sage regards his body like a musical instrument to which he tends and cares; but he gives up the body gracefully at death in the same spirit of a musician who is ready to give up his lyre which was useful to him while he was playing music [I.4, 16, 13-29].

But there is a limit in the significance of body for the good life. Following Plato, Plotinus rejects hedonism and states that the Good is desirable because it is good; It is not good because it is desirable [VI.7, 25, 20]. A mark of the good is self-sufficiency and pleasure is not self-sufficient, because one is not satisfied with the same thing but always desires something different. The ethical doctrine here is related to Plotinus' aesthetics, as he notes that The Good has no need of beauty whereas beauty is in need of The Good [V.5, 12]. Moreover good presupposes actuality and truth, whereas with physical pleasure one is often pleased by expectation of a pleasure like eating or sex, even when such an expectation is not realized. In fact one can reasonably say that even if no pleasure should follow from it, the good should still be chosen. Ultimately salvation is achieved when the higher dimension of the soul turns its attention away from worldly affairs towards the Intelligence in order to restore its divine image [I.2, 3]. This is done by attempting to train the lower soul voluntarily to accept the dictum of reason and then to withdraw one's attention from it [IV.3,32 6-18]. Even though dialectical training in philosophy is an essential beginning of this journey, ultimately the aim is an encounter as a person "sees" the Intelligence as if it were an object of sense [VI.9.5, 12-13]. In this path we should turn to The One which is our primordial origin and source [VI.9,7. 33-4]. The mode is a union through love with our transcendent source [VI.9,9,26]. Salvation is

within our power and requires self-discipline [I.6, 9 ,22-5]. Since not all parts of the soul have descended into the lower realm, the upper part is able to have the intellect which is concatenated with action. To know something is to act according to the necessity of its truth and to give up the choice provided by the passionate part of the lower soul. Consequently only by contemplation of the recognition of the primordial origin of ourselves in The One, do we know and act towards surrendering our otherness for It. Here freedom exists in the context of the knowledge of the necessity of action, not in the conscious willed ignorance of desires affected by passions which blind us to our original affinity with The One. The question of happiness follows isomorphically the Plotinian doctrine of freedom. True happiness cannot be material pleasure, as we share this type of experience with animals or even plants [I.4,2,22-31]. Thus happiness must be related to our higher soul whose pleasures deal with the intelligible. In order to be happy, one must accomplish two tasks: first, separate his interest from sensible pleasures so he can focus on the atemporal sense of happiness available only to his higher soul, and, second, awaken to and become aware of The One which is the primordial origin of his existence [I.5,7,2,27].

Influences.

Through its doctrine of emanation and return, the core of Neoplatonic metaphysics became the framework of a significant portion of the medieval mystical traditions in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. The other core of Neoplatonism is the replacement of the Aristotelian substance-event language by a metaphysics of processes. A majority of nin teenth-and twentieth-century philosophers such as Hegel, Bergson, Whitehead, and Dewey adopted processes over substances as the ultimate category of being. Even though few of these philosophers would consider himself indebted to Neoplatonism, its perennial message of the

Unity of Being, with its structure of processes and its recognition of an affinity between the ephemeral and the eternal, left a final imprint on most subsequent philosophy.

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ONTOLOGY: GREEK SOURCES OF SOME ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHIES OF BEING AND EXISTENCE

INTRODUCTION

This essay attempts to answer the following two interrelated questions: How are being and existence viewed in Islamic philosophy?[1] And what can we learn about ontology from the Islamic philosophies of being and existence?[2] In the course of examining these questions we shall develop theses which are in part historical and in part systematic. The historical findings are: (*a*) that three problems embedded in the Neoplatonized versions of Aristotelian texts, which enlarged Aristotle's notion of being and existence, played a decisive role in the Islamic perspectives on being and existence; and (*b*) that three distinct philosophies of being and existence can be found in Persian and Arabic texts, many of which have hitherto been unavailable in English. Our systematic findings are: (*c*) that an important issue of ontology is or should be the depiction of a satisfactory relation between what might be designated as "the ultimate being" and "persons"; (*d*) that no Aristotelian categorical language in which the notion of "substance" is considered primitive (in the Carnapian[3] sense of "primitive") can adequately explain the ontological problem formulated in (*c*); and finally (*e*) that, instead of limiting its analysis to those issues which can be easily expressed in a clear language or in the exact languages of the physical sciences or mathematics, ontology should use the best available language to depict significant problems. In the case of being and existence, we wish to show how the Arabic and Persian equivalents are used to

clarify the relationship between two perennial questions of both Western and Islamic philosophies: What is the nature of an individual existent? How can we talk about the ultimate being and depict a satisfactory relation between the ultimate being and persons?

In any historical reconstruction of the philosophical issues in the Aristotelian and the Neoplatonic traditions transmitted to the Muslims, there are a number of difficulties. For example, the basic primary text devoted to the analysis of being and existence is Aristotle's *Metaphysics*; yet in the early period of Islamic philosophy there is no clear counterpart to this text, merely a work called *The Theology of Aristotle,* which was a combination of Aristotle's own writings and two other works — a *Theologia,*[4] derived from Proclus' (411-485)[5] *Elements of Theology,* and a celebrated *Liber de causis* (*Fi'l Khair al-Maḥḍ*; literally, "On the Absolute Good"),[6] a paraphrase of the last three books of Plotinus' *Enneads.* Moreover, Muslims read most of the works of Aristotle, as well as the marginal commentaries of the Neoplatonists and of other, later Greek philosophers such as Alexander Aphrodisias (ca. 250) and Themistius (d. 390).[7] Consequently, a Muslim philosopher would not only have to attempt to make sense of his Aristotelian source containing οὐσία before constructing his own philosophy of being and existence, but also have to come to terms with Plotinus' and Proclus' doctrine of "the One" and Plato's "Form of the Good." Difficulties of analyzing the transmission of vocabulary and the extent of the Muslim philosopher's involvement with the various theological and ontological aspects of the matter at hand have forced us to be selective in this essay and have dictated our choice of the following three problems, which not only are of importance for contemporary ontology but display aspects of being and existence philosophically significant for Muslim thinkers.

The first problem involves the legitimate scope of "ontology." In what sense can ontology investigate entities other than "first

substances" and "their accidents"? Can it investigate, for example, possible unactualized or impossible entities? Should the entire realm of "reality," which may or may not extend beyond Aristotle's nature (φύσις) be regarded as an individual or a closed "entity" ? In passing, we note that Neoplatonic treatments of Aristotle's texts and, Neoplatonic doctrines provided the Near Easterners such as ibn Sīnā with a concept of an "ultimate being" type of entity which went beyond the Aristotelian concept of the prime mover and the entire Aristotelian φύσις.

The second question concerns the ontological implications of the predication of species. The historical roots of this problem lie in Porphyry's (232-270) addition of species (εἶδος) to Aristotle's account of the four predicables (genus, property, definition, and accident) in the *Topics.* Now, if one predicates over "species," then its designatum *species* is named as the subject of a sentence. Because first substances or "individuals" were usually named by subjects of sentences, predication over species led some philosophers to regard the *Topics* of Aristotle (in spite f its anti-Platonic features, e.g.,113A24-32, 148A14-22) as a sc ırce of a Platonic theory of universals.[8] The predication over species brings us to the issue of determining the ontological implications of using a certain kind of language. The modern version of this issue is well known and deals with the controversy over the possible implications of certain conditions governing the quantification of signs of levels higher than zero.[9] Older historical scholarship concerned itself with such problems as how Porphyry's *Isagoge*[10] reflected a misunderstanding of Aristotle and gave birth to the world of universals, the nominalists' rejection of this realm of entities notwithstanding. Porphyry's formulation had two specific features: (*a*) the statement of the problem of universals in terms of "thing-universals" and (*b*) the inclusion of spc :ies as a predicable. It will become clear, in the course of this essay, how in Islamic Philosophy Ṭūsī's[11] reaction was a representative clarification of the problem, recently reformulated by M. K. Munitz,[12] who draws

a distinction between "syntactic" and "ontologic" senses of predication. As is to be expected, Ṭūsī does not treat the crucial problem of "semantic" predication in a satisfactory manner.

The third problem inquires into the role of syntactical analysis in dealing with ontological problems. If one can develop an ontology with a notion of "ultimate predicates," should one do so? A general problem which arises out of this peculiar formulation is the specification of the role of the primitive schema of logic, e.g., "the subject-predicate form," in shaping our metaphysics of being and existence. The historical counterpart of this problem deals with the question: "What did Aristotle mean by his categories?" It is obvious that the Neoplatonists could not have accepted the metaphysical implication of the categories, which did not make a distinction between the sensible and the intelligible realms; but many Neoplatonists were teachers of logic and had to rely on the entire organon for the texts on logic. A. C. Lloyd[13] has argued that some aspects of Neoplatonic logic freed the categories from their metaphysical implications. If this hypothesis is true, then one is led to ask: "What did the Muslims do with the Neoplatonic versions of the categories?" It seems that many of them, including ibn Sīnā,[14] had two notions of the categories: one for logic and one as a tool for the analysis of being and existence. As is to be expected, ibn Sīnā and others did not believe that a categorical analysis of existent entities was the initial task of metaphysics; they began with a wider notion of being *qua* being (*hastī*) which permitted them to discuss non-existent types of entities prior to proffering a discussion of the categorical types of entities.

The interdependence of the problems raised in the above questions precludes answering each in isolation and suggests that a better approach would be to focus on the positions taken by three schools of Islamic philosophy; such an approach would allow us to highlight their differences as well as their agreements on two issues: (i) the impossibility of defining an "existent" and (ii) the

rejection of the categories as a suitable framework for the depiction of the ultimate being.

(*a*) The first school holds the view that there are two distinct domains in which the problem of being and existence may be discussed; in the realm of actual existents by means of an empirical inquiry, and in the realm of conceptual essences (*māhiyyāt*) by means of logical and linguistic distinctions (*farq-i lafḍī*). This position anticipates to some extent certain aspects of Carnap's philosophy[15] touching on "abstract entities" when it attempts to consider the use of abstract entities as legitimate without admitting a realistic ontology. The major figure in this school is ibn Sīnā (980-1037). Doctrines similar to his may be found in the works of the earlier philosopher al-Fārābī (870-950),[16] whose logical works have been studied by N. Rescher and D. M. Dunlop.[17] Moreover, some of the works of a later Iranian philosopher, N. Ṭūsī (1201-1274), contain similar doctrines. Apart from making mention of a few studies in English, we shall present the first English translation of passages taken from the works of writers of this school, including Ṭūsī's *Foundations of Derivations* (*Asās al-Iqtibās*[18]), and ibn Sīnā's *Indications and Remarks* (*al-Ishārāt wa-l-Tanbīhāt*[19]). We shall also provide a modified translation of al-Fārābī's remarks on the *Categories* of Aristotle[20] and shall consider his recently edited book, which devotes a section to existence.

(*b*) For a representative of the school which emphasized the Platonic approach to the metaphysics of essence (*māhiyya*), we turn to another Iranian philosopher, 'A. Nasafī (ca. 1250),[21] and a section of his recital "Analysis of the Primary Foundations [of the World] and an Account of the Worlds of Necessity, of the Heavenly, and of the Terrestrial [Realms]" (*Mabdā'-i Awwal wa Baiān-i ᶜAlam-i Jabburāt wa ᶜĀlam-i Malakūt wa ᶜAlami Mulk"*[22]). Nasafī's mystical account of the existence of persons and the ultimate being is taken from other sources, such as his

Perfect Man (*Al-Insān al-Kāmil*[23]) and *Revelations of Truths-Realities* (*Kashf al-Ḥaqā'iq*).[24]

(*c*) As representative of "the philosophers of existents," we shall examine selected passages from *The Peripatetics* (*Al-Masha'ir*[25]) written by still another Iranian philosopher, Mullā Ṣadrā (1572-1640),[26] and note Fazlur Rahman's observations on his major work, *The Spiritual Journey* (*Al-Asfār al-Arba'a*).[27] Mullā Ṣadrā leads a major school of philosophers who maintain that "existents" are the only significant concern of philosophy and consider "existence" an abstract term which, in fact, is an essence which cannot capture the features of that which is "an existent." God is considered "an existent" which cannot be discussed in essence-types of terms such as "being a substance."

Two Preliminary Problems: the transmission of philosophical vocabulary and the extent of the concern with being and existence in Islamic Philosophy

In the first phase of our investigation, we should briefly take cognizance of two minor problems: the transmission of Greek philosophical vocabulary, itself a representative illustration of the transmission of ideas, and the extent to which Muslim philosophers concerned themselves with being and existence in their relevant metaphysical and logical works.

Let us acquaint ourselves, on the one hand, with the transmission of ὕλη and οὐσία to become familiar with various modes of transmission and, on the other, with *ḥaqq* to learn about Persian and Arabic terms lacking Greek equivalents. " Ὕλη ," meaning "primary matter," is a concept pointing to the nature of the ultimate material constituent of a corporeal individual existent in *Physics* 192A22-34[28] and *Metaphysics* 1029A20-26 and 1042A27-28. Where a correspondence between the Greek concept

and the Persian-Arabic concept can be detected, four renditions into the Persian-Arabic concept can be observed: (1) *hayūlā,* a blind transliteration of the Greek word, probably copied from a Syriac version of a Greek text; (2) *jins-i basīt,* the formation of a composite of two terms meaning "a simple body," coined to signify the fundamental meaning of the Greek term; (3) *mādda,* a slight modification of the Greek term used sometimes for ὕλη and sometimes for ὑποκείμενον ("subject"); (4) *māya,* a thematic extension to a Persian word, probably derived from the Middle Persian *māta*, which has two meanings: one corresponds to matter-substratum, as does ὕλη; the other is used like the Indic-Zoroastrian concept *māya.*[29] These four different modes illustrate that the correlation of a term in Greek with any one Arabic-Persian term is an inadmissible reduction which fails to recognize the impossibility of simply converting a Greek philosophical problem into an Arabic-Persian counterpart.

In the case of being and existence, not only is a more consistent set of *termini technici* employed in the translation, but the Near Eastern terms used for οὐσία (usually translated as "substance") and τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὄν (usually translated as "being *qua* being") are invariably more refined in meaning than their Greek counterparts.

There is, to be sure, no sharp specification of οὐσία observable in Aristotle, and several translators have attempted to find alternative terms for "substance." R. Hope,[30] for instance, translates it as "primary being," while J. Owens[31] prefers a neutral term — "entity." It is our conjecture that the constant refinements in the Arabic-Persian translations and analyses of Aristotelian texts, beginning with topics such as οὐσία, led to the eventual emergence of divergent Near Eastern philosophies on being and existence. For example, some consider *maujūd* ("an existent") to be the primary concern of ontology, while others take *hastī* ("being *qua* being") as the fundamental term from which an ontology of possible essence is derived. But most philosophers agree on relatively standard usages of the basic terms significant for debates

on philosophies of being and existence. Among these, in addition to *maujūd* and *hastī*, are the following terms and the meaning corresponding to them: *wujūd*: "existence"; the Persian *gauhar-i awwalī* and the Arabic-Persian *jauhar awwal*: "a first substance"; the Persian *gauhar-i duwwumī* and the Arabic-Persian *jauhar thāni*: "a second substance"; the Arabic-Persian *huwiyya* and *dhāt*: "essence." Some philosophers match some of the above-mentioned words specifically with an Aristotelian concept and use it uniformly in their own writings. For instance, Aristotle heads the list of the categories with οὐσία in *Categories* (1B26) and with τίἐστι in *Topics* (103B22) — both are usually translated as "substance," the former as a general notion of substance, the latter as a concept related to essence (a secondary sense of a substance). Ibn Sīnā, in his account of the categories in the *Book of Definitions* (*Kitāb al-Ḥudūd*[32]), refers specifically to Aristotle as the prime source of the categories and heads the list with *jauhar*. Moreover, in all his works on metaphysics and logic, ibn Sīnā uses *jauhar* (and its Persian version, *gauhar*) consistently as "substance," while using *wujūd* (or *annīya*) for "existence." Al-Fārābī, in his commentary on Aristotles' *Metaphysics* entitled *Book of Letters* (*Kitāb al-Ḥurūf*),[33] explains how "is" is used in Persian, Greek, and Sodgian, and how Arabs, in spite of the fact that they have no proper copula, can use various other words to distinguish "existence" from "existent" or "existence" from "being." In sum, much of Greek philosophical vocabulary was refined through the conscious efforts of Near Eastern philosophers who not only possessed an intimate knowledge of the Greek texts but used this knowledge to draw subtle distinctions in meaning in the philosophical vocabulary received and transmitted, including the terms related to being and existence.

Yet a noteworthy exception should be mentioned at this point. Certain key terms which lacked Greek counterparts were used in the Near East with multiple meanings, all related to being and existence. For example, a term transliterated as *ḥaqq or ḥaqiqat* is

sometimes used as "truth" (in the sense of Heidegger's interpretation of the Greek ἀλήθεια), "reality" (in the sense of "that which ultimately exists"), "essence" (in the sense of "that feature of an existent necessary for its persistence as an actual entity"), "God," and "a person's most intimate existential features" (not in the sense of his essence — e.g., humanity — but what some existentialists may call one's authentic experiences or the memory of such events which is considered crucial for one's own identity). When the mystic Ḥallāj[34] utters "*Anā al-Ḥaqq*," for which he was killed by the Muslim orthodoxy, one cannot go back to Greek works to find the meaning for the peculiar medieval mystical doctrine of "I am reality-truth-God." A meaningful inquiry into the Islamic philosophical usage of being and existence should, therefore, take into account, but not limit itself to, Greek philosophical vocabulary; for from the perspective of Muslim philosophers this vocabulary is not adequate for the discussion of such topics as ultimate being and its relation to the self. It is in these latter designations of terms such as "being" and "existence" that new and pregnant doctrines in Islamic philosophy are most manifest.

Although the mere listing of the texts concerned with being and existence is no substitute for an analysis of the problem, it can serve as an index to the magnitude of the contributions of the Muslims to logic and ontology, fields which are related to being and existence. The 166 authors writing on logic in Arabic and Persian from 728 to 1545, mentioned by Rescher, is matched by the number of metaphysical texts in this and later periods.[35] As anyone working in related problems will realize, the problem is complicated by questions of actual and attributed authorship. For instance, 134 works[36] are attributed to Ṭūsī; and 244 titles to ibn Sīnā, in one count, but 276 titles in another.[37] A conservative estimate would conjecture a minimum of 300 treatises and commentaries dealing with being and existence. It goes without saying that the texts in question are not simply copies of Greek

doctrines. Ibn Sīnā's attitude to Aristotle's writings exemplifies how he and other philosophers investigating the Greek texts preserved their philosophical independence in spite of their interest in Aristotle's doctrines. As ibn Sīnā notes in his autobiography, "I read the *Metaphysics* [of Aristotle] forty times...to the extent where I had memorized it."[38] Although it was only after he had read al-Fārābī's commentary on the text that he grasped its meaning, ibn Sīnā, nonetheless affirms that "one should clarify the confusion in his [Aristotle's] discourse and correct any mistake in his [system]; [one should moreover] expand the foundations of his [philosophy]."[39] And this is precisely what ibn Sīnā did when he rejected Aristotle's notion of the ultimate being as a substance. In another instance ibn Sīnā ridicules Greek philosophers, especially Porphyry:

> There is a story about a man who is called Porphyry, and he wrote a text on intelligence and intelligibles. The Peripatetics praised him for the book, for they do not know that this book is totally worthless and absurd, as Porphyry who [obviously] did not know [the worthlessness of this book] and thus wrote it. One of his contemporaries wrote a book criticizing Porphyry's book; Porphyry wrote a book criticizing the critique [of his first book] and his [Porphyry's] new book was more ridiculous and valueless than his first.[40]

Avicenna's basic critique of Porphyry's work is based on the assumption that Porphyry attempted to identify the known with a knower in the act of knowledge. Ibn Sīnā's example demonstrates that each text must be examined separately for its particular philosophy of being and existence.

Three Major Problems: Ontology (the scope of being), Porphyry's five predicables (species [εἶδος] as a "thing"), and the Categories (the role of logic in a metaphysical explanation of being)

Let us proceed with these three topics to demonstrate how Muslim philosophers received and responded to problematic formulations of issues crucial to the question of being and existence.

Ontology, or What is the scope of being?

That Aristotle's notion of ontology as a study of being *qua* being (τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὄν) and his views on the concept of substance (οὐσία) are confusing is corroborated by his own remarks as well as by the criticism of many of his interpreters, such as W. D. Ross, J. Owens, and others.[41]

In addressing themselves to these problems, some of these interpreters have given serious consideration to passages such as the following: "Therefore that which is primary, i.e., not in a qualified sense but without qualification, must be substance" (*Metaphysics* 1028A29-30). From it they have of being *qua* being (το ὂν ᾗ ὄν) and his view on substance (concluded that Aristotle focuses on what actually exists in the sense of the first substance and on whatever might be related to such an existent. C. Kirwan notes, for example, that for Aristotle "metaphysics is concerned only with a restricted 'genus' of things that are."[42] M. K. Munitz asserts, in a similar vein, that "Aristotle's theory of existence (the other dimension of his general theory of being) is best seen as taking the form of a theory of substances, the primary constituents of the world of nature."[43] E. A. Moody follows an Ockhamian line of Aristotelianism in reporting that metaphysics "is a speculative

science and not an art, because it is concerned with that which is...."[44] He goes on to note that for the Ockhamian version of Aristotle

> The distinction between *ens per se* and *ens per aliud,* or between substance and accident, is not a metaphysical [ontological] distinction — not a distinction between two ultimate kinds of entities. It is rather a distinction between two ways in which individual things (which are what they are *per se* or by their individual nature) are apprehended or signified in discursive thought.[45]

Any examination of Greek Platonic ontology and of its Neoplatonic counterpart, together with a few Islamic ontologies, will reveal that Aristotle's attempt to restrict the subject of ontology to individual substances and their accidents proved unacceptable to Muslim thinkers in at least three areas. (1) The first stumbling block was his concept of the prime mover as a substance which is essentially separate from the material world. As will be explained later, Etienne Gilson considers this particular feature of Aristotle's ultimate being extremely important since it prevented the Aristotelian model from serving as a unitary type of metaphysics. (2) Two specific passages in his work suggesting the opposite notwithstanding,[46] individual persons, according to Aristotle, are limited substances composed of a soul and a body.[47] Since substances in the Aristotelian scheme cannot "blend" or be united with each other in the manner which mystical literature indicates when it describes such events as processes through analogies such as "the ocean waves," some Muslim philosophers rejected the Aristotelian substance theory of the self and resorted to other media of expression and to the use of concepts such as the active intelligence (already present in Aristotle) to depict the mystical union. For ontology, this resulted in the invention and application of a new ontological category of process as well as a

heavy reliance on similes and allegories to depict the union of two initially separate entities — a non-substance concept of a person and an ultimate being — in the last stage of mystical self-realization. Finally (3) in several passages Aristotle interprets the Platonic forms as abstractions of "natural entities."[48] Moreover, his obviously naive comparison of Plato's "participation" and Pythagorean "imitation," his view of "participation" as but a replacement of this "imitation," and many other interpretations which could be cited demonstrate that there is no room for unactualizable universals (i.e., in medieval terminology, "essences" with no "existents") in his ontology. As will become obvious Muslim philosophers rejected Aristotle's ontology for this reason as well. Before turning to these Islamic theories, let us take note of a few representative passages from Plato and Plotinus which present an ontology with an ultimate being extending beyond the Aristotelian notion of οὐσία.

The problem of being and existence in Plato's philosophy unfolds in the "generator" relation between the Form of the Good and other entities in Plato's universe. In the following passage, Socrates uses the typical analogy of the Sun-World relation to clarify his ontology of being. Socrates states: "The Sun, I presume you will say, not only furnishes to visibles the powers of visibility but it also provides for their generation and growth and nurture though it is not itself generation."[49] This passage suggests that the Form of the Good itself is an independent type of being upon which other entities depend. Socrates subsequently focuses explicitly on the ontological dimensions of this issue, asserting:

> In like manner, then, you are to say that the objects of knowledge [i.e., forms] not only receive from the presence of the good [τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ] their being known, but their very existence [τὸ εἶναι] and essence (substantiality) [τὴν οὐσίαν] is derived to them from it, though the good itself is not an essence (substantiality) [οὐσίας] but still transcends

[ἐπέκεινα] essence (substantiality) [οὐσία] in dignity and surpassing power.[50]

The above formulation of the basis of ontology is ambiguous and contains prima facie paradoxes. We note that the Form of the Good is beyond and distinct from other forms. But in what sense, we may ask, is an entity a reality but not an existence (being-substantiality) τὴν οὐσίαν? However we choose to translate the Greek expressions τὸ εἶναι and τὴν οὐσίαν, it follows that the Form of the Good is neither a particular nor a specific unique universal. Obviously, Plato's Form of the Good here is a prototype of the ultimate being of Plotinus' ontology, i.e., the One. Let us now turn to an examination of this concept in Plotinus' ontology.

Plotinus begins the *Enneads* VI[51] by giving reasons for his rejection of the categories and for the introduction of his own doctrines of the authentic existence of numbers, of the generation of the Ideal Forms, of the Good, the One, the will of the One, and the identification of the One with the Good. Plotinus' basic objection to Aristotle's categorical explanation is evident in his question: "Are the ten [categories] found alike in the Intellectual and in the Sensible realms?" (VI [1]). Plotinus' presupposition about the distinction which can be made between intellectual entities and what one can consider sensible entities precludes any common bond between them. For example, the intellectual aspect of the secondary substantial being cannot intimately be related to the material aspects of the first substantial being. But apart from this distinction between the two realms, another reason made it impossible for Plotinus to accept the categories: his One exists prior to Forms, and is not a being to which intellectual discourse can make any type of categorical application, e.g., by calling it a being of a non-sensible "substance" (VI [9] 2).

A similar theme appears in another passage in which the One is viewed as the generator of entities which transcends οὐσία or being.

> The One [τὸ ἕν] is all things but not one of them; the source [ἀρχή] of all things is not all things; and yet it is all things in a transcendental sense — all things, so to speak, having run back to it; or, more correctly, not all as yet are within it, they will be. [But why does the universe form] an unbroken unity, in which there appears no diversity, not even duality? It is precisely because there is nothing within the One [i.e., the One is "simple"] that all entities are from it. In order that an entity may be brought about, the source must be no entity [οὐκ ὄν] but the entity's generator [γενέτης] in what is to be thought of as the prime act of generation.[52]

Other Neoplatonists followed the same view. Proclus, for example, depicts the ultimate being as separate from the world: "Now, that the One is God follows from its identity with the Good: for the Good is identical with God." He goes on to state that "every God is above being [πᾶς θεὸς ὑπερούσιός ἐστι], above life, and above intelligence";[53] yet the One is more significant than all other gods, ... Every God is 'participable,' except the One."[54] In addition to naming individual actual existent entities and whatever else might be "a being" (e.g., round squares and unicornness), the Neoplatonic concepts mentioned above name the One which in a sense is the generator of being, and is not a being in the world. It follows from this analysis that in the Greek texts Plato and some Neoplatonists presented a non-Aristotelian notion of the ultimate being.

Another notion of a non-categorical type of entity found in Islamic as well as in some Western philosophies is the concept of "persons." In his account of al-Ghazālī's doctrine which is embedded in *The Alchemy of Happiness*, R. C. Zaehner cites a paradigm case illustrating this point. Zaehner concentrates on two features of al-Ghazālī's doctrines: "the indwelling of God in creatures" and "the denying not only to God but to the human soul as it is in its essence of any attribute whatever." According to al-

Ghazālī, the human soul-self has neither *chun* ("property") nor *chigūnagī* ("a kind" or "a classification"). In this aspect it is said to be like God, a secret, which one should not reveal explicitly.[55] It will become clear that an important feature of Isalmic philosophies of being is the oft expressed doctrine that the ultimate being, as in the Greek cases studied, is the model or the last stage of the perfection of the experiencing subject. Lacking a limit in the world, the ultimate being cannot be designated as the substance of a category. One way of approaching the issue is to consider an ontology in which "persons" become in a Carnapian sense a "primitive term" in one's ontology. The approach differs from that taken by Aristotle in formulating his concept of the self, in which a physical body is connected to a formal soul — Aristotle's remarks on the active intelligence notwithstanding. The approach is illustrated in part by P. F. Strawson, who has concluded that one can explain the mental and the physical constituents of experience only if one takes the concept of persons as a primitive notion.[56] A variant of the aforementioned approach is found in Wittgenstein, where the self is depicted as the metaphysical subject which is not in the world but is a limit of the world and as such cannot be experienced or referred to as an individual object.[57]

In sum, ample illustrations substantiate that not all Greek philosophical systems depict persons and the ultimate being as οὐσία. Moreover, in some systems it is impossible to conceive of these two entities as ultimate existents. Gilson made a similar point:

> Since being is thinkable apart from actual existence, whereas actual existence is not thinkable apart from being, philosophers will simply yield to one of the fundamental facilities of the human mind by positing *being* minus actual existence as the first principle of metaphysics.
>
> Let us go farther still. It is not enough to say that *being* is conceivable apart from existence; in a certain sense it must be

> said that *being* is always *conceived* by us apart from existence, for the very simple reason that existence itself cannot possibly be *conceived.*[58]

We shall show that any conception of the self and the ultimate existent as substances implies an unbridgeable separation between them. Cherniss points out that "hav[ing] a separate existence in the manner of particular entities"[59] is the essential feature of the Aristotelian concept of substance. For this and related reasons Aristotle's limited ontology could not serve as a satisfactory framework for the Islamic thinker who wished to depict a union between the ultimate being and persons. What may be called "an open" or "non-substantial" view of the ultimate being — more in line with Platonic and Neoplatonic traditions than with others — proved better suited to their purposes than the Aristotelian ontology. There was also a problem with Aristotle's classification of time as an accident. In process theories, durations and thus time cannot be an accidental entity. Mullā Ṣadrā, for eaxmple, considered time, space and motion as substantial.

The Problem of "Species" (εἶδος) in the Light of Porphyry's Fifth Predicable

Aristotle introduces the predicables in the *Topics* by making distinctions among four kinds of reasoning, three uses of his own treatises, and methods of inquiry which include propositions and problems. He thereafter notes that every proposition and problem indicates four specific elements: property, genus, definition, and accident.[60] It is clear, on the one hand, that he introduced the so-called "four predicables" to single out those elements of propositions which are used in arguments of demonstrative sciences; in this respect there is no mention of species (εἶδος)

or secondary substances which may be taken as references to Platonic forms. On the other hand, some argue that by including the concept of the genus and by making assertions about it in other passages, Aristotle indicated his wish to include "species" among the predicables. But when Porphyry wrote his *Introduction* (*Isagoge*) to Aristotle's logical works, his inclusion of species as a predicable, and of species and genus, which are "things-universals," made it possible for some medieval philosophers to take "thing-universals" as individuals, on the basis of passages such as

> For the present I shall not discuss the question whether genera and species really exist or are in bare notions only; and if they exist, whether they are corporeal things or incorporeal; and whether they are separated or exist in things perceived by the senses and in relation to them. Of these questions are profound and demand other and more acute examination.[61]

The *Isagoge* was translated into Latin by Marius Victorinus (ca. 370), and subsequently retranslated by Boethius (ca. 510) when he found the earlier rendering unsatisfactory. It was Boethius' translation and commentary on this work which led to the popularization of the classical positions of realism, conceptualism, and nominalism on the status of such universals as "species" and "genera." Conceptualism presents us with non-existent kinds of entities — mind-dependent concepts which may or may not, depending on the philosopher's position, have supra-mental status. Contemporary commentators have reached different evaluations of Porphyry's role in the development of medieval ontology.

Moody takes an Ockhamist position on Aristotle and criticizes Porphyry for changing what some commentators call a syntactic or a logical problem in Aristotle into an ontological or a metaphysical problem. On this point Moody states: "In the *Categories* Aristotle is concerned with terms as un-complex modes of signification,

considered in abstraction from questions of existence or fact, and from truth or falsity of any propositions such as can by voluntary act of judgment be formed through the synthesis of such terms."[62] Moody harshly judges Porphyry for his "idea of using the predicables as an introduction to the *Categories* of Aristotle [which] stands as a master stroke, though probably an unconscious one, in the struggle to restore to dialectic the primacy that Plato had claimed for it, and that Aristotle had denied."[63]

W. and M. Kneel join Moody in his criticism of Porphyry, but place some of the blame on Aristotle and Boethius. While acknowledging his "share in the transmission of ancient learning," Kneale and Kneale consider Porphyry to be "the source of a misinterpretation of Aristotle's doctrine of the predicables which produced some confusion in later times"; and claim that the doctrine of predicables for Aristotle was to "set out the different relations in which a predicate might stand to a subject in a general statement..."[64] Moreover, the Kneales maintain that a reading of Aristotle's and Porphyry's writings "suggests that [Aristotle] thinks there is a species named 'man' and a genus named 'animal'"[65] The Kneales blame Aristotle for this confusion since he uses "substance" to name such universals. Furthermore, according to the Kneales, the damage done by Boethius was that he perpetuated "the puzzle about universals which exercised the minds of medieval philosophers."[66] The importance of Boethius is that he presented Aristotle's views in such a way that, according to Kneale and Kneale, it established a position "without presuming to decide definitely against Plato's view that universals are not only thinkable apart from bodies but capable also of existing in separation."[67] In contrast to the Kneales, who assume an Aristotelian position and criticize Porphyry for keeping to his own Neoplatonic doctrine, Aaron holds that the basis of a non-logical theory of predicables lies in Aristotle's own writings. Aaron's interpretation rests on two key points: the first, which resembles the Islamic theories on existents, points out that, for Aristotle, though "real individuals elude our thought, we do nonetheless

think real qualities are shared in common by a number of individuals. It is because real individuals have such common qualities that we can group and classify them and speak of them as members of species and genera."[68] Two special issues are raised here (*a*) Aaron's statement that "individuals elude our thought" may be taken to mean that no "individual existent per se as an individual existent without any consideration of concepts" can be thought about, and (*b*) Aaron's mention of "real qualities" may already presuppose a non-nominalist position on universals. We shall demonstrate that (*a*) was adopted as the basis of an Islamic philosophy of universals. Concerning the problem of existence of species in (*b*), Aaron presents an interesting quotation from Aristotle's *De partibus animalium* 644A23-27, where Aristotle states,

> The individuals comprised within a species, such as Socrates and Coriscus, are the real existences; but inasmuch as these individuals possess one common specific form, it will suffice to state the universal attributes of the species, that is, the attributes common to all its individuals, once and for all, as otherwise there will be endless reiteration.

On the basis of this passage and related sources, Aaron concludes that

> the Aristotelian doctrine of the "common specific form" which gives the universal and genus a real reference, in spite of the remoteness from thought of the real individual, is thus rooted upon the apprehension of "the universal attributes of the species" possessed by individuals, and the sciences which deal with universals are possible only because of this apprehension.[69]

In defense of Porphyry, Lloyd mentions that we should not forget that "the categories are predicates and the predicables manners of predicating."[70] Moreover, the *Isagoge* is an

introduction, not to the *Topics,* but to the *Categories,* which are logically prior to the *Topics,* and the *quinque voces* are terms considered necessary to the understanding of the *Categories.*

In sum, no common agreement has been reached by several key interpreters of Aristotle on the following issues: (*a*) What was Aristotle's position on the significance of predication over species? (*b*) Did Porphyry in fact, as Moody and others claim, misunderstand Aristotle's logic? (*c*) Was it really a tragedy to bring to the attention of the medieval philosophers the ontological problem of universals? (*d*) Did the Neoplatonists' logic assist or retard the development of logic? But there is no doubt that Porphyry's modification of Aristotelian texts had an influence on the medieval concepts of being and existence, as Moody, Kneale and Kneale, and Aaron all agree.

The *Isagoge* also affected Islamic philosophy. Originally, it was translated into at least three Syriac versions, which included commentaries by Hibba (d. 457), Probha (d. 480), and Athanasius of Baladh (d. 696). Arabic and Persian translations or commentaries soon multiplied and have continued to the present.[71] With regard to the concepts of being and essence, the reaction of Islamic philosophers can be divided into three classes:

(1) First, there were the philosophers who wanted to be as faithful as possible to Aristotle's own texts and disliked Porphyry as some "bastard" offspring of Neoplatonism and Aristotelianism. This school is represented by Averroës , who wrote a short commentary on the *Isagoge* but expressed misgivings about the work and was reluctant, for two reasons, to translate it. Believing that whatever can be demonstrated about the predicables is found in the *Posterior Analytics,* and whatever is generally accepted is found in the *Topics,* he asserted that "I do not consider the Isagoge necessary for beginning the art of logic, since its contents cannot belong to what is common to the entire art, as some imagine";[72] and concludes that the *"Isagoge* is not a part of logic, though al-Fārābī implies that it is." Averroës also cites the simple nature of

the text, but admits that "at some point [in the book] there is room for speculation."[73] Nonetheless, he was indirectly affected by Porphyry insofar as he devoted much argumentation to the topic of universals, challenging the ibn Sīnian "essence-existence" version of the problem. The latter was to a degree supported in ibn Sīnā's own lengthy version of the *Isagoge*.

(2) A second school of philosophy basically followed the arguments contained in Porphyry's work and those of later commentators on it.. These philosophers themselves wrote long detailed commentaries on every point of philosophical import in the *Isagoge* and developed in turn an interpretative viewpoint of their own. Ibn Tayyib (980-1043), for example, in writing his commentary on the work, interjected his own notes into the Arabic translation; the commentary below, including the parenthetical remarks, belongs to him:

> PORPHYRY: Are they separate or perceptible in objects? (He means: if genera and species are incorporeal, are they absolutely separable from matter, or are they in some way dependent upon sensible and concrete existence?) Since an inquiry into that is difficult, it requires another investigation loftier than. this. (He means: since the inquiry into genera and species in terms of these questions is a complicated one, it requires another [branch of] knowledge which is loftier than logic.)
>
> COMMENTATOR: The translation of this passage is confused. The passage should be translated in this way: If they (i.e., genera and species) are incorporeal, are they separable or are they dependent upon sensible things ? The interpretation of this statement is this: If they are incorporeal, are they absolutely separable from matter like God and the Platonic Forms?[74]

We note here ibn Tayyib's immediate attempt to connect the Porphyrian question to Plato's theory of the ultimate being. In objecting to Porphyry's texts, ibn Tayyib often introduces a new point of view. For example, following Porphyry's statement as it is rendered in Arabic, ibn Tayyib writes: "Porphyry [states]: As the genus is predicated triply, the discussion of philosophers concerns only the third." In clarifying the meaning of this passage, ibn Tayyib objects:

> how did you begin, Porphyry, by defining the genus at the time of your opening a discussion of it, while you know from logical laws that every thing investigated is investigated only under the following inquiries: Firstly, does it exist? Secondly, what is it? You should have prefaced your investigation of the genus by discussing whether it exists, and then, discuss what it is.[75]

It is evident from these quotations that for some Muslim philosophers Porphyry's text was not taken as an authority on questions dealing with being and essence, especially when some of the commentators' remarks on Porphyry were read along with the translation of the *Isagoge.*

(3) The third approach to the *Isagoge* is illustrated by the philosophical school represented by ibn Sīnā and Tūsī. Both philosophers wrote their own versions of the text without attempting to furnish a paraphrase of Porphyry's actual work. Indeed, they expound on the *Isagoge* (*al-Madkhal*) as if it were a standard topic in logic about which each logician wrote his own book. In his version of this text, ibn Sīnā does not refer to Porphyry by name but alludes to "the author of the book." At one place, ibn Sīnā states that he has taken into account what previous philosophers have said on the subject of the *Isagoge,* adding to it whatever resulted from his own thinking (*fikr*) and from solving problems by his own speculative (*naẓar*) faculty, especially in the sciences of physics, metaphysics, and logic.[76] Analogously, Ṭūsī

demonstrated his independence from Porphyry by introducing his own *Isagoge* as follows:

> In the *Introduction* [*Madkhal*] on logic which is called [by the Greeks] "*Isāghugi*," four techniques are found: first, expressions; second, universality and particularity; third, essentiality and accidentality; and, fourth, the universal five [predicables].[77]

Ṭūsī proceeds to furnish Persian philosophical terminology for the readers of the *Isagoge* and to discuss different schools of thought on the philosophical issues in this book. Later in our discussion we shall illustrate how these muslim philosophers used only the logical aspects of Porphyry's *Isagoge* in their own works of logic, whereas in their works on metaphysics they distinguished between two senses of a species: one sense applicable to the actual domain; one, to syntactical analyses.

In sum, Porphyry's *Isagoge* was instrumental both in focusing philosophical discussions on the problem of universals, and on those issues which were ambiguous in Aristotle's philosophy — the realm of being, predication over species, and the categories — and in bringing about the distinction between the logical and the metaphysical senses.

The Problem of Categories

Another important source for analyzing being and essence, and one which in itself has generated much confusion among Muslim philosophers, is the doctrine of the categories. Aristotle introduces the list of categories with the statement that "Expressions which are in no way composite signify . . ." (*Categories* 1B25-26). The only other place where he renders the entire list is in *Topics* 103B20-23 where he writes: "we must distinguish between the

classes of predicates in which the four orders in question [i.e., where one finds the four predicables of an entity: namely, accident, genus, property, and definition] are ten in number. . . ." Although "substance," called οὐσία (presumably "primary" or "first" substance, meaning an individual particular existent), begins the first list, the second list starts with τί ἐστι or "essence." In some of the more difficult passages of the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle is busy with the specification of "universals" and "individuals" and does not use his categories, except in a few places not directly related to "first substance." Nonetheless, some of these passages demonstrate the significance of Aristotle's analysis of "being" as it relates to the subject of the categories: he states in *Metaphysics* 1017A23-25 that "The kinds of essential being are precisely those that are indicated by the figures of predication [τῆς κατηγορίας]; for the senses of being [τὸ εἶναι] are just as many as there are these figures." Hence, any language analysis or ontological investigation which claims to clarify the nature of being must focus on the categories, for whatever does not belong to a category cannot for that reason be a "being."

In short, what did Aristotle attempt to accomplish by means of the categories? It seems that there is a confusion among modern Aristotelian commentators concerning this topic. The confusion may be clarified by delineating two alternative views of the categories, both of which were adopted as the basis for the Islamic analyses of being and existence. There are many who follow our account of Moody's position, outlined in the previous section, that categories as tools of linguistic and logical analyses are relevant, not directly to the world, but only indirectly to the ways in which language is used to talk about the world. Anscombe's account of the categories points to them as a "crude sketch" for correct usage.

> The doctrine of the *Categories* is indeed a relatively crude sketch upon which Aristotle never improved, . . . while he nevertheless continued to allude to it . . ., in developing his

> account of *per se* existence in the *Metaphysics*.... we must consider what Aristotle is getting, at in propounding his ten categories. These obviously correspond in some way to a set of things which it would make sense to say of e.g. a human being.... Aristotle's intention was to find a complete list of fairly simple kinds of things, with significant logical differences between them, that might be said about a subject.[78]

In a manner similar to Moody's, I. M. Bochenski notes that this theory of the categories[79] "constitutes an attempt at classifying objects according to the ways in which they are predicable...." Following the same line of interpretation, G. Ryle asserts that "Aristotle's list [of categories] is intended to be a list of the ultimate types of predicates."[80] To establish such a list, for Ryle, means to "collect a range of simple, singular propositions, all similar in being about the same particular or particulars; then the respects in which these propositions differ from one another will be their predicates."

Insistent on preserving his own method in the analysis of Aristotelian texts, Ryle also claims that "In the main Aristotle seems to content himself with taking ordinary language as his clue to the list of heads of questions, and so of types of predicates."[81] Both Ryle and Anscombe attempt to criticize Aristotle because, in their opinion, he did not develop his "ordinary language ability" to a sufficient degree of perfection.

J. L. Ackrill has observed further complications in the Aristotelian analysis of being. He expresses the view, for instance, that Aristotle developed his theory of the categories in two ways: (*a*) in the classification of the different kinds of questions asked about substances; and (*b*) in the various answers appropriate to "one particular question which can be asked about anything whatsoever — the question 'what is it?"[82] Still other interpreters provide us with a broader approach to Aristotle's categories. J. M. E. Moravcsik, for example, holds:

> The theory of categories is partly a theory about language and partly a theory about reality.... elements of a language have key-designating roles, the full understanding of which requires that we understand the designata as falling within those classes which jointly form the set definitive of that to which a sensible particular must be related.... [Aristotle] did believe that there are specific items of language and reality the correlation of which forms the crucial link between the two.[83]

Kneale and Kneale provide us with the most comprehensive and illuminating perspective in noting the troubles which confronted the Muslim philosophers who attempted to develop a theory of being and existence which was based upon a metaphysical analysis of the categories: they point out that it was not Aristotles decision to include the *Categories* in the *Organon* but that of compilers who, during their time, were unable to draw sharp distinctions between logic and non-logical studies.[84] Accordingly, the Kneales assert that "much of the doctrine of the *Categories* must be regarded as metaphysical rather than logical."[85] The two ambiguities which they pinpoint in the categories are: (*a*) "whether Aristotle is classifying symbols or what they symbolize, words or, in a very wide sense, things.... a question which has exercised commentators since ancient times";[86] and (*b*) "whether Aristotle is concerned with predicates only or with terms in general, including subjects."[87] The ambiguities specified by Kneale and Kneale had far-reaching logical consequences for philosophers attempting to use the categories in their analyses of being and existence. Kneale and Kneale list three major consequences: (*a*) "Aristotle's emphasis on primary substance as the ultimate subject of predication led to an over-emphasis on the subject-predicate form of proposition which still restricted logical development at the time of Leibniz";[88] (*b*) "Aristotle's use of the term οὐσία to signify both

primary and secondary substance blurs the all-important distinction between singular and general propositions";[89] and (*c*) "the *Categories* seems to be the first attempt at what has recently been called a theory of type-distinctions, that is to say a theory in which entities are classified according to what can be said about them significantly. Plato had already remarked that to be capable of expressing a truth a linguistic formula must be complex, containing at least both noun and verb [*Sophist* 262 A]. This is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition of meaningfulness."[90] When we transfer the logical queries of Kneale and Kneale to their ontological counterparts, we discover the emergence of three questions on being and existence which led to the formation and development of different schools dealing with these concepts.

Several factors are apparently responsible for the confusion noted in the doctrine of the categories. To begin with, it is unclear what Aristotle himself meant by the categories and why he did not make a more extensive use of categorical analysis in his account of being in his metaphysics. Another ambiguity stems from the fact that Neoplatonists who used Aristotle's texts to teach logic could not have accepted their metaphysical premises; this difficulty resulted in the Neoplatonic attempt — noticeable especially in the case of Porphyry — to restrict the metaphysical implications of the categories. Lloyd, for instance, points out that "After Porphyry, Aristotle is credited with having consciously restricted the scope of the Categories. The ten Categories themselves are decided to be neither terms nor things, but terms *qua* signifying; each is a γένος τῶν ὄντων, 'a genus of being,' but indirectly for they classify terms with respect to the things they designate."[91] A third difficulty stems from the Muslim interpretation of the categories. In the Muslim Aristotelian tradition, the doctrine of the categories was treated in two distinct ways: as a branch of logic, the *Categories* (*Maqūlāt*) usually preceded seven other "logical texts" of Aristotle, the last of which was the *Poetics*; and as a part of metaphysics, as was customarily done by the school of ibn Sīnā,

who began his discussion of metaphysics by giving an account of the categories. We shall illustrate the interrelationship between the two treatments in the next section.

Three Islamic philosophies of being and existence

Three problematic issues of Greek philosophy, specifically the problem of being and existence, predication over species, and the role of logic in the discussion of metaphysical issues, were extensively debated by Muslim philosophers. Here we shall present the views of three different schools which treated these topics.

The "Analytical" School of ibn Sīnā

The first school is characterized by a method of "analysis," and the basic tools which its philosophers used are (*a*) syntactical (*lafḍī*) inquiry, which deals only with words and belongs to the domain of logic yet allows for purely conceptual (*wahmī*) activity independent of actual existents; and (*b*) empirical (*ḥissī*) inquiry referring to existents, an inquiry essentially conducted by the empirical sciences about the actual world. The philosophers of the analytical school used these preliminary distinctions to satisfy what we may call an Ockhamized Aristotelian position on being and existence in a syntactical context. Most of our discussion will be devoted to ibn Sīnā's approach; nonetheless, in order to illustrate the continuity of the approach, we shall select a few passages from al-Fārābī (d. 950), who preceded ibn Sīnā, and from Ṭūsī (d. 1274), who succeeded ibn Sīnā.

In an interesting passage, al-Fārābī draws a distinction between two domains within which one may ask the question "Is existence a predicate?" The account of his views is given by Rescher as:

> He was asked about the following problem: Does the proposition "Man exists" have a predicate or not?
>
> He answered: This is a question on which both the ancients and the moderns have disagreed: some have said it does not have a predicate, others that it has. My position is that both assertions are true in different senses. When this proposition is studied by a scientist who investigates the world it does not have a predicate, because the existence of a thing is nothing but the thing [itself], and the predicate ought to be a concept whose existence or non-existence is judged *about* the thing. So from this angle it is not a proposition that has a predicate. But when it is studied by a logician, since it is composed of two expressions, which are its two parts, and is capable of truth and falsehood, from this angle it has a predicate. So the two assertions are both true, each one in a certain sense.[92]

Note the two domains which are postulated here: "the domain for an empirical scientist" in which basic elements are actual existents, and the domain of expressions, a syntactical domain, which is investigated by the logician. Now, if we wish to formulate a language which is applicable to the actual world of empirical sciences, then we choose terms of our predicate constants which name properties corresponding to non-empty classes. "Unicorn" is not a useful term for the science of zoology, whereas "cat" is.

Another passage, in this case from al-Fārābī's Categories, makes a distinction between the interrelationship of a second substance (a universal) and a first substance (an individual existent).

> Individual substances [*ashkhās al-jauhar*] are what are called "primary substances": while their universals are [called] secondary [substances] because individuals are [in a sense] more appropriately substances, as their beings are more determined [*'akmal*] than [the being of] their universals.... A thing is understood intellectually when its essence [*māhiyya;* literally, "what it is"; similar to τί ἐστι] is known. Individual substances thus became intellectually known [to us] as their universals were [understood] intellectually. Intelligibles [such as universals] are realized only due to their individual existents [cases or instances of them]; with respect to being intelligible [and understandable, nameable], individual substances need their universals. Their universals need their specific cases in order to be considered as [concepts, the cases of which are] existents. For if their individual instances would not exist, then whatever we thought of them in our minds would be due to our own imagination and lies [and would not correspond to the actual world], and whatever is a lie [and does not correspond to the actual world] is other than existents. Consequently, universals are realized as existents only with respect to their individual [instances], while individuals are intellectualized only due to their universals. Thus universals are also [may be regarded as] substances because they are intelligible features of substances; their realization however is secondary, as their existence depends on the existence of individuals.[93]

In this passage a preliminary distinction is specified by means of a universal, such as species (εἶδος); we can have intelligibility or discourse about existents, though any actual existent has to be examined in reference to a particular substance. Now, did al-Fārābī describe "this particular" substance? In another text he states that we can refer to this substance only ostensibly by gestures and that an "existent" cannot be defined by itself:

> It has become customary to state that this to which one points is sensible and that it is not used to describe [*wasf*] anything unless in an accidental or unnatural way. What is known by what it is — when one indicates it — is the simple (first substance).[94]

Al-Fārābī's ontology contains existents which can be only experienced not totally described. Any partial description of an existent needs to be expressed by the mediacy of a universal. Hence, "What is being?" is answered in terms of two features — existents which can be only experienced not totally described, and intelligible concepts which, as universals, are used to speak about existents.

Before acquainting ourselves with the system of ibn Sīnā, let us examine two hitherto untranslated texts of Ṭūsī's which argue in favor of the position that only individual existents can be actual and that logical analysis is not in need of information about existents. The following is a close paraphrase of Ṭūsī's *Principles* (*Fuṣūl*):

> Whoever learns anything about an entity must without doubt assume that the entity in question exists, for whatever is received [as known] must necessarily exist, as one cannot know [anything] about an entity which does not exist. Consequently, that aspect of a being which is its "existential status" must be recognized. Moreover, since this "existential status" is an aspect of being, whoever knows the universal feature [of an existing entity] must also be acquainted with its specific feature [namely, that it is an existent]. [Thus our argument is valid.] Since the meaning of this issue is manifest, it becomes clear that before knowing anything about an entity, one must inquire whether or not the entity in question exists, and before receiving any information about the entity, the knower must be informed about the reality of the entity in question. Whoever wishes to

> describe the meaning [of a fact] in terms of other facts needs to know that an entity exists [or at least needs to be able to assume] that the entity exists.[95]

Although he is not defining what existence is within the domain of actual existents, Tūsī proceeds to show that any factual description of such an entity can be given only within the particular (*juz'*) context of the reality of its existents.

The passage reproduced below is a translation of the first chapter of Ṭūsī's text on the *Categories,* which is Book Two of his logical collection *Al-Asās al-Iqtibās.* From our perspective the major points of interest in this passage are: (*a*) that Ṭūsī's Avicennan treatment of categories is no copy of the Aristotelian doctrine (Persian and Arabic texts on logic bearing the same title as an Aristotelian text were not necessarily copies of the Greek work in question); (*b*) that Tūsī draws a sharp distinction between, on the one hand, a logical inquiry about concepts, derivation, and related analytical activities, and, on the other, empirical analyses dealing with questions about the existence of actual entities; and (*c*) that logical analysis of categories and the use of logic in general be recommended for various inquiries, since there is a distinction between justifications of principles in analytical contexts and their workability for practical purposes.

The Categories (al-Maqulāt)

> It is obvious that the first phase of logic analyzes the highest kinds [ajnas; literally, "genera"] which are called the ten categories. Contemporary [thinkers] are of the opinion both that [(i)] a determination of [the status] of the universals of any [level] of generality or determinateness and [(ii)] our act of pointing] to what is substantial or accidental in an ostensive manner are outside the province of logic; and that the method

using the techniques of logic is not applicable [to such factual matters]. [Moreover, contemporary thinkers are also of the opinion that] the preoccupation of logicians with the aforementioned subjects is wrong and [should be considered] unfortunate. [In spite of such strong opposition to the concern which logicians have demonstrated for the highest [kinds, (genera)], we should observe that without the consideration of the categories and without our ability to distinguish between them, it is impossible to make progress in the art [of logic] in such matters as stating definitions, making descriptions, and abstracting premises from various syllogisms. Knowledge of this science [i.e., logic] is useful for evaluating every problem or deducing cases [from general theorems or axioms], due to the fact that logic can clarify that line of reasonings [different analytical moves] in all the [problems which attempt to prove a point]. Even in stories we notice [informal] accounts of the points and laws of this science; for such an account is necessary in order to grasp the proper way of deriving the basic [argument embedded in the story in question]. And [all] investigators of truth have written [in one way or another about] this [science] — may God grant them success.

Prior to beginning our inquiry, we say that all the wise men agree that ordering the essential features of whatever is conceivable or intelligible to us falls into one of these ten categories. [Indeed] there are more general [determinable] concepts than these ten categories, such as existence, necessity, contingency, establishing, the extreme in domains of certain kinds — e.g., "unity," "point," and the reality of such notions. [We admit] that these notions do not belong to the domain of logic proper. However, whatever can be analyzed by means of language in the domain of actual existents does not fall outside these categories. Even though much has been said about the

nature of these categories, we hope to say more about them [in our subsequent discussions].

When we say that "existence" is not a genus common to these categories, we mean that we can conceive the meaning [of each category] without necessarily assuming that the [category] in question has [an instance in the actual world] and [that] we can conceive an essence although it has not been realized [by the mediacy of its instance]. Had "existence" been a feature of these categories, we could not have thought of essences without knowing whether their instances were realized [in the actual world]. It is true that we do not necessarily inquire whether [the concept] of "color" is also a [more determinate entity such as a] "black" [patch] or whether [the concept of] a figure is a[n actual triangle]; when a black entity or a triangle has been realized, we wonder about the cause which realized it. Consequently, if existence were a genus or a predicate, its [realization] would be due to conditions of other genera or predicates [e.g., if there is "blackness," then there is also "being" a color]. It is possible to predicate a genus to a lower kind [e.g., a species] and individuals which exist under it [i.e., the sign "genus" can be predicated of a sign of a lower level — e.g., "species" or "an individual"] but one cannot attribute "existence" to "existence" since an existent exists only due to itself and persists only with respect to itself [i.e., we need no other "essence" to know that "an existent" is in fact "an existent"]. The distinction between what is an existent and what is not an existent is due to the First Existent [to God, who is the Principle of Sufficient Reason determining why certain contingent propositions about existents are true]. Consequently "existence" is not a genus of these categories but is added to them [in the sense that some of their instances are realized] due to [other] conditions.[96]

Let us consider how Ṭūsī treats the predication of species simply as a problem of logic rather than as one of metaphysics in the context of a theory of types.[97] His implicit notion of predication found in the above quotation is followed in a later section by his explanation of what he means by the expressions "a species" and "a genus." In order to clarify his analysis without using unnecessary expressions, let us consider a simple language governed by the "level" aspects of the theory of types.

There are certain individuals of level zero — e.g. , "s" (which according to our rule of designation names Socrates); there are one-place predicates of various levels, among them the following: "H" (standing for "humanity") of level "1," "A" (standing for "animality") of level "2," "L" (for "living") of level "3," and "B" (for "having a bodily feature") of level "4"; let us assume that there are indefinitely many levels in our language and that each predicate on a given level is a one-place constant the designation of which is specified in such a way that "well-formed sentences" of our language correspond to ordinary English following the standard rules of formulation such that if we predicate X to Y, then the level of X is greater than the level of Y. According to this rule, "H(s)" (Socrates is a human), "A(s)" (To be a human is to be an animal), "B(s)" (Socrates has a body) are legitimate sentences (well formed), while "s(H)" (humanity has Socratesness) or "A(B)" (to be a body is to be an animal) is illegitimate. According to the theory of types in a legitimate predication, the level of the sign naming the predicate must be greater than the level of the sign naming the subject. Now, let us note how Munitz' scheme applies to Ṭūsī's concept of predication. For Munitz "predication" has three senses: the syntactic, the semantic, and the ontologic. Munitz notes that "Syntactic predication is to be understood as the tie that holds between two sets of linguistic expressions designated respectively as the subject and predicate of some sentence or proposition."[98] In Ṭūsī's system this sense of predication is easily implemented by the rule that any sign can predicate a sign of a

lower level. Munitz notes that "By a semantic predication we shall understand a relation or a tie between an extra linguistic subject and the predicate taken as a linguistic item." A similar theme is expressed in the works of Tūsī; here he provides us with one specific rule: namely, that the only kinds of existent statements are those the subject of predication of which is of the lowest level. Accordingly, "A(H)" or "L(H)" is a legitimate statement about "essences" but not about existents, which are named by the signs of level zero. Consequently, the only language-thing implication which a sentence would have is determined by the number of the level of its signs. Obviously, this method is incomplete, for cases like "H(s)v-H(s)" contain a sign of level zero. But it asserts nothing significant for the actual world and does not imply an existential fact. This and many other obvious difficulties notwithstanding, we observe that Tūsī's semantical sense of predication does not even permit the question of treating "humanity" (a Porphyrian "species") as an individual; since "humanity" can meaningfully be predicated of "Socrates," "humanity" is not a name of an individual, for its level must be higher than zero. This condition explains clearly what it means to say that : "a first substance is not predicated of any subject." Now, let us turn to Munitz' third distinction.[99] "By ontologic predication is meant a relation or a tie between subject and predicate where both are extra linguistic." In this context, Tūsī would say that logic has nothing to do with the ontologic sense of predication. Accordingly, in Ṭūsī's *Isagoge* the problem of universals, which Porphyry himself excluded from his logical work, is not even raised. Ṭūsī's position may be summed up as follows: if we apply logic to the actual world, then sentences in which individuals of the lowest levels function as subjects are existent-type of sentences. The contingent truth value of a sentence belongs, not to logic, but to semantical considerations when we interpret the language. In the first sense, the notion of species as "predicables" is irrelevant to existence; in the second sense, we could say that "species" are not

individuals; and, in the third sense, "predication" is analogical problem.

When we turn to the most prominent Muslim philosopher, ibn Sīnā, we observe a series of philosophical analyses which deal specifically with being and existence. First, a few observations concerning his methodology. Ibn Sīnā differentiates between two kinds of justifications: a theoretical justification by means of which we can decide, for instance, whether or not the concept of a "bodily substance" can have an instance; and a sensible justification which is the only kind which can enable us to decide whether or not a particular body (a first substance) exists in the actual world. For example, when Strawson claims that he can explain "the close connection between the idea of an individual in a logical sense, and the idea of existence, of what exists," he does so in order "to have ... some reason in the idea that persons and material bodies are what primarily exist."[100] Strawson needs only a "theoretical justification" for his analysis, for he is only talking about "kinds of existents" and not pointing to an actual specific existent. When we come to the problem of explaining how categorical analysis is relevant to the questions of being and existence, we note that for ibn Sīnā there are two senses of categories. Asserting that categories belong to logic,[101] he wrote what may be the most extensive book on the logic of categories ever to have appeared in Greek, Arabic, or Persian. Like Aristotle, ibn Sīnā gave to the categories a logical sense; unlike Aristotle, he also endowed them with a metaphysical sense, a sense which he integrated into his metaphysical texts as *the second* most primitive tool for a conceptual analysis of terms related to being and existence. His Persian text begins with the assertion that being *qua* being (*hastī*)[102] is the most general concept of metaphysical analysis.

> Being is recognized by reason itself without the aid of definition or description. Since it has no definition, it has neither genus nor differential because nothing is more general than it. Being

does not have a description since nothing is better known than it. It is possible that one recognizes its name in one language by means of another language.

He mentions, moreover, two kinds of being: the impossible essences, which cannot be realized, and the Necessary Existent, which is neither an individual existent nor part of the categories of substance and accident. Consequently, his first argument focuses, not on categorical analysis, but on the conceptual analysis of modalities. Accordingly he assumes that being can legitimately be concatenated with the three modalities: necessity (*wājibī*), contingency (*mumkinī*), and impossibility (*mumtani'ī*). The combination of "being" with the last two modal terms leads to a specification of an "essence" but not of an "existent." Ibn Sīnā asserts that the "essence of a Necessary Being" is none other than "existence." Only in the case of "the Necessary Being," which is identified with "that which is none other than 'existence' [wujud]," can we use a metaphysical analysis of being to speak about an actual existent. As we shall note later, this entity is not an "individual" existent. Impossible essences - e.g., "being a round square" - have no instances. In ibn Sīnian metaphysics contingency can be applied to both essences and existents. All existents, except the Necessary Existent (*al-Wājib al-Wujūd*), are contingent existents because their realization is due to an external cause. Ibn Sīnā distinguishes between two kinds of "contingent essences": (*a*) those which can be predicated of actual existents, as "humanity" can be predicated of Socrates; and (*b*) those which have no instances in the actual world, as illustrated by the case of "being a unicorn." Ibn Sīnā points out that, in the case of humanity, understanding the meaning of "humanity" (*mardumī*) is not an empirical inquiry but an inquiry into "essences." By contrast, an inquiry into the essence of a particular entity which exists — e.g., that Socrates' essence is "humanity" — must presuppose the existence of the entity in question. We should note

here that even though a contingent existent such as Socrates is not a Necessary Existent, he is nevertheless hypothetically a Necessary entity in the context of the entire world. Literally speaking, an existent exists if it is realized due to a cause which goes back ultimately to the Necessary Existent because the actual world conforms to the best of all possible designs; this he calls "the Good Universal Order" (*niẓām-i khair-i kullī*). In legitimate philosophizing we should be careful, ibn Sīnā warns us, to distinguish between two distinct kinds of entities: essential beings and actual existents. The following text, hitherto unavailable in English, illustrates this point:

From al-Ishārāt wa-l-Tanbīhāt

Know that anything [*shai'i*] which has an essence may be realized among existents and may be conceived intentionally when all its elements are present. But [the concept in question] has a meaning other than that [its instance is an] existent, [this meaning] which is a feature of what neither exists [in the realm of actual entities] nor is conceived [by us along with other accidents in the context of its instance]. Thus it follows that for [any entity] "existence" [i.e., the realization of an entity] has a meaning which is different from its "essence." That which determines its existence [i.e., its realization in this world, as a "thing"] differs from factors determining its essence [i.e., the conceptual element in the specification of an essence]. [The latter is] irrespective of its realization among sensibles or its [psychological considerations] in our intention. Consideration of neither of these factors [its realization among actual existents or our mental attention to the concept in question] is needed for [establishing the meaning of a concept such as humanity: these

factors — i.e., the realization of an instance of an essence and our conception of it —] are additional [features] of it. Should existence be the basis of the [meaningfulness] of an essence, then it would be impossible for us to establish the meaning of that reality [essence, universal] by ourselves independently of instances [which would have been the basis of the essence in question]. Moreover, it would have been impossible for us to understand the meaning of "being a human" only on the basis of our thoughts alone [if the meaning of an essence would depend on its existent instances]. We would have to know whether or not there is an instance [of the essence in question among the sensibles before being able to know about the essence].[103]

Let us now turn our attention to the entire realm of being in the ibn Sīnian system.

There are:

(1) one Necessary Existent
(2) an indefinite number of intentional concepts of impossible essences, e.g., a round square
(3) an indefinite number of contingent essences which are divided into two groups
 (a) unactualizable contingent essences which could be realized but are not actualized in this world, the best of all possible worlds, and
 (b) contingent essences which are realized by their actual instances due to causes which ultimately relate to the Necessary Existent
(4) individual first substances, along with their realized accidental features, e.g., "a white patch" of snow on a mountain would be an accidental concrete aspect of a substance (the mountain).

The last-mentioned — i.e., individual substances — include the heavens and bodies in the sublunary realm. The status of the soul of a person is a controversial topic in ibn Sīnian philosophy. We have expressed our view on this topic elsewhere, and recommended the adoption of a process (instead of a substance-event) language for clarification of ibn Sīnā's concept of the self and its relation to his "intelligences" (the forms of the heavenly bodies).[104] To answer questions posed in this paper, let us note how the existence of the soul-person (*nafs*) can be discussed in terms of the Necessary Existent.

Without any question the most important feature of ibn Sīnā's philosophy is his concept of the Necessary Existent, which is neither Neoplatonic nor Aristotelian. As we have noted, for Plotinus and Proclus the One is above being, but for ibn Sīnā the Necessary Existent is a being — specifically, that being which is a necessity. Numerous other distinctions between the Necessary Existent of ibn Sīnā and the Neoplatonic One can be documented.[105]

A comparison between Aristotle's and ibn Sīnā's doctrines of the ultimate being establishes that there are three major distinctions between them. The first is that Aristotle's prime mover, being co-eternal with the world, does not generate matter. Gilson uses this feature of the Aristotelian system to distinguish it from the Thomistic:

> In short, because the God of Aristotle is one of the causes and one of the principles of all things, but not the cause nor the principle of all things, there remains in the Aristotelian domain of being something which the God of Aristotle does not account for, which is matter, and for this reason the metaphysics of Aristotle cannot be reduced to unqualified unity.[106]

In contrast to Aristotle's view of the ultimate being, in the ibn Sīnian depiction of this principle, the Necessary Existent emanates

bodies. Secondly, there is no "mystical union" between the prime mover and the ψυχή of Aristotle, while, as we shall demonstrate, ibn Sīnā advocates a mystical union between persons and the ultimate being. But, thirdly, the most significant feature of the ibn Sīnian doctrine of the ultimate being is that it is neither a substance nor an accident, and thus posits a being outside the Aristotelian categories.

In his argument on the ultimate being, ibn Sīnā presupposes the significance of such terms as "dependence," "essence," and "cause," terms which are part of Scholastic vocabulary, which he was instrumental in developing. Though it is beyond the scope of this essay to analyze each of these terms, we can offer some examples from ordinary language which may be helpful in understanding ibn Sīnā's use of them. Ibn Sīnā's argument to prove that the Necessary Existent is not a first substance may be outlined as follows. To begin with, every first substance is a composite of an essence and a substratum of which the essence in question is predicated. For example, in the case o the individual substance Socrates, the essence humanity is at ibuted to the substratum, the body of Socrates. In addition to these elements, there must be some laws which keep the elements together. He uses the term *dāranda* (which may be translated as "the beholder of") to express his view that the persistence of a composite actual existent is dependent upon several factors. For example, in the case of a house, the persistence of the house depends not only on the elements constituting the house or the shape (the formal cause) of the house in question, but on gravity and other laws governing the chemical reactions between elements constituting the house, e.g., the cement which connects the glass window and the brick wall. According to ibn Sīnā, all these variou factors — namely, the elements, the form, and the laws necessary for the persistence of an entity X — are "causes of X." But since ibn Sīnā assumes that no necessary entity can have a cause, the Necessary Existent cannot be a composite, and thus it cannot be a substance. In the

same manner, since accidents depend on substances for their realization, the Necessary Existent (*al-Wājib al-Wujūd*) cannot be an accident.

Therefore, since ibn Sīnā rejects outright the οὐσία (*jauhar,* "substance") theory of the ultimate being, what is his ultimate being? One interesting clue, which does not describe the ontological status of the Necessary Existent but may "point to" its relation with the realm of existent individuals, is found in the *Dānish Nāma:*

> Thus it became evident that there is for the world a primary [entity] which is unlike the world; moreover, the existence of the world is due to it and its existence is a necessity. Its existence is due to itself. In fact it is absolute Existence [or existence per se; *wujūd-i maḥḍ*].[107]

The ultimate being for ibn Sīnā, then, is that which is the source of the existence of individual existents; to be an existent is to have been caused by the ultimate being. Is it possible to explain and analyze this basis of all existents? Ibn Sīnā answers this question firmly in the negative; in the metaphysics of *al-Shifā',* he points out that we cannot reason (*burhān*) or argue about the nature of the Necessary Existent.[108] But, we may ask, what other means can we find to point to the Necessary Existent in order to distinguish it from other existents? The answer leads us to the notion of "self."

Man, according to ibn Sīnā, can be depicted not as a fixed substance but in terms of a process of a revelation, a spiritual journey described in different languages, e.g., by means of a series of philosophical insights which make us aware of our own "modal" dependence on a Spinozaic type of an ultimate being. The last stage on this way of salvation, according to ibn Sīnā, lies in the "highest happiness" and in "the ultimate success" of persons: namely, to be united (*paivand*)[109] with the Necessary Existent.

This relation of "union" is not a metaphor used to relate man to the ultimate being. In his *Treatises on Love*, [110] ibn Sīnā envisions an eschatological scale of degrees of "love" which is based on two factors: (*a*) the notion of man as that entity which was originated from the Divine Source retaining within him a theophany, the existent aspect of the Necessary Existent; and (*b*) a concept of *ittiḥād* or union the aim of which is our own perfection (*kamāl*, ἀρετή). The Necessary Existent is also called "the Absolute Good" (*al-Khair al-Muṭlaq)* in Platonic terminology but in a non-monotheistic mode;[111] the emanation of the contingent realm from the Necessary Existent is determined in the following sense of "determination." In monotheistic cosmologies it is logically possible for God, an absolutely transcendent entity, to exist while there is no other entity in the world. By contrast, in the ibn Sīnian cosmology, it is logically impossible for God to exist while the contingent world does not exist. The differences between "rational" and, "mystical" perspectives of the ultimate being lessen when the normative dimension of man's salvatioı ᴐ discussed. For example, in the *Dānish Nāma*[112] the mystical ı. 'on is treated as an abstract metaphysical topic related to the notion of different degrees of pleasures. In the *Najāt*, ibn Sīnā develops a similar theme in relating that it is the aim of the rational soul to become united with the Absolute Good, and describing this vision as the "perfection" or "the virtue" of the rational soul.[113] In the *Ishārāt* (III.53) he states specifically that there is exactly one way of indicating (or pointing to, *Ishārāt*) the Necessary Existent: namely, by means of the mystical intelligence (*al-ᶜirfān al-ʿaqlī).*

Thus, it is clear that in ibn Sīnā's philosophical system the ultimate entity, which is identified with the first cause (*ᶜilat-i awwal*), is that entity in terms of which w⁻ can claim our own existence. To be an existent is to have been derived from the ultimate entity. Moreover, we can relate to the Necessary Existent only by our most perfect insight in a mystical vision of the ultimate entity aııɹ existence per se. This vision is achieved by our love for

the ultimate being, not when we are constituted in terms of an Aristotelian Body-Soul composite, but when our personal ego perspective of the self is transformed by what our highest philosophical intuition can achieve: a reflection upon the Necessary Existent. This vision leads man from a contemplation of his own existence to a contemplation of the ultimate being.

In sum, ibn Sīnā's realm of being (which contains entities other than existents), and existence (which interrelates existents of persons and other existents to a vision of Existence per se) is a radical modification of the Aristotelian οὐσία theory of ontology.

A Philosophy of "Essence"

In the medieval world the problem of universals divided the philosophers into realist, nominalist, and conceptualist camps; in the Near East similar debates also served as rallying points for philosophical positions. The "essence-existence" distinction initiated by ibn Sīnā became the *point d'appui* for different ontological positions. Some philosophers, numbering in their forefront the followers of al-Suhrawardī, who created a school of illuminationistic monism, held the view that philosophy proper should consider the ontological status of entities which have no relationship to existents. There were other philosophers who considered those signs which in some sense point to, but never "capture," the realm of existent entities as the only signs which have meaning. Let us focus on the views of Azzīz al-Dīn Nasafī, a philosopher belonging to the former camp whose writings have hitherto not been discussed in English.[114]

Nasafī (ca. thirteenth century) postulates two different perspectives according to which the structure of the world may be schematized. In the first perspective there are three realms, which

for simplicity's sake we shall designate as R1, R2, and R3. R1 contains only God, whose role in Nasafī's system is analogous to the Principle of Sufficient Reason. According to him, all statements about the existence of every actual entity are based on God's existence, God's nature, and the structure of the best of all possible worlds. R2 contains two sets of universals: a set of impossible entities — e.g., "a round square," which only can be named but cannot be conceived by God or by creatures; and a set of universals, which may or may not have instances in the actual world, e.g., "humanity" or "being a unicorn." Nasafī refers to the latter as *quwwa* or "contingent" kind of entities. His peculiar use of "contingency" as applied to universals may be explained by the following reasons: (*a*) unlike their instances universals in their totality are not objects of sense experience and are not "actual" (*f āʿ l l*) determinate particulars in the sensible world — e.g., by means of our senses we can never experience "humanity"; and (*b*) universals not expressing contradictory properties may or may not have instances in the actual world. Among the members of this latter realm, God's will decides which of the contingent entities will be instantiated. Instantiated actual cases of contingent potential entities in R2 constitute particular existents which endure only for a limited time in R3. Members of R3 are actual entities which, according to Nasafī's position, are inferior and posterior to potential beings. We recall from Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (Book *0*, chap. 8) that "actuality" (ἐνέργεια) is prior to "potentiality" (δύναμις) in definition, time, and substance. It follows from this that no "suspended form" or universal without an instance is a legitimate subject matter of metaphysics. Nasafī presents arguments showing that potentiality (*quwwa*) is applicable to *abstracta* and is prior to actuality (which is also true of *concreta*). Let us paraphrase some of Nasafī's arguments.

To begin with, for Nasafī, potentiality need not be instantiated, nor, for that matter, can it "begin" or be "created." For example, it is nonsense to talk about "the origin of the concept of circularity in

time t(o)" such that prior to t(o) no instance of circles could have existed; moreover, literally speaking, potential entities, like non-material concepts, are not events which can be initiated or terminated; nor are they composite terms which can be assembled. It is true that one may say that at time t(o) someone began talking about a concept, e.g., about the "smallest infinite number larger than the size of natural integers"; but it would be difficult to understand what saying that a number began at a particular time would mean. Conversely, every composite entity and all bodies which are composites can be assembled at a time or can be conceived of as a composite in their present form at a given time. Thus Nasafī regards potentiality prior in time to actuality.

Now, let us move to the subject matter of definitions. A definition takes a few determinable features through a potential essence which can define them — e.g., "humanity" is "being a 'rational' animal." However, "being an individual of every particular bodily existent" in R3 has an indefinite number of determinable features, e.g., shades of color, physical size, a relationship to other entities, a rate of decay or growth, and the like. Since there is no definition of individual existents and since potential senses are relatively simple and can be specified by means of a few universals, we should note that if "individuals" are the only actual entities, then "potentiality" is prior by definition to actuality.

The final point in Nasafī's system, priority in substance, may be discussed in the following way. There are two senses of "substantiality": one with regard to being the "first substance," as in not being a predicate of a subject; and one with regard to being the "second substance," as in "being an essence." Nasafī takes the "persistence" of an entity to mean a relationship to its substantiality and assumes that "being an essence," going back to the time argument, is a more "persistent" feature than being a temporally limited existent. In this second sense of substantiality, actualities are prior to potentialities.

Nasafī's second ontological perspective opens on two domains: the realm of the annihilated entity, which Nasafī mistakenly calls *ma'dūm* but which in Arabic-Persian philosophical vocabulary is the traditional equivalent of "privation," and the realm of essences the "existential reality" of which is determined as follows. All particular existents: (*a*) have been realized, (*b*) are realized, (*c*) will be realized, or (*d*) may be realized in another possible world which can be conceived by God, who, due to his own nature, did not choose to realize it. Now, an essence is "existentially real" if and only if a member of classes of entities belonging to groups (*a*), (*b*), or (*c*) possesses the property of the essence in question. An essence is "totally God-dependent" if and only if it is neither an impossible essence nor "existentially real" (which means that its ontological status depends on God's knowledge). Even though Nasafī emphasized "essences" over "existents," in the context of "existential reality," his essences turn out to be dependent either on actual cases or on God, who is an existent. Let us examine some passages from Nasafī which delineate his system. (The following is an original translation.)

On the Analysis of Essences (Māhiyyāt)

Know that essences are the being-reality [*ḥaqa'iq*] of existents. Any entity which is an existent in an actual mode has a being-reality such that the entity in question is an existent because of that being-reality. Had the being-entity not existed, then the entity in question would not have been realized as an actual existent. Such a being-reality is called "an essence" [*māhiyyāt*], but it is also called a "possibility" [*mumkini*]. The reality in question is other than "existence" (*wujūd*) and "privation — not-being" [*ᶜadam*].

External existence [meaning that an essence has a instance in R3] as well as external non-existence [meaning that an instance of an essence in R3 is lacking] are two of the features of essences. Such a being-reality [essence] can be described by its predicate which is "existence" [meaning that an instance of it exists] or by its predicate which is "privation-non-existence" [meaning that it lacks an instance in R3].

Concerning the existence of God the exalted, the first generator, there are arguments which support and arguments which deny the position that he has an essence. Some hold that there is no essence for the existence of God the exalted, since there cannot be a multiplicity in the essence of God in any way whatsoever; God the exalted is an independent existent as an absolute unity. Others have asserted that the existence of God is identical with his being-reality [essence]. Still others have claimed that the existence of God the exalted is other than his essence because, although God's existence is known to man, God's essence is not so known. Consequently, his being-reality [essence] is other than his existence. Concerning the possible existents we note that they all have essences, since essences are the being-reality of existents and since having an essence is not the same as simply existing. Names of entities are the names of such essences as correspond to the names given to the world, the heaven, the earth, humanity; in sum, there is a name for each of the essences [i.e., for each existent in question]. One may be able to describe [a] world with respect to its property of being an existent [i.e., with respect to its correspondence to the actual world] or not-being an existent [with respect to its difference from the actual world]. Consequently, "being a world" must be the name of an entity other than "existence" or "non-existence"; that [entity] is [none other than] an essence.[115]

In the foregoing text Nasafī's use of at least two different languages is striking. In analyzing different types of entities which

can be conceived, he stipulates distinct realms of being which are isolated by the manner in which they exist. But when he attempts to discuss "existence of persons" and relationships of persons with a divine-like "ultimate being," he discards the theoretical distinctions, thus allowing the person-self to become once again, in a way familiar to us through ibn Sīnā, related with the divine. Nasafī relates, for example, the following incident. "Someone asked ibn Sīnā 'What exists?' a question to which ibn Sīnā is said to have replied, 'That to which one can [physically] point [*ishāra*].'" But Nasafī continues, "Someone asked Ali (who represents the mystics) 'What is an existent?' and Ali answered with a question, 'What is that (or what can be that) which *is not* an existent?'"[116] Comparing[117] "absolute existence" (of God) to a(n infinite, unlimited) light "without beginning or end," Nasafī observes that this sense of "existence" as a totality cannot be the subject matter of analytical discourse. With regard to the subject of the mystical return, Nasafī holds, with Proclus, that all entities return to their source (ἀρχή, *aṣl*);[118] for the depiction of the mystical return, he uses the familiar drowning analogy[119] in which an individual existent finds his perfection as a mode blending with existence or God. He concludes that "There is no existence but God's existence,"[120] and reiterates the principle that "Pure life which comes from God goes back to God."[121] By "pure life" he means the eternal aspect of persons which is embodied for a limited duration and then returns to its source.

In Nasafī's writings the development of two languages can be observed: one for the analysis of entities about which we can speak, and another to facilitate discourse about topics such as the ultimate being, "existents," and the self. Whereas the first language is totally non-Aristotelian, the second approaches in certain ways the ibn Sīnian process language depicting a mystical union. In spite of his anti-Aristotelianism, Nasafī follows ibn Sīnā in admitting that "an existent" cannot be defined; moreover,

his classification of different kinds of essences depends in fact on existents.

Mullā Ṣadrā - A Philosopher of "Existents"

In the philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā (1572-1640), which championed the position that "existence" and not "essence" is the primary term by which "being" (*ḥaqīqat*) can be analyzed, "existent" itself can be only experienced, not analyzed.

Mullā Ṣadrā advanced the notion that we cannot talk legitimately about the relationship between "existence" and "essence" since, when we use "existence," we are actually abstracting it into a mental essence the reality of which is distinct from any existent. He claims, moreover, that there are only existents and that other terms, including "existence" and "to be an existent,'" are essences rather than facts which should be assigned to a realm which one cannot discuss in language. What exists is uniquely particular and incapable of being known. In talking about it, we mistakenly talk about a conceptualized abstraction of existence as if it were an individual reality. In his *Kitāb al-Mashā'ir* (*Peripatetic Philosophy*),[122] Mullā Ṣadrā notes that there are two kinds of analyses of terms: either (*a*) "one expressing a linguistic usage," a method which we can clarify by citing examples of the position of the term in question and by comparing its syntactical features with other concepts; or (*b*) an ontological analysis (*ḥaqīqī*), which in itself is carried out either by a method of "real definition" (*ḥadd*) or by description (*rasm*).[123] For philosophies of "existents," he holds that the latter procedure is impossible, while the former is useful in presenting us with examples of linguistic analyses of terms which point to, but do not explain, existents.

To show that the ontological analysis of "existence" is impossible, Mullā Ṣadrā points out that a real definition is derived from the specification of an entity in terms of its genus and differential. Moreover, the genus of an entity X must be common, well known, and more determinable than X; for example, in the definition of "man" as a rational animal, animality, the genus of man, is more determinable than humanity. However, nothing can be more determinable and common than "existence"; it follows that "existence" cannot be defined.

When we turn to the problem of describing a class, the description in question singles out a property which belongs, in a unique manner, to every member of that class: e.g., "man is that entity which has a straight backbone and is a biped." Now, since *wujūd,* or existence, is the most evident constituent of actual entities, we cannot single out any particular existent per se, since there is nothing which does not exist; whatever is is an existent.

Having shown the limitation of analyses of "existence," Mullā Ṣadrā proceeds to clarify *wujūd* by its uses in ordinary Arabic discourse. He starts by inquiring into the problem of whether or not "existence exists" or whether there is existence, and observes that whatever exists prior to its realization is incomprehensible unless it is possible to account for it by privation. For example, in the sentence "You do not have a kind uncle who will take care of you," "kind uncle" is supposed to be a kind of entity which could be mentioned by privation, whereas the actual "kind uncle" cannot be described since the description implies listing an indefinite number of facts.

In considering existence as a predicate of an entity along with other predicates, such as "being happy," we note that the most "evident" feature of any entity is the fact that it exists, that it is an existent. Thus, the question "Are there existents?" is restated to mean "Is that which is the most evident feature of any entity evident?" To this we may reply "Yes." If so answered, this question utters only a vacuous truth like "Is *p p*?" Mullā Ṣadrā

also notes that existence is that aspect of an entity which becomes evident as a potentially existing entity is realized. This feature of his use of "existence" is obviously modeled on a definition of the "soul" (ψυχή) given by Aristotle. One may object to both these "definitions" because of their circularity; we recall that Aristotle depicts the soul in terms of "being potentially alive" or "being potentially organic," in spite of the fact that "soul" carries in a sense the vacuous implication "to be alive" or "to be organic." It is questionable whether one can understand "a potentially existing entity" without understanding something about "existence." By confronting this difficulty explicitly, Ṣadrā, in his use of existence in terms of "potentiality," "actuality," "realization," and "privation," shows that a description of "existence" ends at best in circularity.

Let us now focus on Mullā Ṣadrā's philosophical views concerning "essence." He mentions that the notion of "essence" (*māhiyya*) is either useless or vacuous. To prove his point, he distinguishes between two senses of *māhiyya,* which we can designate as "essence 1" and "essence 2." His concept of "essence 1" corresponds to Aristotle's use of τί ἐστι and ibn Sīnā's *māhiyya,* illustrated by the case of "humanity" which can be considered as the essence of Socrates. Mullā Ṣadrā points out that this notion of an essence does not further our understanding of the peculiar nature of the entity in question, for it fails to distinguish it from other entities, an essence being common to many individuals; "humanity," for example, can be attributed to Plato, Aristotle, and others. To explain his use of "essence 2," he mentions the phrase *mā bi al-shi'a huwa huwa,* which expresses the question "What is the thing [which it is] ?" According to Mullā Ṣadrā one can answer this question, not by the statement "It is a human," but by a vacuous tautology "This which is is this which is." Since Mullā Ṣadrā's examples are not clearly translatable into ordinary English, let us try to clarify his views by the following explanation. Syntactically all predicates can be attributed to more than one

entity, but an individual existent, represented by an individual constant, is not predicated of any entity and belongs to the level zero in the context of the theory of type. Supposedly, one may argue that this syntactical distinction between the predicate and individual signs implies an ontological distinction between what is designated by these signs — namely, individual existents and universals. It follows from such a position that no combination of universals can be substituted in fact for an actual existing individual, even though a combination of predicate terms may be used in a language to distinguish individual constants. Mullā Ṣadrā affirms that when we experience an individual existent, the entity in question exists as a unique entity; the predicates which we use to describe this entity merely point to some of its features which may also be applicable to other entities. According to Mullā Ṣadrā, essences, which are expressed by predicates, are at best useful guideposts which point to kinds of existents; no conceptualization of essences can be a sufficient substitute for the experience of actual existents.

Since ibn Sīnā's well-known "essence-existence" distinction was based on his differentiation between being (*hastī*) and existence (*wujūd*), the followers of Mullā Ṣadrā [124] attempted to equate *hastī* with *wujūd* for the following reason: although the ibn Sīnian study of metaphysics admitted some non-existent beings — e.g., "being a round square" — the followers of Mullā Ṣadrā considered only particular existents to be the legitimate objects to metaphysical inquiry and related all discussions of universals to actual existents. Consequently, for Mullā Ṣadrā and his followers there are no "impossible essences" or "essences which apply to no actual existents. For Mullā Ṣadrā , a universal (*kullī*) is a "general term" which has meaning only when the condition is met which requires the "universal" to be attributed to an actual individual existent. He holds, moreover, that there are no "ideal universals" — circularity, for example; rather, our universals are generalizations of different kinds of actual entities, e.g., the round

ball, the round moon, etc. Our understanding of particulars is strengthened when we notice that the terms used for particulars could not ordinarily behave as predicates in language; there is, for example, no correct usage for "Socrates-ness." Now, since "existence" cannot serve as the subject or the clarification, "existence" is neither a universal nor a particular, for it cannot be properly defined. The only "existents" are particulars. As an abstraction, "existence" is an essence which is different from actual existents.

Mullā Ṣadrā's criteria of "universality" are so constructed that higher level universals — e.g., "being a figure" — are universals because they can be attributed to a lower order universal — e.g., "'triangularity' is a figure" and "triangularity" is significant because we can say "this tower is triangular."

Let us now direct our attention to Mullā Ṣadrā's views on the relationship between the world and the ultimate being. Rahman summarizes Ṣadrā's views as follows:

> For Ṣadrā, the world is real when related to God; when not related, it has no being whatever. Indeed, the world is not even *related;* it is a *pure relation* or manifestation.... He therefore describes the relationship of the world to God, not as a building is related to the builder or even a writing is related to its writer, but as speech is related to the speaker; the moment the speaker ceases to speak, speech vanishes.[125]

With the assistance of Rahman's analysis of Ṣadrā's arguments, we may construct his views on the relationship between persons and the ultimate being in terms of the following steps: (*a*) "God is nothing but existence"; (*b*) we are also existents, but, unlike God, we are determinate and finite; (*c*) the wonder that there is existence — or Munitz' "the Mystery of Existence" — for a follower of Mullā Ṣadrā is not a question but an attitude about the world

which reaffirms Ḥallāj's statement "*Anā al-Ḥaqq*" ("I am reality-truth-God"). The analysis of this aspect of Mullā Ṣadrā's philosophy brings us to the topic of normative ethics which is outside the scope of ontology proper.

This last aspect of Mullā Ṣadrā's views presents us with a problem demanding analysis since it appears to contain philosophically significant theses embedded in a highly ambiguous language. Within Mullā Ṣadrā's philosophical and mystical framework, the individual reflects on two modes of his existence: on himself as a particular existent who is distinct from other particulars in the actual world, and on the sense that he too, among others, is an existent who can wonder about the meaning of Hallāj's statement "I am reality-truth-God." Even though it may not be totally clear to him what Hallāj meant by his statement, Hallāj's thesis undoubtedly asserts some kind of affinity between the existence of the individual and the existence of God (who for Mullā Ṣadrā is "nothing but pure existence"). Mullā Ṣadrā ponders over the degree of affinity between the existence of man and God's existence, which he sees reaffirmed in the Qur'ānic symbolical remarks that God is nearer to man than man's jugular vein and that if man were thrown to the very bottom of the earth, he would fall upon God. Our problem now is to determine whether these ambiguous remarks express a significant philosophical position. To begin with, we may interpret Mullā Ṣadrā's views in line with the traditional mystical doctrines which affirm the existence of a divine aspect in man. This aspect is said to persist after the mind-body combination, customarily designated as "person," has been destroyed, i.e., when man's active intelligence returns to God. But a more sophisticated interpretation of his views suggests that when Mullā Ṣadrā asserts that God is nothing but existence, it follows that in his philosophy reflection about the question "Why is there existence?" or the feeling of astonishment "that there is existence!" is equivalent to "Why is there God?" and to the feeling of astonishment "that there is God!" Yet the God in question is, not the transcendent deity of monotheism, but what ibn

Sīnā calls *wājib al-Wujūd.* (We take this concept to be "the ground of existence" or "the Necessary Existent" in terms of which our own actualization can be explained, in the same sense as the actualization of particular existents is explained by an appeal to the so-called Principle of Sufficient Reason.) These questions may result either in a verbal answer or in an attitude which leads to the awareness that probing into the mystery of existence is a primary problem of philosophical inquiry. We note that in Mullā Ṣadrā's philosophy one cannot offer a verbal analysis of "existence" (*wujūd*); consequently, we may look for another answer in the so-called mystical states in which the mystic is supposedly confronted with the divine in his last stage of self-realization. At this point it is appropriate to recall that Aristotle's heavens react to the immobility of the immaterial prime mover by imitating that immobility in a circular movement. In mystical literature this motion is often represented by a circular dance, a salient feature of *samā'* — the last stage of mystical self-realization. A circular dance, an ecstatic trance, is the mystic's reaction to the wonder which he experiences when he is confronted with the problem of the mystery of existence in its specific element of "the feelings of astonishment" in the last stage of mystical self-realization. We are now able to see that mystic's astonishments expressed by the equivalent statements "that there is existence!" and "that there is God" (in Mullā Ṣadrā's sense of "God") are merely linguistic expressions of the underlying philosophical attitude which a person achieves who has contemplated various aspects of the universe, including what may be eternal in him. These questions are not uttered in ordinary discourse; consequently a philosopher who focuses on the ordinary usage of language would not be concerned with them. But for a mystic or a philosopher who is interested in an inquiry into the nature of the universe these expressions embody serious problems which cannot be "answered" in simple sentences. We should note that the simplicity with which a version of the mystery of existence is formulated is misleading if it gives us the

illusion that either there must be a single simple answer to the question of the astonishment about "existence" or else the entire inquiry is meaningless. The reaction of mystics to this philosophical astonishment or to the confronting of the various problems of existence in what they consider to be the last stage of self-realization is symbolized by the dance which is analogous to an eternal circular motion — the best way in which the creature can imitate the divine or can give expression to the divine aspect in himself.

Mystical literature often distinguishes two aspects of this last stage of self-realization, calling them, respectively, *fanā'* and *baqā*. *Fanā'* — literally, "annihilation" — indicates that we no longer view our own existence as distinct from that of other existents; and *baqā* — literally, "eternity" or "persistence" — indicates that only in the context of our relationship with the divine, with God, or with the world can we view ourselves as being eternal. The mystical dance is that gesture which leads us supposedly from the *fanā'* aspect of the last stage of self-realization to an awareness of ourselves as a mode of the eternal divine substance or of the world in which our ultimate persistence (*baqā*) lies.

To avoid any misunderstanding we should make clear that the numerous questions concerning the legitimacy of such a position, which may be attributed to the so-called "existence" and "monist" (*waḥdat al-wujūd*) school of mystics, have not yet been answered satisfactorily. One objection to the solution which we have outlined may be raised by anyone who is committed to a rationalist position holding that no human situation should be beyond clarification by means of language. Obviously, followers of Mullā Ṣadrā would deny the capability of language to describe existents. Similarly, mystics who consider the result of their philosophy an activity rather than an intellectual understanding would refuse to commit themselves to the position of the rationalists. It is beyond the scope of this essay to discuss further normative aspects of

Mulla Ṣadra's philosophy since we have limited the scope of our inquiry to the ontological dimensions of the problems of being and existence in Islamic philosophy.

Conclusion: Some methodological limitations of the philosophies of being and existence

We have surveyed the development of a few representative Islamic ontologies of being and existence and have noticed both their marked differences from the Aristotelian models, and the perseverance of the salient features peculiar to them in spite of Neoplatonic tendencies embedded in the Arabic and Persian Aristotelian texts. In concluding, we should like to point out that these Muslim philosophers attempted to solve an important philosophical problem which has also found a place in the works of philosophers of many different traditions: e.g., Augustine, Descartes, Wittgenstein, M. K. Munitz, and H. D. Lewis. Let us briefly cite those attempts which in some significant aspect parallel the Islamic solutions discussed in this essay.

A number of ways have been mentioned in the course of this essay by which to approach the problem of being and existence. One approach is to provide a single philosophical framework, analogous to a Carnapian "axiomatization" of a theory, in which the entire "realm of being" is explained by an analytical method, thus providing clear and distinct names for constants of the theory and a set of rules which shows how these terms can be combined, how we can deduce truths from the basic assumptions of the theory in question, and how our system is to be interpreted for the actual world. The metaphysics in Whitehead's early writings[126] offers a perfect example of such an approach. The Aristotelian notion of categories or what one may call a "thing-event" language may be

viewed as another manifestation of this approach. According to this view, the domain of being consists basically of individual existents — first substances which include the prime mover as an individual agent. Apparently such a scheme was not accepted in practice by Platonists, Neoplatonists, or the Muslim philosophers, who, instead of following this "substance" approach, followed what Gilson calls a "unitary approach" in which material entities and the ultimate being are essentially related.

It is beyond the scope of this essay to explain causally "why" some philosophers rejected the Aristotelian delineation of being and existence. All we can do is to argue hypothetically on the basis of the logical implications arising out of the various positions examined. We claim accordingly that there is a certain number of "philosophical problems" or "implicit relationships" sought between "individual existents such as persons" and "the ultimate being" which cannot be explained within the closed system of the Aristotelian categories. Let us take note of several cases in which philosophers agree that the problem of relating the finite "person" or "particular" to the ultimate being is one of the most important problems of philosophy.

Wittgenstein assigns to "God" and "the self" similar status in the following passage: "There are two Godheads; the world and my independent I" (N. 8.7.16). Wittgenstein's notion of God is related to the world as follows, "How things stand, is God. God is how things stand" (N. 1.8.16). According to Max Black and E. Zemach, in Wittgenstein's system God can or should be identified with or related intimately to the philosophical self which cannot be experienced. Black expresses the point thusly:

> That which experiences is not itself an experience, is not *part* of the world (5.641*c*). The metaphysical subject must be looked for in the boundary or "limit" of the world (5.632, 5.641*c*): it is, as it were, that *outside* the world on which the existence of

every thing depends — it might as plausibly be identified with God as with my very self.[127]

Black's notion of "that *outside* the world on which the existence of everything depends" is identical to a phrase which ibn Sīnā uses to describe the Necessary Existent, which in his system cannot be defined. Zemach adds a normative dimension to the God-self relation in Wittgenstein by stating that in the German philosopher the definition of "happiness" in the sense of "be[ing] in agreement with the world" "provides us with a unique solution to a baffling problem: how can the independence of the 'second Godhead' [the self] be reconciled with the absoluteness of the 'first Godhead'?"[128] To acquire happiness, according to Wittgenstein, one must establish a harmony between "the world of the willing I" and "the world of God." On the basis of Wittgenstein's own text and the interpretations given to his writings by Black and Zemach two observations may be made: (*a*) the self and the ultimate being cannot be specified as individuals in the world; and (*b*) the highest happiness of man lies in a close relationship with the ultimate being. In his account of what constitutes the content of religious awareness, H. D. Lewis observes that "the question of the feeling or the content of religious awareness. .. begins to be formed from the first apprehension of finite being as having a supreme infinite source."[129] Other philosophers also relate the religious feeling which Lewis mentions to the ontological problem. Using such an approach, M. K. Munitz declares:

> The chief problem of ontology, as I have argued, is to give a satisfactory account of existence, and this amounts to giving an analysis of the relation of the domain of plural existents to the transcendent One that is Existence. In traditional "religious" terms it is to give an account of the relation of the finite to the infinite.[130]

For Descartes, the "finite" was his self-person; the infinite — which he claimed to know as the basis of the finite — was God.[131] Augustine began with the quest for the same two entities in his celebrated statement "God and the soul are all I desire to know."[132] He came to love the two in his quest, proclaiming "now I love nothing else than God and the soul, neither of which I know." In his *Confessions,* Augustine points to the goal of his quest — namely, the longing for a close affinity between the soul and God: "And when Thou art poured forth on us, Thou art not cast down, but we are uplifted."[133] In sum, the problem of the self and God and their interrelationship has been a prime concern for philosophers of different traditions at vastly different times.

The silence which the Aristotelian system maintains on this crucial topic may be attributed not only to a possible lack of interest in this problem on Aristotle's part but also to his inability to proffer a descriptive account of the relationship and its constituents using his substance language. For this language reduces individual existent persons and the ultimate being to the same category of substance, and such a classification precludes any affinity between the two. As has been pointed out, Muslim philosopher-mystics, such as Nasafi and ibn Sīnā, attempt to portray this relationship between the finite and the infinite as a process of self-realization in a language which contains what the earlier Wittgenstein calls "similes." Such relationships emerge in the depiction of the stages of love in the *Risāla fi-l-'ishq,* in the stages of the mystical way in *al-Ishārāt,*[134] and in the process which reveals the interdependence between a person's origin from the divine and his role in the world, described, for example, in the *Hayy ibn Yaqzān.*[135] It should be noted that the philosophical perspective revealed in the ibn Sīnian vision is not what Munitz calls "creationism,"[136] for in the mysticism of Hallāj and ibn Sīnā God does not "create" the world; in their systems, God is not an alien conscious entity to which one can point as an entity distinct from our own existence. Muslim mystics seem to assume that such

differences as may exist for a person between the "philosophical I" and the "ultimate being" are diminished through an acquaintance with the various ways of mystical experiences, even though existents and the ultimate being are not clearly defined in these systems. The objection may be raised that a methodologically correct treatment of ontology should specify the nature of being and the. nature of existence. This approach presupposes that it is the task of an ontology to formulate a coherent language rather than to concern itself primarily with problems which remain invariant with respect to language. There are two suitable answers to this objection. The first points to the uses of such ontological terms as "Existence!" or "God!" in contexts such as the sayings of the Rūmī-mystics in their sūfic dances. In these contexts, when we take account of the "pragmatics" of the words, we note that no clarification of concepts is intended; rather, the mystics use these terms as a response to the problem that, in their system of philosophy, existence cannot be defined and God cannot be known. Consequently, the question "What is existence?" leads not to an answer but to an activity — a dance. This dance corresponds to the circular motion of the heavens which in the Aristotelian system *imitates* the prime mover. It follows that in one system at least the result of an ontological search is an activity rather than a clarification of words. Another response was the invention of non-Aristotelian terms (for "God"), which indicates that the problem later discussed by Wittgenstein, Munitz, Lewis, and others cannot be handled satisfactorily by using Aristotelian terminology. Consequently, Muslimers, confronted with this problem, adopted a notion of an ultimate entity not unlike the Neoplatonic model, one which was essentially connected with a process-like concept of the self. And when the topic of union arose in philosophical texts, these philosophers used either similes[137] or an allegorical language replete with such images as illumination and drowning to depict a closer affinity between the ultimate being and persons. In the actual philosophizing about being and essence in Muslim

philosophy, the question of the specification of being and existence is not meaningful outside of specific contexts. Just as Plato's theory of the soul in the *Republic* was introduced as a means of depicting a just society, so being, existence, and related concepts were introduced in Muslim philosophy to solve the problems we have mentioned. Besides supporting our claims about the philosophical methodology which shaped Muslim ideas of being and essence, we have shown that Greek sources to some extent affected the formulation of the Aristotelian question to which Muslim philosophers in turn gave new answers. We have shown elsewhere how some of these answers affected the course of later Western philosophies.[138] An account of Muslim ontology has yet to be written. It is our hope that this essay constitutes an introduction to both Greek influences and later Muslim formulations of ontological positions on the topics discussed.

NOTES

1. By "Muslim philosophy" or "Islamic philosophy," we mean philosophical issues embedded in Persian and Greek philosophical texts written from the middle of the eighth century to the present era. For an account of some of these issues, see M. Fakhry, *A History of Islamic Philosophy* (New York, 1970) and P. Morewedge, "Contemporary Scholarship in Muslim Philosophy," *The Philosophical Forum,* 2, No. 1 (Fall 1970), 22-140.

2. By "philosophies of being and existence" we mean philosophical problems in which mention is usually made of the terms "being" and "existence" and related words such as "substance," "essence," and the like.

3. See R. Carnap, *Introduction to Symbolic Logic and Its Application,* trans. W. H. Meyer and J. Wilkinson (New York, 1958), pp. 171-73. In Carnap's formulation of an axiomatic system for an Aristotelian theory, "substance" would be one of the axiomatic primitive

constants of the system. Such terms can be presented without a definition, and their uses can be specified by the so-called rules of formation of the language in question.

4. See 'A. Badawi, *Aristū 'ina-l-'Arab* I (Cairo, 1947), pp. 12-21, 329-33; and R. Walzer's "New Light on the Arabic Translations of Aristotle" and "On the Arabic Versions of Books A, α and Λ of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*," in his *Greek into Arabic: Essays on Islamic Philosophy*, Oriental Studies I (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), pp. 60-113, 114-28, respectively.

5. *Proclus: The Elements of Theology*, ed. E. R. Dodds (London, 1963), pp. xxix-xxxiii.

6. Fakhry, *History of Islamic Philosophy*, p. 33.

7. *The Fihrist of al-Nadīm : A Tenth-Century Survey of Muslim Culture*, ed. and trans. B. Dodge, 2 vols. (New York, 1970), II 606.

8. For an analysis of Aristotle's criticism of Plato's position see C. J. De Vogel, "Aristotle's Attitude to Plato and the Theory of Ideas According to the *Topics*," in *Aristotle on Dialectic: The Topics*, ed. G. E. L. Owen (London, 1968), pp. 91-102. De Vogel argues (102) that although Aristotle's spirit is alien to authentic Platonism and in spite of the tendency to favor Platonism which appears in this book, there definitely are arguments against Platonic ideas in this work.

9. See W. V. 0. Quine, *From a Logical Point of View* (Cambridge, Mass., 1953). For a discussion of this topic in the context of Quine's entire ontology, see Guido King, *Ontology and the Logistic Analysis of Language* (Dordrecht, 1967), pp. 127-60; and J.Kaminsky, *Languge and Ontology* (Carbondale, Ill., 1969), pp. 47-64.

10. *Commentaria in Aristotelem graeca* IV, ed. A. Busse (Berlin, 1874), I.II.1-22.

11. Khawja Nasir al-Din Tusi is best known for his works on logic, math- mathematics, and ethics. See *Encyclopedia of Islam*, 4 vols. (Leiden, 1913-1942), IV 980-82. For a list of his works. see Carl Brockelmann, *Geschichte der arabischen Literatur*, 5 vols., 2nd ed. (Leiden, 1937-1949), 1.2.673.

12. *Existence and Logic* (New York, 1974), pp. 48-50.

13. "Neo-platonic Logic and Aristotelian Logic, Part I," *Phronesis*, 1 (1955-1956), 58-72; "Part II," ibid., 2 (1957), 146-60, esp. 155-56.

14. See S. H. Afnan, *Avicenna: His Life and Works* (London, 1958).

15. "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology," in *Semantics and the Philosophy of Language,* ed. Leonard Linsky (Urbana, Ill., 1952), pp. 208-28.

16. See I. Madkour, *La Place d'al-Fārābī dans l'ecole philosphique musulmane* (Paris, 1934).

17. See Rescher's *Al-Fārābī: An Annotated Bibliography* (Pittsburgh, Penn., 1962), pp. 42-43.

18. Ed. M. Mudaras Razawi (Tehran, 1948).

19. Ed. S. Dunya, 4 vols. (Cairo, 1960); hereafter referred to as *al-Ishārāt.*

20. D. M. Dunlop, "Al-Fārābī's Paraphrase of the *Categories* of Aristotle, Part I," *Islamic Quarterly,* 4 (1957), 168-97; "Part II," ibid., 5 (1959), 21-54.

21. 'Aziz ibn Muhammad Nasafī was a follower of al-Suhrawardi's school of illuminationism, which developed the mystical elements of ibn Sīnian philosophy. Six philosophical texts and numerous treatises are attributed to him. See the introductory remarks of A. M. Damghani in his edition of Nasafī's *Kashf al-Haqa'iq* (Tehran, 1965), pp.1-36.

22. *Kitāb al-Insān al-Kāmil,* ed. M. Mole (Tehran, 1962), pp. 344-61; hereafter referred to as *al Insān al-Kāmil.*

23. Ibid., pp. 1-309.

24. See n. 21.

25. Ed. H. Corbin (Tehran, 1964).

26. Ṣadr al-Dīn Muhammad Shirāzī, known as Mullā Ṣadrā , is the most important Muslim philosopher of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. See H. S. Nasr, *Ṣadr al-din Shirāzī and His Transcendent Theosophy* (Tehran, 1978).

27. *The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā* (Albany, NY, 1976).

28. All references to the works of Aristotle are taken from *The Works of Aristotle,* ed. W. D. Ross, 12 vols. (Oxford, 1908-1952), unless otherwise indicated.

29. In ordinary Persian the primary use of a phrase such as "the *māya* of so and so" means "the active ingredient of so and so." When one refers to an entity without a "*māya,*" one usually means, not that the entity in question has no bodily constituent, but that the entity is weak or has no power. R. C. Zaehner explains the role of *māyā* in the *Rig-Veda* as follows: "Varuna and Mitra are distinguished from other Gods by

their possession of māyā, 'mysterious power.' . . . This '*māyā*' in the *Rig-Veda* may be used for either good or evil ends, but in case of Varuna it is always regarded as being beneficent" (*The Dawn and Twilight of Zoroastrianism* [New York, 1961], p. 68). In Aristotle there is at least one normative of ὕλη in which it is the opposite of māyā. Aristotle notes that "matter [ὕλη]" desires form and adds that "the truth is that what desires the form is matter [ὕλη] , as the female desires the male and the ugly the beautiful — only the ugly or the female not per se but per accidents" (Physics 192A22-25). The Persian use of *māyā* never is negative but follows more what Zaehner describes as the Indic use of *māyā*. In the development of philosophy in Iran, some of the Zoroastrian themes which were originally developed from Indic thought persisted and were not modified by Greek theories; see E. Panoussi, "La Theosophie iranienne, Source d'Avicenne?" *Revue Philosophique de Louvain*, 66 (1968), 239-66. Consequently, a complete analysis of being and existence should in fact take into account the Avestan and Pahlavi Zoroastrian texts as well as those written in other Muslim languages (some of Mani's writings, for example, were written in eastern Aramaic).

30. *Aristotle: Metaphysics* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1966).

31. Owens notes four conditions for finding a suitable translation for οὐσια and concludes that a neutral term such as "entity" is "entirely non-committal" while both "substance" and "essence" are unsatisfactory (*The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics* [Toronto, 1936], pp. 137-54).

32. Ed. A. M. Goichon (Cairo, 1963), pp. 23-24.

33. *Alfārābī's Book of Letters* (*Kitāb al-Hurūf*): *Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics*, ed. M. Mahdi (Beirut, 1969), pp. 110-28.

34. Abu'l Mansūr Hallāj (857-922), the celebrated Iranian theologian-mystic, is the author of several texts on mysticism including twenty-seven recitals, eleven shorter works, and several poems. His famous assertion "I am *Haqq*" has been a stimulus to the development of monistic mysticism symbolizing the view that persons have a close affinity with God or in a sense, as some say, are God.

35. *The Development of Arabic Logic* (Pittsburgh, Penn., 1964), pp. 87-91.

36. *Asās al-Iqtibās,* pp. yaj-yah Of these, 113 are definitely his texts.

37. Y. Mahdawi lists 244 titles in his *Bibliographie d'Ibn Sīnā* (Tehran, 1954); G. C. Anawati gives 276 in his *Essai de bibliographie avicennienne* (Cairo, 1950).

38. *The Life of Ibn Sīnā: A Critical Edition and Annotated Translation,* ed. and trans. W. E. Gohlman (Albany, NY, 1974), p. 33.

39. *Mantiq al-Mashriqiyyīn* (Cairo, 1949), pp. 2-4.

40. *Al-Ishārāt,* III 271.

41. Ross observes distinctions in Aristotle's concept of what ontology is supposed to be:"Aristotle has in the main two ways of stating the subject matter of metaphysics. In one set of passages it is stated as τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὄν, the whole of being, as such." To support this view Ross refers to Book X, 1025B3, 1060B31, 1061B4, 26, 31, and to instances of σοφία

in 981B28, 982B9. About the second meaning Ross notes: "But more frequently metaphysics is described as studying a certain part of reality viz. that which is χωριστόν (exists independently) and ἀκίνητον (is independent of motion)"; to support this, he cites 1064B4, 1069B1, and *Physics* 192A34, 194B14, and *De anima* 403B15 (*Metaphysics* [London, 1958], I 252-53). Owens, in pointing out that variations of the legitimate subject matter of ontology as listed by Aristotle range from those which we have listed to "causes of the visible divine things" (Met. 1026A16-18), "the science of truth" (Met. 983B2-3), and "the science of Form" (*Physics* 192A34-36), asks "Can all these different modes of expression denote the same doctrine of Being?" while noting that "Aristotle himself appears conscious of no inconsistency or contradiction in these various designations" (*Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics,* p. 43).

42. *Aristotle's Metaphysics: Books, Γ, Δ and E* (London, 1971), p. 77.

43. *Existence and Logic,* p. 69.

44. *The Logic of William of Ockham* (New York, 1965), p. 119.

45. Ibid., p. 122.

46. The first is the celebrated passage about the active intelligence in *De anima* 430A, 10-25; the second, in *De generatione animalium* 736B15-25, states that νοῦς enters man as an additional factor from the

outside. In spite of these two minor remarks, no trace of what might be called the "mystical" can be found in the Aristotelian corpus.

47. For a support of this view, see J. L. Ackrill, "Aristotle's Definition of *Psuche*," in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,* 73 (1972-1973), 119-32. Ackrill holds that Aristotle's concept of a person is one of the primary substance, which is a combination of matter and form. No one takes into account Aristotle's remarks on the active intelligence; but in most Muslim philosophies, a "person" is immortal, after the death of the body, because of his active intelligence. Though this formulation often is conceptually unsatisfactory, we can think of no case in which the Aristotelian concept of a person, as Ackrill states it, was adopted in Muslim philosophies.

48. In *Met.* 1070,.18-21, Aristotle asserts, "Plato was not far wrong when he said that there are as many Forms as there are kinds of natural objects (if there are Forms distinct from the things, of this earth)." Earlier, at 99OBI-8, Aristotle had affirmed the notion that what others mean by Forms must be abstract entities which must correspond numerically to natural entities. It follows that there is no single Aristotelian interpretation of Plato's ontology of forms. This ambiguity in Aristotle's interpretation of Plato's metaphysics was a source of confusion for early Muslim thinkers who tried to find the development of a single ontology from the master Plato to the student Aristotle. Among the post-Averroës Muslim thinkers there was a tendency to take sides in the Plato-Aristotle controversy.

49. *Plato: The Republic,* trans. P. Shorey (London & Cambridge, Mass., 1935), 509B, p. 107.

50. Ibid.

51. *Plotinus: The Enneads,* trans. S. MacKenna (London, 1930). All references are given with the number of the *Enneads* followed by the section number.

52. *Plotini opera* II, ed. P. Henry and H.-R. Schwyzer (Paris & Brussels, 1959), p. 291. We have introduced a slight modification in our translation of this passage from MacKenna's text in order to preserve uniformity with the vocabulary used in this essay.

53. *Elements of Theology*, p. 101.

54. Ibid., p. 103. The Greek reads πᾶς θεὸς μεθεκτός ἐστι, πλὴν ἑνός which means that every particular can partake of every transcendent (divine) entity except the One.

55. *Hindu and Muslim Mysticism* (London, 1960), p. 163.

56. In *Individuals : An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics* (New York, 1963), Strawson clarifies his position in several ways. He asserts, for example, that "What we have to acknowledge, in order to begin to free ourselves from these difficulties, is the primitiveness of the concept of a person. What I mean by the concept of a person is the concept of a type of entity such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics, a physical situation etc. are equally applicable to a single individual of that single type" (p. 98). Even though Strawson argues that "material bodies, in a broad sense of the expression, were basic particulars" (p. 81), he nevertheless designates "persons" as a peculiar kind of primitive term in his metaphysical language, and does so, moreover, in such a way that no logical construction of "bodies" or "physical events" can give us an indication as to what is meant by "persons." According to Strawson's scheme, both "material bodies" and "persons" must, be primary particulars (p. 256).

57. Wittgenstein's positions are outlined in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (edd. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGinnes [London, 1961]) and *Notebooks, 1914-1916* (edd. G. H. von Wright and G. E. M. Anscombe, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe [Oxford, 1961]). Our references to these texts will cite the section number in the *Tractatus* and the date in the N*otebooks*. Wittgenstein notes that "the I" or "the metaphysical subject" — signifies an indefinable constituent of "experiencing" rather than something in the world which can be named. He notes, accordingly, that "the philosophical self is not the human being, nor the human body, nor the human soul, with which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject, the limit of the world — not part of it" (5.641). Elsewhere he observes that "The I, the I, is what is deeply mysterious! The I is not an object. I objectively confront every object. But not the I" (N 7.8.16-11.8.16). By means of analogy Wittgenstein attempts to explain the undefinability of "persons" in another passage, "Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be found? You say that it is just as it is for the eye and the visual field. But you do not actually see the eye. And I think that nothing in the visual field would enable one to infer that it is seen from an eye" (N 4.8.16). Even though in the above passage Wittgenstein calls "the thinking subject a mere illusion," the analogy between the connection of the eye and the visual field, on

the one hand, and that of the metaphysical subject and the world, on the other, indicates that no "limited" or "substantial" definition of the metaphysical subject is permitted in the Wittgensteinian system.

58. *Being and Some Philosophers* (Toronto, 1952), p. 3.

59. *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy* (New York, 1962), p. 318.

60. In *Topics* 100A-102B27, the predicables are described as follows: *property*— "a predicate which does not indicate the essence of a thing, but yet belongs to that thing alone and is predicated convertibly of it"; *genus* — "what is predicated in the category of essence of a number of things exhibiting differences in kind"; *definition* — "a phrase signifying a thing's essence"; and *accident* — "(1) something which, though it is none of the foregoing — i.e. neither a definition nor a property nor a genus — yet belongs to the thing; (2) something which may possibly either belong or not belong to any one and the self-same thing. . . ."

61. We have adopted the translation of R. I. Aaron in *The Theory of Universals* (London, 1967), p. 1.

62. *Logic of William of Ockham*, p. 68.

63. Ibid., p. 67.

64. *The Development of Logic* (Oxford, 1962), p. 187.

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid., p. 196.

67. Ibid., pp. 196-97.

68. *Theory of Universals*, p. 9.

69. Ibid., pp. 9-10.

70. "Neo-platonic Logic and Aristotelian Logic, Part II," 154.

71. See Kwame Gyekye, *Arabic Logic: Ibn -al-Tayyib's Commentary on Porphyry's Eisagoge* (Albany, NY, 1979).

72. *Averroës' Middle Commentary on Porphyry's Isagoge and Aristotle's Categoria*, trans. H. A. Davidson (Berkeley & Los Angeles, 1969), p. 27.

73. Ibid.

74. Gyekye, *Arabic Logic*, pp. 41-42.

75. Ibid., p. 56.

76. *Al-Shifā', Al-Mantiq (Al-Madkhal)*, edd. M. El-Khodeiri, A. F. El Ehwani, G.Anawati, and I. Madkour (Cairo, 1952), p. 10.

77. *Asās al-Iqtibās*, p. 6.

78. G. E. M. Anscombe and P. T. Geach, *Three Philosophers* (Oxford, 1963), pp. 16, 14, 15.

79. *A History of Formal Logic,* trans. I. Thomas (Notre Dame, Ind., 1961), p. 54.

80. *Collected Papers* II (New York, 1971), p. 171.

81. Ibid.

82. *Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione* (London, 1963), p. 79.

83. "Aristotle's Theory of Categories," in *Aristotle,* ed. J. M. E. Moravscik (New York, 1967), p. 145.

84. *Development of Logic,* p. 25.

85. Ibid.

86. Ibid.

87. Ibid.

88. Ibid., p. 31.

89. Ibid.

90. Ibid., p. 32.

91. "Neo-platonic Logic and Aristotelian Logic, Part II," 151.

92. *Studies in Arabic Logic* (Pittsburgh, Penn. 1963), p. 40.

93. "Al-Fārābī's Paraphrase of the *Categories* of Aristotle, Part I," 170; we have modified Dunlop's translation of section 4 of this text.

94. *Al-farabi's Book of Letters,* p. 36.

95. Ed. M. Danish Pashuh (Tehran, 1956), p. 10.

96. *Asās al-Iqtibās,* pp. 34-35.

97. Tūsī explicitly places the relative positions of "being a species" or "being a genus" in a definite order. He calls the species which can be predicated only of the individual *nau'-i sāfil,* and states that this species "because it is predicated of individuals [*ashkhās*] is also called the 'real' species" (ibid., p. 29). For a clear exposition of a version of the theory of type see Carnap, *Introduction to Symbolic Logic,* pp. 112-13.

98. *Existence and Logic,* p. 48.

99. Ibid., pp. 49-50.

100. *Individuals,* p. 256.

101. *Al-Shifā', al-Manṭiq (al-Maqulāt),* edd. M. El-Khodeiri, A. F. El Ehwani, G. C. Anawati, and S. Zayed (Cairo, 1959), p. 4.

102. *Dānish Nāma,* ed. M. M'in (Tehran, 1952), p. 102; see also our translation of and commentary on this text: *The Metaphysica of*

Avicenna (ibn Sīnā) (New York, 1973). In his Arabic texts on *Metaphysics* (p. 29), ibn Sīnā presents another version of the primitives of metaphysics: an existent (*maujūd*), a thing (*shai'ī*), and necessity (*ḍarrūrī*). From the context of the following discussion it becomes clear that he is using the concepts of necessity, contingency, and impossibility (p. 35) in subsequent passages in such a way that no meaning differing from that found in the Persian version is rendered. See *al-Shifā', Illahiyyal,* edd. G. C. Anawati, S. Zaid, M. Y. Moussa, and S. Dunya, 2 vols. (Cairo, 1960); hereafter referred to as *al-Shifā'*.

103. I 202-203.

104. See "Ibn Sīnā's Concept of the Self," *The Philosophical Forum,* 6, No. 1 (Fall 1972), 49-73.

105. For example, ibn Sīnā rejects the separation of the sensible world from the intelligible world by means of universals; Plotinus affirms this separation. Ibn Sīnā's Necessary Existent is a kind of being; Plotinus' One is beyond being. Plotinus regards numbers as substantial and associates them with the soul (*Enneads* VI [9] 5); for ibn Sīna numbers are accidents (*Dānish Nāma 10*).

106. *Being and Some Philosophers,* p. 135.

107. P. 38.

108. P. 354.

109. *Dānish Nāma ,* p. 37.

110. *Risāla fī l-'ishq,* ed. M. A. F. von Mehren in *Traites mystiques d'Abou Alī alHosain b. Abdallāh Sīnā ou d'Avicenne: Texte arabe avec l'explication en francais,* 3 vols. (Leiden, 1894).

111. Ibid., II 21.

112. Chap. 37.

113. P. 293.

114. *Kashf,* p. 35.

115. *Al-Insān al-Kāmil,* pp. 365-66.

116. *Kashf,* p. 31.

117. *Al-Insān al-Kāmil,* p. 289.

118. *Kashf,* pp. 132-33.

119. *Al-Insān al-Kāmil,* p. 113. The reference is made in the context of the lover (the philosopher-mystic who is aware of the significance of the Necessary Existence) who is drowning in his love for the beloved. This kind of love symbolizes the loss of the separated *ego*

(*fanā'*) for the sake of the eternal state (*baqā*) of union with the Necessary Existent.

120. *Ahl-i waḥdat mīgūyand ki wujūd yīkī bīsh nīst wa an wujūd khudā ist* ("The followers of unity assert that there is only one Existence and that is God"), *Kashf,* p. 22.

121. *Al-Insān al-Kāmil,* p. 144.

122. Our analysis covers the first eleven steps, which deal with the foundations of Mullā Ṣadrā's basic metaphysical language; for example, the first section or "step" deals with "the reality of existence," the question of talking about "the essence of existence," understanding existence by using words, and the problem of the peculiarity of existent entities.

123. Pp. 6, 82-83.

124. Ibid., p. 79. 'Umad al-Daulata, in his Persian commentary on this work, adds that *hastī is wujūd,* which is not found in the corresponding section of the Arabic text. Al-Fārābī, however, mentions the ordinary uses of the Persian *hastī'* and the Arabic *mawjūd* (an existent), and discusses the use of similar terms in Arabic, Persian, and Sodgian; see *Kitāb al-Ḥurūf,* pp. 111-13.

125. *Philosophy of* Mullā Ṣadrā , p. 77.

126. See his *An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge* (London, 1955). See Carnap's remarks (in *Introduction to Symbolic Logic,* pp. 171-76) that the Whiteheadian system in this text, especially Part III (on the method of extensive abstraction), may be axiomatized as physics. An example of an extended vision of the world in terms of value-bearing actual entities in the language of process is found in Whitehead's later system *in Process and Reality* (New York, 1955). It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss Whitehead's later system and its relevance to our analysis, but we might point out a remark in the later text (p. 28): "The notion of 'substance' [in his *Process and Reality* system] is transformed into that of 'actual entity.'" See Morewedge, "Ibn Sīnā's Concept of the Self" for a notion of "processes" as a substitute for "substance" in the context of "mystical union."

127. *A Companion to Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus'* (Ithaca, NY, 1964), pp. 308-309.

128. "Wittgenstein's Philosophy of the Mystical," in *Essays on Wittgenstein's 'Tractacus'*, edd. I. M. Copi and R. W. Beard (New York, 1966), p. 370.

129. *Our Experience of God* (London, 1959), p. 112.

130. *Existence and Logic*, p. 204.

131. In his third meditation, Descartes notes, "I clearly understand that there is more reality in an infinite, than of the finite — rather of God, than of myself. How could I understand my doubting and desiring — that is, my lacking something and not being altogether perfect — if I had no idea of a perfect being as a standard by which to recognize my own defects" (*Descartes' Philosophical Writings*, trans. E. Anscombe and P. T. Geach [New York, 1963], p. 85).

132 *Soliloquies* 2.7.1, in *Basic Writings of Saint Augustine* I ed. W. J. Oates (New York, 1948), p. 262.

133. *The Confessions* 1.2 (ibid., p. 4).

134. The last section of this text is devoted to mystical stations (maqāmāt).

135. Ed. and trans. H. Corbin as *Avicenne et le recit visionnaire* (Tehran, 1952).

136. *Existence and Logic*, pp. 204-205. Here Munitz shows why the so-called "creationism" and "illuminationism" are unsatisfactory attempts to solve the ontological question at hand. His use of "illuminationism" should not be confused with Suhrawardi's illuminationistic (*ishrāqi*) doctrine, which became the source of Nasafi's philosophical ontology of light rays emanating from the sun-like God. In Islamic illuminationism there is no distinction between "appearance" and "reality." It is a monism in which Munitz' "ontological question" cannot be formulated.

137. See L. Wittgenstein, "A Lecture on Ethics," *The Philosophical Review*, 74 (1965), 3-12. Wittgenstein notes here (9) that "I want to impress on you that a certain characteristic misuse of our language runs through all ethical and religious expressions. All these expressions seem, prima facie, to be just *similes*." Wittgenstein goes on to say (11) that, "For all I wanted to do with them [the ethical and religious expressions which are prima facie similes] was just *to go beyond* the world and that is to say beyond significant language [statements about facts *in the world*, e.g., statements in physics]." Among the normative

experiences, he mentions (8) one dealing with the fact that "the world exists" and another with the "experience of feeling absolutely safe."

138. For the development of the essence-existence distinction, see P. Morewedge, "Philosophical Analysis of Ibn Sīnā's 'Essence-Existence' Distinction," *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 92, No. 3 (1972), 425-35.

EPISTEMOLOGY: THE INTERNAL SENSE OF PREHENSION (WAHM) IN ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY

I. Methodology, Historical Context, and Aims

In his psychology, Avicenna recognizes *wahm* as an internal (*al-bāṭinī*) sense (*ḥiss*) or perception (*idrāk*), a category absent in Greek epistemology. He illustrates this sense, which we will argue should be understood to be "the process of prehension," with the story of a sheep who flees at the sight of a wolf because it *wahms* "danger."[1]

This paper focuses on the epistemic significance of *wahm*. With respect to formal methodology, Carnap's technique of reconstructionism is used for an informal explication of *wahm* through clarification of "the process of prehension".[2] The process of prehension is clarified by three secondary uses of *wahm*, rules for the primary uses *of wahm*, and four coherent meta-epistemic themes. In the light of this framework, we take our interpretation of *wahm* to be adequate in the context of the domain of its use.

Our philosophical methodology is pragmatic in spirit, applying the category of processes to depict a normative theory of prehension in the tradition of Dewey's instrumentalism.[3] We make use as well of Kenny's application oi post-Wittgensteinian methodology to Aristotle's notion of "will" and the recent scholarship of Rahman and Corbin on the Muslim contributions to the productive theory of imagination.[4]

The only research on *wahm* in contemporary literature is found in Wolfson's classical work on the internal senses.[5] Wolfson has done a great service to the field by gathering relevant material on the neglected topic of the internal senses. But his reductionistic method is logically unsatisfactory, and his philological findings are void of philosophical significance. In the spirit of Walzer, Wolfson who reads only what is "Greek" in "Arabia," recognizes the absence of any account of the internal senses in the Aristotelian corpus; moreover, he admits that *wahm* is not a direct translation of any Greek term.[6] However, he dismisses Goichon's recognition of the originality of *wahm* in Avicenna.[7] The bizarre explanation offered is that *wahm* is a result of a misunderstanding of a combination of Greek terms which vaguely "reflects" its function. Prior to the present study, no one challenged this conclusion, in spite of the fact that Muslims offer distinct explanations for each of the terms in question.[8]

Let us reflect upon the usefulness of our inquiry. First, since there is a germ of pragmatism in Aristotle's and in the Stoic's psychology of the animal soul, *wahm* may be a link between Greek philosophy and recent pragmatism. Second, an historical account of *wahm* as a creative process could be used as the first phase of a study of the creative role of the productive imagination in the discipline of the history of ideas. Finally, a study of *wahm* refines the instrumental approach to clarifying a dimension of experience by integrating values, reason, and activity.

II. Secondary Uses of *Wahm*

Wahm has been used consistently, but not universally, in Muslim philosophy, and it is omitted [illegible]iously only by Averroës.[9] As an ordinary word in the Arabic-Persian vocabulary, it has extensive uses. The term is found in Fārābī, Rāzī, Ṭūsī, Nasafī, Ghazālī, Suhrawardī, and others.[10] The most colorful sense

of *wahm* is employed in a mystical allegory of the process of emanations: (i) First, there is a point depicted as the atom of fire; it is the terminating limit of thought and the initiating limit of the space in the mind of the active intelligence.[11] The latter is the last member of a series of intelligences emanating from the One. The Neoplatonic One *(to hen)* in Islamic philosophy is identified with both Plato's form of the Good *(al-Khaiyr al-Maḥḍ)* and the Necessary Existent *(al-wājib al-wujūd).*[12] In its mystical symbolism, the One is often depicted as the sun, while the active intelligence *(nous poietikos, al-ᶜaql al-faᶜᶜāl)* is depicted by the moon or its intelligence as the angelic mediator (Gabrail);[13] together they signify the heavenly origin of the terrestrial realm; (ii) in the next stage, the point *tawwahum, i.e., wahms,* and a line is emanated; (iii) then, by similar emanations, a two-dimensional surface is generated; and (iv) finally, we have the emanation of the world of solids which depicts the material substances of the sublunary world.

This account is given in a Pythagorean poem by Jami;[14] it also appears in a text attributed to Avicenna entitled *Risāla dar ḥaqīqat wa kaifiyat-i silsilah-i mawjudāt wa tasalsul-i, asbāb wa musabbāt.*[15] The model is a mixture of Neoplatonic emanationism with the Pythagorean quantitative depiction of the world structure. Such a system is developed fully by *ikhwān al-Ṣafā.*[16]

The aforementioned ontological use of *wahm* is an exception; ordinarily, *wahm* is used only in epistemological contexts. Moreover, in spite of its universal use, investigators such as Goichon, Wolfson, and Rahman correctly single out Avicenna as the key Muslim philosopher of *wahm.* Avicenna is justly regarded as the most original Muslim thinker whose elaborated system influenced later philosophers. Aquinas, for example, quoted him, over five hundred times.

Accordingly, let us focus on the Avicennian corpus, which is rich in examples of both the primary and the following secondary usages *of wahm.*

First, *wahm* signifies a conceptual type of imagination. Using the term in this sense, Avicenna mentions that, while a body in fact may not be divided for the senses, its possibility of division is received by *wahm* (DAI, chap. 8). The same point is mentioned by Suhrawardi in *al-wāhi ʿamādī*.[17] Obviously, the position in question has at least two senses: (a) "a particular division" (For example, we may first look at a table which is a unity; then, by will we can conceive, in an imaginary field, scattered parts of the table in question), or (b) "a conceptual understanding" (For example, we cannot form an image of the set of real numbers, but we know that they are dense, in the sense that between any two real numbers there is a third one; and, theoretically, we can map a model of the table in question upon a three-dimensional axis explicated by real numbers).

Second, Avicenna uses *wahm* to clarify the limit of our ability to form a phenomenal image. He notes that ultimately a body is finite with respect to division. In principle, it cannot be indefinitely subdivided in two senses; no part can be divided indefinitely either (a) in actuality, or (b) by *wahm* (DAI, chap. 4). *Wahm* is used in describing a lower bound of a phenomenological extension of a conceptual image. For example, an area must be of a minimum extension to be an experiential sector of our image of a physical actuality or its abstract model. Hume made the similar claim about the minimal extension of an impression.[18]

The third notion of *wahm*, for Avicenna, is awareness of a set of transcendental conditions of the phenomena in the Kantian sense of the term. Using *wahm* in this sense, Avicenna states that what subsists in the body, i.e., the substratum, may become evident or known by *wahm* (DAI, chap. 7). Obviously, one cannot perceive a pure substratum (*hayūlā*), a prime matter which is a mere verbal abstraction. An experience of a first substance must contain some particular realization of perceptual universals such as a determinate set of qualities of either tactual or visual nature.[19] It is impossible to form an image of primary matter. There is, however, another

type of "knowledge" of a substratum; it signifies our awareness that our perception of change must presuppose a static subject which, as a Kantian transcendental substance, is also the designatum of the ostensive gesture. It is not clear which of these two senses is implied by Avicenna's remarks on primary matter.

Avicenna's report on the views of other thinkers on time indicates that he is clear on the main substance of this point: he relates that some hold that temporality is realized purely as an object of *wahm (tawahummī)* (Fann, p. 477); i.e., its existence is solely in the inner mind, not in the external world. This position, which circulated in the medieval Islamic world, is obviously the celebrated Kantian doctrine of the transcendentality of the spatio-temporal dimension of experience. Thus, *wahm* is used in the context of synthetic a priori knowledge of general conditions of experience.

As a philosopher, Avicenna is careful not to use *wahm* as, formally, intellection of the universal intentions, even though this is the most common usage in classical Arabic and Persian literary but non-philosophical texts.

III. *Wahm* as a Technicus Terminus In the Avicennian Normative Epistemology

Avicenna ranks *wahm* among the internal senses, *ahwal-ibatini,* of which he recognizes the following:

1. Common sense *(mushtarak):* analogous to Aristotle's *koine aisthesis,* this faculty integrates data from the five senses.

2. (Formal) conception *(muṣṣawara):* this takes the form of the sensibles from the common sense. The term *ṣurat* in Arabic-Persian means "form" (universals), *eidos;* thus, this faculty is related to the Platonic conception of purely formal and abstract

knowledge without particular content. It is not itself a perception, but combines the data, of other senses.

3. (Sensible) imagination (*takhayyul*): imagination in the sense of the Greek *phantasia*. It resembles sensation, except that its object may be absent in reality while the subject is imagining.

4. Prehension (*wahm*): the faculty in question.

5. Memory, for which three terms are used: *ḥāfiḍa, ḍikr, and yāddāsht* (Persian). It is usually described as the storage *(khazīna)* of the results of other senses (DAT, p. 96).

For Aristotle, the only addition to the external senses is the common sense which was adopted by the Muslims. The closest parallel to prehesion found in the *De Anima* and in *De Motu Animalium* is in the discussion of the reasonable imagination.[20] Here, Aristotle begins by dividing imagination into reasonable *(logistike)* and sensitive. He holds that animals which are calculative have a deliberative imagination (433b25-434a9). Elsewhere, imagination is called a faculty of judgment (700a10). He refers to those who "may venture to regard imagination as a kind of thinking *(noesis)*" (433a10). But Avicenna's prehension is reasonable, while *phantasia in* Aristotle may be irrational; thus they cannot be the same.

For Avicenna the prehensive process happens to both men and animals. In *al-Nijāt,* on the level of the rational soul, he divides the intelligences into scientific (*al-ʿilmī*) and practical *(al-ʿamalī)* categories. The first is also rendered by *al-naḍarī* ("theoretical"). Practical reason is the principle of movement of the human body,

> which urges it to individual actions characterized by deliberation and in accordance with positive considerations. This faculty has a certain correspondence with the animal faculty of appetence, imagination, and estimation (*wahm*). . . it uses that faculty to deduce plans considering transitory things and to deduce human arts. . .with

> the help of the theoretical intelligence it forms ordinary and commonly accepted opinions concerning actions. (*al- Nijāt*, p. 32)

Thus, prehension is a process which serves practical reason as a vehicle for making prudent decisions, emphasizing the functional aspects of this faculty. For example he uses *qūwwat* ("faculty," literally, "power") in a Persian text (DAT, p. 96); in Arabic he uses *al-quwwat al-madraka min bāṭin (al-Nijāt*, p. 162), signifying "the faculty of internal perception or inspection." In *al-Shifā', he* consistently uses *idrāk* for the internal faculties and *hiss* for the external powers (p. 43). In ordinary Persian-Arabic *idrāk* means "intellectual inspection or understanding," while *hiss* means "sensation." The significance of receiving the "meaning" of the sensibles is described both in the psychology of *al-Nijāt* (pp. 30-31) and al-Shifā'(see, e.g., p. 44).

According to *al-Shifā'*, some faculties receive the forms of the sensibles, while others receive the meanings of the sensibles. Modes of perceptions of the internal senses are classified into the active and the passive types. Next, a distinction is made between the first and the second orders of perception. The former only receives the forms; the latter relates the form to another faculty. Form and meaning are received in a different manner. Both external and internal senses are affected by the forms of the sensible. First, an external sense observes; then this datum is received by the internal perceptions. For example, the form of a wolf is received by the external senses of the sheep. It includes the shape, positions, and color of the wolf. Only the internal perception perceives the functional meanings of the wolf, which are not received by the external senses. Among these are animosity, causes for being fearful, and reasons to avoid the wolf. While "form" applies to that which is observed by both types of senses, "meaning" refers to that which is perceived only by the internal and not the external senses. It is noteworthy that, as a practical faculty, prehension is initiated only by a material sensible context. It is analogous to Plato's theory of recognition, where

universals are recognized *after* particular instances of them are sensed. Because prehension is a normative judgment, i.e., it deals with proper conduct, Avicenna's formulation implies that according to him at least some questions of ethics are conclusively decidable on materialistic grounds initiated by observation; e.g., the structure of the species of an animal makes certain acts right for it. We shall examine this aspect of naturalism in Avicenna's ethics in the latter part of this paper.

Having outlined the basic features of the internal perceptions, Avicenna proceeds to describe the internal senses one by one. After the analysis of common sense, he proceeds to give an account of *al-muṣṣawara,* which may be called "passive (formal) conception," since it retains the forms given to it by the faculty of common sense. Finally, he gives the following description of "prehension" and its sister faculty *khiyāl* (imagination):

> The other is the faculty-power *(al-qūwwat)* of prehension situated in the middle cavity of the brain; it prehends the nonsensible meanings which exist in the particular *(al-juz'ia)* sensibles. Such a faculty functions (literally, "exists," *maujūda)* when it directs (literally, "rules," or "guides," *al-hakima)* a sheep to run away from a wolf, and to show affections to its offspring; it is likely that (this faculty) synthesizes *(al-tarikiba)* and analyzes *(al-tafisla) [the* subject matter of] imaginations *(mulikhayyla).*
> The other is the faculty of memory *(al-ḥāfiḍa, al-ḍakira);* it is a faculty, situated in the end of the cavity of the brain and retains whatever is prehended *(tadaraka)* by the faculty of prehension *(wahm)* of non-sensible meanings of the sensible particulars. (*al-Shifā',* p. 44).

In a discussion similar to that found in *al-Nijāt,* Avicenna continues to mention that the faculties related to the human rational soul (*al-nafsi al-nāṭiqa al-insānia)* are divided into practical and

theoretical. The practical dimension of the rational soul causes bodily actions due to the reasonings related to the animal faculties, imagination, prehension, and reasoning due to its own soul. The animal soul causes behavior such as shame, laughter, crying, and the like. The dependence of the practical reason on imagination and prehension lies in activities like acquiring technical (Persian-Arabic *ṣanʿa*, the Greek *techne)* abilities. Man's reasonings due to its own soul are pragmatic axioms such as "Lying is wrong" and "Injustice is wrong." Acceptance of these axioms does not depend on any argument *(burhān)*.

In the second part, which deals with analysis of the perceptions, Avicenna clarifies further the operation of prehension (pp. 58-61). Perception, Avicenna tells us, deals with the subject abstracting the form of the object in question. But there are different modes, mixtures of modes, and degrees of abstraction. In addition to static forms, pragmatically significant data are received by the mind.

The faculty of "sensation" *(ḥiss)* receives only an aspect of the form while it is co-present with its material constituent.

The faculty of imagination is more powerful than sensation. It receives that form from a body which is not in need of being co-present with its body. Consequently, imagination can totally break off with the matter from which it abstracts the form. Nevertheless, sensible imagination cannot be separated from a body, since it receives a form which is applicable to a particular body and not a form qua form. E.g., we can imagine a specific man, but not the form of humanity. Elsewhere in *al-Shifā'* is stated that a group of people are gifted to have a prophetic imagination which receives axioms without a previously caused sensation (p. 193). Consequently, we note that *khiyāl* is rendered more adequately by "sensible imagination" than by "imagination."

Perception of objects of prehension is described as follows:

> Prehension is higher in its ability to abstract than imagination; it receives meanings which are not essentially material, even though these meanings have been realized in bodies. Now, figure, color, position and alike are entities which cannot be realized unless in material substances. But goodness, evil, amiability, negativity, and the like are entities belonging to the immaterial souls; sometimes they are realized (accidentally) in a body. The reason why they are immaterial is (as follows): if they had a material essence, then goodness, evil, amiability, negativity would not be intelligible, except in (the accidental) context of matter. But they are intelligible and are actual. It is evident that these entities belong to the immaterial souls and accidentally exist in bodies. Prehension receives such data. Thus, sometimes prehension receives immaterial entities and abstracts from body. Moreover, it receives an immaterial meaning, even though it is realized in a body. (pp- 60-61).

Avicenna recognizes that, in spite of its superiority to both sensible imagination and sensation, prehension, unlike intelligence, cannot totally abstract its datum from matter for the following reasons: (i) it originates with a material context, (ii) its judgment is particular, (iii) its perception is assisted by imagination, and finally (iv) its judgment is prescriptive to a context which necessarily has a practical material constituent (p. 61).

The most extensive account of prehension is in the third section of the text (pp. 182-187) where Avicenna says, "We say that prehension is the highest judge among the animals." Moreover, its judgments are without the intermediacy of logical reasonings. Only man, due to his ability to relate his faculties to intelligence *(al-mujariwāt al-nuṭq),* enjoys the highest of sensations, such as delicate taste and refined music.

Basically, there are two types of prehension. First, there are superior divine revelations construed for the good of the creatures, e.g., the infant's attraction towards the breast, or the reflexive response of extending the hands prior to a fall. Due to such

revelations, gains and losses are internally evaluated by prehension: consequently a sheep fears a wolf, even if it has no memory of him. Likewise, most animals are afraid of a lion; weak birds, independent of experience, are afraid of hunting birds. The second type of prehension is due to non-reflective memory which associates a present particular event with a universal generalization made from experiencing a non-identical but similar event in the past, e.g., avoidance of pain and attraction towards pleasure. He refers to the example of a dog that fears sticks and stones.

The first type of prehension is analogous to the internal ability to use logical reasoning and to associate ideas. If the analogy is extended, one may observe a germ of intuitionism in Avicenna's theory, for in his view nature has planted in man and animals an ability to respond to a class of stimuli with a family of normative responses which have a minimal pragmatic utility.

Avicenna concludes that reflective reasoning belongs only to intelligence (*ʿaql*). However, if there should be another faculty capable of reasoning, it is prehension as it relates its findings to (practical) reason.

Avicenna notes that the soul receives meanings which are not passed through the faculty of external perception and are translated into functional behavior; this applies to cases in everyday experience. For example, consider subliminal advertising on television, posthypnotic states, or a common allergy; when one acts under the influence of any of these, one acts without any conscious awareness. Avicenna uses the example of a body of water which receives a stone, but can't retain it. He is careful to eliminate any reference to a purely mental event, be it conscious or unconscious. Instead, "prehension" is clarified in the processes of an organism's adaptation to a problematic situation.

Let us recapitulate by a list of illustrations:

Dispositional concepts such as habits. A runner hears the starter's shot and runs. Obviously, there are other possible responses in

which consciousness plays a role, e.g., analyzing the mathematics of the trajectory of the bullet or the intensity of its sound. The significant response to the gun shot is the activity of running. A trained athlete usually develops an automatic response to events in games without conscious awareness and reflection. "Knowing the how of a sport" is associated with acquiring a set of habits.[21] In such contexts, Dewey calls "habit" an art, an art of successfully performing a task without reflection.

Significant gestures. Suppose the beloved of a dentist smiles at him in a romantic context. Obviously this stimulus is a call for an affectionate response, not for an examination of the cavities in the beloved's teeth. The spontaneous dimensions of folk and other types of social dancing exemplify what is "naturally" in accord with *wahm,* non-conscious, norm-oriented activity. G. H. Mead's notion of "significant gestures" clarifies a family of "minded behavior" which includes Avicenna's prehension.[22]

Purely pragmatically significant expressions which may be syntactically vacuous or contradictions. Wishing to be recognized. one may utter a semantically analytic sentence, e.g., "I am here," or ask a semantically redundant question, "Am I not here?" Obviously, the speaker is aware of the analyticity of his discourse; its purpose is likely a need for recognition. If the other person answers, "I know that, for all persons x, at all times t, 'I am here' is true." then the former speaker has the right to claim that the hearer did not understand the (pragmatic) meaning of his sentence.

Avicenna's theory of *wahm* primarily clarifies significant gestures, but casts light on other phenomena as well. There is a continuous development of instrumentalist epistemology from the ancient period to the Middle Ages. Plato in the *Theaetetus* refuted a naive sensationalist version of empiricism which equated knowledge with a quantitative function of the external senses.[23] Aristotle uses "intelligence" *(nous,* as in *De Anima 3.* 5, *or 'aql)* to

refer to the mind's creative ability. The passive intellect perceives relations which may not be inherent in substances, e.g., "greater" between two trees. The active intelligence is used to explain how we experience notions outside of any material constituent. Practical reason also describes a pragmatic ability to choose the right end for life. The Stoics and the Epicureans made ample use of reason for their respective views of the good life. The ancients never isolated norms from existents. Following this tradition, Avicenna's instrumental theory of prehension integrates norms, knowledge, and activity in a single concept that, without postulating a static model of a pure mental event, explains reasonable behavior better than do the theories of his predecessors.

IV. Development of the Theory of *Wahm* In Mullā Ṣadrā

Mullā Ṣadrā classifies *wahm* as an internal sense. For him a particular dimension of *wahm* has two aspects: first, the intelligent reception of universal concepts such as "animosity," then their application to temporal and sensible contexts. His original view is that *wahm* arises from a conjunction of intelligence (*ʿaql*) and imagination *(khiyāl)* as follows:[24] (1) An organism is involved in a decision making process which happens in a physical context although the outcome of the process has normative consequences. (2) The intelligence of the organism abstracts a universal such as animosity. The universal in question is not a static property of a physical entity in the context in question. It is, however, functionally significant in modifying the context, as a general guideline implies. For example, animosity in the wolf implies the potential for pain in the sheep. Beauty in the beloved implies the chance of pleasure for the lover. (3) *The wahm* process translates the pragmatic significance of the general universal to particular successful responses of the organism. (4) The organism adjusts to

its situation by the performing acts without being conscious of its action.

In addition, Mullā Ṣadrā discusses the negative function of wrong combinations of thinking and imagination. We may call these negative uses of *wahm*. For example, *wahm* may be applied to an intellectual context which is void of concrete actuals (e.g., perfect circles); here a conflict arises. In the same manner, *wahm* cannot be applied to a purely concrete situation, because only a universal implies variable instances. In its "fallible" sense, the faculty of *wahm* is responsible for invalid inferences. Sadra calls *wahm* a skeptic liar *(kāḏib)* when it accepts the premises of an argument but attempts to "avoid" the conclusion. For example, it accepts that all contingent beings exist due to an external agent. Also, it agrees that a series of contingencies necessarily leads to a non-contingent (necessary) being. *Wahm*, however, by itself cannot transcend the realm of the contingent and enter a non-contingent domain; consequently, by mistake *wahm* inquires about the cause of the first member of the series. At another place, Mullā Ṣadrā illustrates the misuse of *wahm* as follows. Any entity which resides in a place must be a body. Moreover, each body is a composite and each composite is a caused contingency. Sadra means that each composite is a contingency, since it is the effect of its constituents and the laws that assure its persistence as a unit. Since there is no actual infinite, there must be a non-contingent first member of the series. A necessary entity which is uncaused must be simple. Since it is simple, it cannot be a body, because bodies are composite; it has no extension; thus, it is not in any place. If it exists, it must be prior to spatio-temporal contexts. Once again, misuse of *wahm* leads to a confusion of a simple non-physical entity with sensible particulars receptive to imaginations. Accordingly, *wahm* wonders about the sensible actuality of the first being. Mullā Ṣadrā seem to be postulating two languages: an intelligible atemporal syntax with universals as individuals and a language with concrete spatio-temporal processes as individuals.

Wahm activity transfers an inspection from the first level to an activity at the second level. Any other combination results in a mistaken inquiry. It appears that analogous to Kant's method of dialectical "misuses" of reason, Mullā Ṣadrā holds that *wahm* can only process categories of problems with a universal input and a functional particular output. Category mistakes result if different pairs are processed by *wahm*, e.g., if it applies spatio-temporal features to abstract entities.

V. Rejection of Six Theories of *Wahm* Found in Contemporary Scholarship

Prior to offering our own explication, let us clarify why we reject six proposed translations offered in the present-day scholarship of Avicenna's psychology.

1. F. Rahman translates it as "nervous response."[25] "Nervous response," however, suggests an automatic singular physical reaction which has two features distinct from *wahm*: (a) It is a specific value of a domain of a function where a singular movement is the output. This can be simulated by a computer program. *Wahm*, however, is a generalized pattern of behavior. (b) A nervous response may be harmful, while *wahm* is supposed to issue in normatively successful behavior. Consequently "nervous response" cannot be a satisfactory translation of *wahm*.

2. R. Hammand translates *wahm* as "instinct."[26] Instinct overcomes the objection of the nervous response, since it cannot be mechanized. But there are cases of instincts, e.g., fish swimming against the tides to their death, which illustrate that instincts, unlike *wahm*, may be harmful to a person. Whereas *wahm* signifies a cognitive epistemic term, instinct does not. For example, while a "death wish" is a possible experience for an organism, a *wahm* of death is an impossibility in Avicenna's psychology. Thus *wahm* cannot be translated as "instinct."

3. S. H. Nasr defines *wahm* as "apprehension."[27] Apprehension, however, involves both a conscious awareness on the part of the subject not essential to the *wahm* process and an intellectual capacity usually referred to the ability to receive the universals absent in the animal soul. And it does not necessarily imply an activity, while *wahm* presupposes an active agent. Thus, "apprehension" is not a suitable translation for *wahm*.
4. M. Iqbal renders *wahm* as "conception."[28] Since it is open to the same objections that "apprehension" is, this translation is not acceptable either.
5. *Wahm* has also been rendered as "imagination."[29] "Imagination," as we have shown, is a complex term with various senses, many of which are different from the senses of *wahm*. Moreover, the term *takhayyul* is usually employed both in ordinary language and philosophical vocabulary to signify the general notion of imagination. Avicenna himself makes a distinction between *takhayyūl and wahm*. Conceptually, a primary use of "imagination" is related to fantasizing such as day-dreaming; *wahm* is more action-oriented without the necessity of employing any type of imagery peculiar to imagination.
6. Finally, the most common translation of *wahm*, a translation found in the works of Wolfson, Goichon, Rahman, and Afnan is "estimation," taken from the *estimatio* of the scholastics.[30] For several reasons "estimation" is not satisfactory. To begin with, it is a *terminus technicus* of scholastic philosophy; consequently, its equivalence to *wahm* must be proved by an argument; the conclusion cannot be asserted as a premise. Moreover, "estimation" implies an ordinary faculty of deliberation which presupposes both a consciousness and a will, neither of which is presupposed by *wahm*. *In* addition, one may "estimate" a solution without actually carrying it out; *wahm*, however, implies action. Finally, "estimation" may apply to a problem in pure syntax without any reference to a pragmatic norm; by contrast, *wahm* is a problem-oriented activity for a concerned agent. Accordingly, the

بخط اليد: من ص ١٤١ إلى ص ١٥٦ ساقطة من أصل المصدر

(b) DAT *Dānish Nāma-i alā'i (Ṭab^c iyyāt),* ed. S. M. Mishkat (Tehran, 1952).

(c) Shifa' Avicenna's *De Anima* (Arabic Text), ed. F. Rahman (London, 1959).

(d) Nijat *Al-Nijat* (Cairo, 1938); *Avicenna's Psychology*, tr. F. Rahman (London, 1952).

(e) Fann *Fann Samā Ṭabī^c i,* tr. M. Furugi (Tehran, 1888).

(f) Hayy *Hayy IbnYaqzān,* ed. and tr. H. Corbin, *Avicenne et le récit visionnaire* (Tehran, 1952).

(g) Ishq *Risāla fi'l-^c ishq,* ed. M. A. F. von Mehran in *Traités mystiques d'Abou Ali al-Hosain b. Sina ou d'Avicenne; texte arabe avec l'explication en français,* 3 vols. (Leiden, 1894).

2. R. Carnap, *Logical Foundations of Probability* (Chicago, 1951), pp. 1-19, 576-577. Carnap's method is to develop a linguistic framework in the context of which the actual function of a concept is clarified. Accordingly, one cannot understand the meaning of the concept of prehension by itself; its meaning in use becomes clear only when we consider (i) how "prehension" operates as a constituent of a complex expression (for example, (a) what values of x and y satisfy an adequate interpretation of "x prehends y," and (b) how "x prehends y" differs from "x imagines y" and "x deliberates on y"), (ii) differences between the primary and the secondary use of "prehension," (iii) the historical genesis of family of Graeco-Islamic epistemic terms related to "prehension," such as Aristotle's "practical reason," and finally (iv) the meta-epistemological presuppositions of the Muslim philosophical tradition which influenced its formulation of prehension.

3. For a discussion of the application of the category of process to Islamic philosophy see P. Morewedge, "Ibn Sina's Concept of the Self," *Philosophical Forum* 4, no. 1 (Fall 1972): 49-73. We have argued that the intentional and phenomenological themes of Islamic mysticism can be expressed better by a language in which primitive terms are continuums instead of, to borrow an expression from Whitehead, discrete first substances situated in a simple spatio-temporal location. For example, the relation of mystical union (*al-fanā' wa-l-baqā*), in which the self and the ultimate being merge, cannot be accounted for by

a substance-event language; we recall that, while the only substantial changes are generation and destruction, processes can merge into a new process. The relevance of Dewey's theory of instrumentalism is explained in the last section of this paper.

4. Kenny distinguishes between two theories of will: (i) "will" in modern philosophy as "mental event" which accompanies "consciousness" of the agent, and (ii) "will" in the light of contemporary views found in the works of Wittgenstein, Anscombe, and others. In the latter it is analyzed by intentionality, rationality, in the context of the relation between belief and action. Since Aristotle has no theory of consciousness, investigators such as Ross and Gauthier, who presuppose the consciousness theory, fail to detect any Aristotelian contribution on this subject. Kenny, who inspects Aristotle in the light of contemporary theories of "intention," finds merit in his doctrine (A. Kenny, *Aristotle's Theory of the Will* [New Haven, 19791). Historians of Islamic philosophy often take "deliberation," which is a conscious state, to be the model of the epistemic state of the rational soul. Accordingly, they are handicapped i. understanding the faculty of internal senses which is on the borderline between the animal and the human soul. They mistake "prehension" for "estimation," even though it is indeed odd to apply "estimation" to a dog or a sheep, unless it is in a secondary use in a humorous context. This mistaken approach is also found in the treatment of the faculty of imagination. While in Greek philosophy imagination *(phantasia, eikasia)* is often used in its reproductive sense of "sense imagery," in Islamic thought it has developed in its "productive" meaning. Recent research makes explicit two aspects of this concept: first, the phenomenology of the creative imagination in Ibnal-'Arabi as studied by Corbin, according to which man casts himself in the creative image he forms; second, the Muslim philosophers' complex theory of prophetic and mystical imagination as analyzed by Rahman where, by symbolization and figurization, the prophetic imagination grasps the pragmatic maxims revealed to rule the community of the faithful. An interesting project would be to synthesize both imagination and prehension into a study of Islamic normative epistemology. A prototype of such a work is exhibited in M. Sharif, *Al-Ghazalis Theory of Virtue* (New York, 1974). See F. Rahman, *Prophecy in Islam* (London, 1958); and H. Corbin, *Creative Imagination in the Sufism of Ibn Arabi* (Princeton, New Jersey, 1969).

5. See H. A. Wolfson, "The Internal Senses in Latin, Arabic, and Hebrew Philosophic Texts," *Harvard Theological Review* 28 (1935): 69-133. Also H. A. Wolfson, "Goichon's Three Books on Avicenna's Philosophy," *Muslim World* 31 (1941): 29-38.

6. H. A. Wolfson, "The Internal Senses," p. 69.

7. See A. M. Goichon, *La distinction de l'essence et de l'existence d'après Ibn Sina (Avicenne)* (Paris, 1937); *Lexique de la langue philosophique d'Ibn Sina (Avicenne)* (Paris, 1938); and *Vocabulaires comparés d'Aristote et d'Ibn Sina* (Paris, 1939). Focusing on the metaphysics of Avicenna, which refines many of the ambiguities found in the Aristotelian system, Goichon finds *wahm* an original contribution. Wolfson's begins with an a priori prejudice: "Now every student of philosophy knows that none of these topic was invented by Avicenna" (H. A. Wolfson, "Goichon's Three Books," p. 31). The archaic approach of looking for the "hidden" Greek "genesis" of all medieval thought is shared by some historians who hold that Muslim thought is either derived from the Greeks or is religious. Walzer claims that Islamic philosophy is theistic and served only to have a natural theology for the Muslim religion (R. Walzer, *Greek into Arabic* [Cambridge, Mass., 1962], p. 35). Since "prehension" is neither Greek nor religious in its implication, it is reasonable to investigate it in its functional context.

8. Wolfson claims that the Muslims confuse "prehension" as a combination of three Greek terms, *synesis, phronesis, and pronoia* as used by Aristotle in connection with animals. His thesis is totally refutable by two facts. First, Muslims cannot be confused about these faculties, for often they present lengthy analyses of each of these faculties in their psychology; they analyze the key terms, give theoretical arguments, and illustrate their understanding of these faculties with specific examples. Secondly, Muslim philosophers were conscious in their choice of either accepting or rejecting *wahm* as an internal faculty. For example, Averroes rejected it, Avicenna and others accepted it. The concept did not make its way t Islamic epistemology by "accident" of mistranslation or confusion. In a similar manner, Muslim philosophers were aware of Aristotle's doctrine of the co-eternity of the world and the religious position of creation, but, with a few exception, they embraced emanation. For our criticism of the

Walzer-Wolfson methodology, see "Contemporary Scholarship on Near Eastern Philosophy," *Philosophical Forum* 2, no. 1 (Fall 1970):122-40.

9. Blaustein points out that Averroes consciously avoids *wahm* in order to bring his psychology closer to Aristotle's than to Avicenna's original theory. See M. A. Blaustein, "Averroes on the Imagination and the Intellect" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1984).

10. See Al-Fārābī, *Fusul Muntaza ah,* ed. F. Najjar (Beirut, 1971), p. 81; Z. al-Razi, *Opera Philosophica,* ed. P. Kraus (Cairo, 1939), p. 304; N. Tusi, *Akhlâq Muhtashamî,* ed. M. T. Danish Pajhuh (Tehran, 1960), p. 9; A. Nasari, *Kitab al-Insân al-Kâmil,* ed. M. Mole (Tehran, 1962), p. 22; Al-Ghazali, *Tahâfut al-Falâsafa,* ed. M. Bouyges (Beirut, 1927), p. 183; S. Suhrawardî, *Oeuvres philosophiques et mystiques,* ed. S. H. Nasr (Tehran, 1970), p. 355.

11. In the extreme type of monism to which naturalistic Sufism belongs nature has to be a continuum from the ultimate being to the lowest particular matter. Monism needs to be preserved in two crucial links: between the ultimate being, viz., the One, and the first emanated being, viz., the first intelligence, and between the immaterial world and the physical realm. Accordingly, a Neoplatonic type of eschatology depicts a world in which there is no radical causal break between layers of entities. Specifically, the first emanated being is a direct effect of the thought of the One; in the present case, mind and matter are essentially related by a conceptual limit shared by both, i.e., by an idealized point which is the boundary between the two. For a discussion of the monistic dimensions of mysticism, see R. C. Zaehner, *Mysticism, Sacred and Profane* (London, 1960) together with our criticisms of his position, "Sufism, Neoplatonism, and Zaehner's Theistic Theory of Mysticism," in *Islamic Philosophy and Mysticism* (Delmar, N.Y.: Caravan Books, 1981), pp. 223-45, and "Ibn Sina (Avicenna) and Malcolm and the Ontological Argument," *The Monist* 54, no. 2 (April 1970): 324-49.

12. Avicenna's ultimate being is The Perfect (Pure, Abstract) Good in itself *(al-Khair al-Maḥḍ).* In his treatise on love, this entity functions in the same manner as the form of the Good *(agathon)* in Plato's system. It is also called the first cause *(Ishq,* p. 18). For our comparison of the philosophic, mystical, and religious aspects of the ultimate being in Islamic tradition, see P. Morewedge, "The Logic of Emanationism and Sufism in Ibn Sina (Avicenna)," part 1, *Journal of the American*

Oriental Society 91, no. 4 (1971): 467-76, and part 2, ibid. 92, no. 1 (1972): 1-18.

13. In *Hayy ibn Yaqzan,* Avicenna identifies an isomorphism between the intelligence of the moon, the mystic, and Gabriel (p. 17). We have grouped these variations of the same entities as the philosophic, the mystical, and the religious variation of the phenomenon of the mediator figure in systems linking a particular finite self to an indefinite One or the God of religions. See P. Morewedge, "A Philosophical Interpretation of Rumi's Mystical Poetry- Light, the Mediator Figure, and the Way," in *The Scholar and the Saint: Studies in Commemoration of Abu'l-Rayhan al-Biruni,* ed. P. Cheikowski (New York, 1975), and *Islamic Philosophy and Mysticism.*

14. See *Divan-i Kull-i Jāmi,* ed. H. Razi (Tehran, 1962), p. 102. Jami's Pythagorean poem is not an accidental philosophical work. As is indicated in his other writings, Jami is a sophisticated philosopher. For example, he has an elaborate metaphysical theory of monism. See Jami, *Naqd al-Nusūs,* ed. W. C. Chittick (Tehran, 1977), and N. Heer, "Al-Jami's Treatise on Existence," in *Islamic Philosophical Theology,* ed. P. Morewedge (Albany, 1979), pp. 223-56.

15. Avicenna, *Risāla dar Haqiqat wa Kaifiyat-i Mawjūdāt wa Tasalsūl-i Asbāb wa Musabbāt,* ed. M. Amid (Tehran, 1952), pp. 21-31.

16. See *Ikhwān al-Ṣafā, Rasa-il,* 4 vols. (Beirut, 1957); I. R. Netton, *Muslim Neoplatonists* (London, 1982).

17. S. Suhrawardi, *Oeuvres philosophiques et mystiques,* p. 115.

18. Hume notes, "'Tis therefor certain, that the imagination reaches a minimum, and may raise up to an idea, of which it cannot conceive any sub-division, and which cannot be diminished without a total annihilation" *(A Treatise on Human Nature,* ed. L. A. Selby-Biggs [Oxford, 1964], p. 27). For a pragmatic account of the minimal duration as a construct, see G. H. Mead's discussion of "The Specious Present," in *The Philosophy of the Act,* ed. C. W. Morris (Chicago, 1938), pp. 220-23.

19. See W. E. Johnson, *Logic,* 3 vols. (Cambridge, 1921). In Islamic philosophy, there is an exception to this maxim. For Mullā Ṣadrā , the most determinate entity is "being an existent" (*al-maujūd*), which is God, the ground of being. Every other entity is a determinable

essence, which is an abstraction. See P. Morewedge, "Greek Sources of Some Near Eastern Philosophies of Being and Existence," in *Philosophies of Existence* (New York, 1982), pp. 285-336.

20. Our quotations from Aristotle's writings are from The *Works of Aristotle*, ed. W. D. Ross (Oxford, 1908-1952). The Greek is quoted from the appropriate edition of the Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1927-1970).

21. For example, Dewey relates "habits" to "will" and "means," but names them "active means"; See, J. Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct* (New York, 1930), p. 25. For "habit" as applied to both man and animals, see J. Dewey, *Experience and Nature* (New York, 1958), pp. 279-82.

22. Mead uses his theory of "significant gesture" to distinguish between human intelligence and higher animals. Unlike non-significant gestures, in "significant gestures" man brings out the same meaning indicated to or for himself, e.g., language (G. H. Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society*, ed. C. W. Morris [Chicago, 1934], p. 81). According to Mead, conversation is social and "meaning is a content of an object which is dependent upon the relation of an organism or groups of organisms to it" (ibid., p. 80). Thus, there cannot be any "private" language -- a position similar to that of the later Wittgenstein; thought and reason are based upon the presupposition of the "generalized other" (ibid., p. 81). Mead's analysis of "universality" in terms of "universal responses" to a whole set of particulars, brings out the interplay of prehension as a mediation between the medieval Islamic concept of abstract thinking (*fikr*) and sensible imagination (*khiyāl*).

23. Plato, *Theaetetus*, ed. H. N. Fowler (Cambridge, Mass., 1961), 184b-186e. Plato's refutation of the naive quantitative form of epistemic sensation theory of knowledge can be presented in the following language suitable to most philosophical traditions. A sense datum is a mind-dependent entity; a substance is independent; thus, a sense datum is not a substance. An actual sense field, e.g., visual field, of a sensation is a continuum capable of being grouped and synthesized in many distinct ways. For example, when a group of sense data is named Theaetetus, the synthetic unity (to borrow a Kantian term) given to this quantitative group is not given in sensation. For Plato this extra-sensory element is a universal. In the context of prehension, Avicenna takes the

unity of the synthesis of the sensibles in a problematic situation to be a meaning *(ma' na)* in the sense of a signal to action.

24. Our account of Mullā Ṣadrā 's theory of prehension is taken from his chapter on *Wahmiyyāt* (the objects of *wahm)* in his *Mantiq-i Nawin,* ed. and tr. A. Mashkoot (Tehran, n.d.), and the book of the soul in the *Afsar,* ed. and tr. J. Musalah (Tehran, 1973).

25. See F. Rahman, "Ibn Sina," in *A History of Muslim Philosophy,* ed. H. M. Sharif (Wiesbaden, 1963), vol. 1, pp. 480-506.

26. R. Hammand, *The Philosophy of Alfarabi and Its Influence on Medieval Thought* (New York, 1947), p. 7.

27. S. H. Nasr, "Shihāb al-Din Suhrawardi Maqtūl," in *A History of Muslim Philosophy,* ed. H. M. Sharif, p. 393.

28. M. Iqbal, *The Development of Metaphysics in Persia* (Lahore, 1964), p. 35.

29. See *The Dream and Human Societies,* ed. G. von Grunebaum and R. Caillois (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1966), pp. 409-21.

30. "Estimation" is the most common translation of *wahm.* Apparently, no one questioned the mistaken rendering of *wahm* by the Latin "estimatio." See F. Rahman, *Prophecy in Islam,* p. 118; S. H. Nasr, *Three Muslim Sages* (Cambridge, Mass., 1964; rpt. Delmar, N.Y.: Caravan Books, 1976), p. 39; H. A. Wolfson, *The Internal Senses,* p. 99; A.-M. Goichon, *Lexique,* p. 138.

31. See G. F. Hourani, "Ibn Sina's 'Essay on the Secret of Destiny'", *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies (BSOAS)* 29 (1966): 25-48. In Avicenna's metaphysics each contingent actual in the history of the universe owes its concretion directly to its proximate cause and indirectly to its cause. The Necessary Existent *(al-wājib al-wujūd),* who is the ultimate cause of the world, could not have been other than what it is. Thus, every contingency is a relative one. In this context, Avicenna's ontology is the prototype of the Leibnizian system without its Christian flavor.

32. For Leibniz's debt to Spinoza, see B. Russell, *A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz* (London, 1958), pp. 5, 6, 139, 287. Spinoza's monism is harmonious with Islamic mystical doctrine of the unity of being *(al-waḥdat al-wujūd).* See P. Morewedge, "A Philosophical Interpretation of Rumi's Mysticism." The major

differences lies in the Islamic eschatological doctrine of emanation and return, absent in Spinoza's ontology.

33. See P. Morewedge, "Ibn Sina's Concept of the Self."

34. Avicenna, Tusi, Ghazali, and most other Muslim philosophers are also the prominent representatives of Islamic Sufism. Even though they may vary their philosophical language due to context of expressions, they agree in their key ontological doctrines, e.g., the doctrine of the Necessary Existent. For the case of Ṭusi, see P. Morewedge, "The Analysis of 'Substance' in Ṭusi's *Logic* and in the Ibn Sinian Tradition," in *Essays on Islamic Philosophy and Science* (Albany, 1975), pp. 158-88.

35. See Hume's *Treatise*, bk. 1, pt. 1, sec. 2. Here he notes that after sensation a copy is taken by the mind which remains after the impression ceases. The problem of specifying the ontological status of this "copy," which haunts Hume, is not raised in our construction of "prehension" which is not based upon a mental image.

36. L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, tr. G. E. M. Anscombe (New York, 1953) pp. 87-88. Viewing language as a signpost implies that ordinarily a response to a linguistic stimulus may be a "movement" and not a mental image. Prehension may be interpreted in this context; the non-sensible meaning *(ma' na)* of a group of sensibles is a behavioral response.

37. Wittgenstein notes here that "doing" itself is a necessary constituent of all human acts, including thinking. Thus there is no place in his epistemology for a spectator role of a static mind or a mental image. A theory of "prehension" is coherent with this dimension of Wittgenstein's epistemology (ibid.).

38. P. Morewedge, "Ibn Sina's Concept of the Self," *Philosophical Forum* 4, no. 1 (1972): 49-73.

39. See Al-Farabi, *The Fuṣūl al-Madani of Al-Fārābī*, ed. and tr. D. M. Dunlop (Cambridge, 1961); Ibn Sina, *Shifā'*; S. Suhrawari, *Hikamt at-Ishrāq*, ed. H. Corbin (Tehran, 1977); Ibn 'Arabī, *al-Futūhāt al-Makkiyah*, 4 vols. (Cairo, 1939); Mullā Ṣadrā , *Al-Afsar* (Tehran, 1958).

40. *The Nicomachean Ethics*, commentary by H. H. Joachim, ed. D. A. Reese (Oxford, 1962), p. 207.

41. J. H. Randall, *Aristotle* (New York and London, 1965), p. 172. For a similar "naturalistic" presentation of Aristotle, see F. E. Woodbridge, *Aristotle's Vision of Nature* (New York, 1965).

42. John Dewey, "Antinaturalism in Extremis," in *Naturalism and the Human Spirit,* ed. Y. H. Krikorian (New York and London, 1944), P. 1.

43. J. J. Houben, "Avicenna and Mysticism," in *Avicenna Commemoration Volume* (Calcutta, 1956), p. 220.

44. *Diogenes Laertius,* ed. R. D. Hicks, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1958), vol. 1, p. 217.

45. Ibid., p. 221.

46. A. N. Whitehead, *The Concept of Nature* (Ann Arbor, 1957), p. 3.

47. John Dewey, *Essays in Experimental Logic* (Chicago, 1916). p. 38.

48. Ibid., pp. 331-32.

49. See R. C. Zaehner, *The Dawn and the Twilight of Zoroastrianism* (New York, 1961), pp. 35-37, 203-5, 309.

50. Charles Stevenson, *Ethics and Language* (New Haven, 1949). For an analysis of Stevenson's position and its critique by a pragmatist see the exchange between R. Carnap and A. Kaplan in *The Philosophy of Rudolph Carnap,* ed. P. A. Schilpp (La Salle, Ill., 1963), pp. 827-856, 999-1013.

51. See F. Rahman, *Prophecy in Islam.*

52. D. Ross, *Aristotle* (Cleveland and New York, 1959), p. 144.

53. H. H. Joachim, *The Nicomachean Ethics,* p. 174.

54. A. Kenny, *Aristotle's Theory of the Will,* pp. ix, 89-101.

ISLAMIC MYSTICISM

SUBSTANCE AND PROCESS THEORIES OF THE SELF IN ISLAMIC MYSTICISM

The Problem

The work of the most celebrated Muslim philosopher, Ibn Sīnā, known to the West as Avicenna, has often been investigated from an historical point of view for the contribution it has made to the development of western philosophy.[1] The significance of this *geistesgeschichtlicher* approach notwithstanding, we propose to undertake a textual analytical study of a recently edited text of Ibn Sīnā. It will be shown that such an approach can serve as a source of philosophically stimulating inquiries into topics of contemporary interest. In this essay we shall concentrate on the concept of God and the self, using a recently edited text of Ibn Sīnā on metaphysics which was written in the latter part of his life as the basis for philosophical analysis, and make reference to the familiar works of Ibn Sīnā only when such notes are relevant to the arguments presented.

Let us begin by making two aspects of this inquiry explicit. It is taken for granted that the problem of God and the self is not restricted to either Ibn Sīnā's philosophy or to his Islamic cultural tradition. For example, Augustine, a Christian, mentions in a celebrated passage that all that he wishes to know is God and his soul-self.[2] Likewise, Buber, a Jew, states emphatically in his renowned I-and-Thou philosophy that the salvation of man is dependent on a non-alienating relationship between man and God.[3] Incidentally, in the works of these two philosophers, conscious

attempts are made to relate the concept of God to the concept of the self, a task which meets with success in several of Ibn Sīnā's mystical works.[4] Consequently, the significance of Ibn Sīnā's contribution does not lie in his role as an apologist for Islamic dogma, but rather in his presentation of a solution to a problem of primary concern to great philosophers operating within the framework of monotheistic religions. As is to be expected, our critical study of his work will examine the logical adequacy of the solution he proposes to this universal problem.

The second aspect of this inquiry endeavors to clarify the meaning of the concept "God" as follows. Since we are specifically concerned with clarifying Ibn Sīnā's notion of *wājib al-wujūd* (translated hereafter as the Necessary Existent), and are not assuming that this concept is equivalent to the God of Islam, it should be pointed out to the reader who might consider our inquiry a mere logical exercise in Ibn Sīnā's texts without relevance to other philosophical or religious system, that *wājib al-wujūd* is conceptually related to the notion of an ultimate being in many mystical works in Islam.[5] It should also be mentioned that many western philosophers have attempted to explain the concept of the self by means of non-religious notions, e.g., Wittgenstein's notion of "the limit of the world"[6] or by some non-religious aspect of God, e.g., Descartes'[7] notion of infinity or Kant's criticism of Descartes.[8] Our inquiry will attempt to elucidate the notions about the ultimate being and doctrines, such as the principle of sufficient reason, in other non-religious metaphysical systems.

Moreover, this inquiry may also clarify the possible confusion about Ibn Sīnā's relationship to Islam in instances where the tenets of the latter conflict with rational philosophy. E. Gilson, who considers the Islamic philosophers as originators of modern European rationalism, makes the following observation about Ibn Sīnā:

> Avicenna had succeeded in solving that difficult problem by building up a philosophy whose crowning part was a natural theology, thus leaving a door open to the supernatural light of Revelation. What Avicenna really thought of the rational value of religious belief is not quite clear. If, as there are good reasons to believe, he did not make much of them, he at least was clever enough never to entangle himself in serious theological difficulties.[9]

Having stated our two basic approaches and issues related to them, we shall construct the first set of arguments concerning two paradoxes in Ibn Sīnā's metaphysical works.

I. TWO PARADOXES IN IBN SINIAN METAPHYSICS

A close inspection of a recently edited text, the *Metaphysica) (Illāhiyyāt) of the Book of Sciences (Dānish Nāma,*[10] hereafter designated as DAI) reveals two fundamental paradoxes in Ibn Sīnā's philosophical system. These paradoxes do not occur in isolated passages; evidence gleaned from Ibn Sīnā's other writing supports the contention that the paradoxes in question are in fact representative of his metaphysical system.

An intuitive, but not precise, formulation of the first paradox can easily be presented as follows. It can be observed that Ibn Sīnā tends to follow the Aristotelian doctrine that all actual entities are either substances or accidents (i.e. falling within one of the -nine categories). In addition, Ibn Sīnā states that there is an actual entity, the Necessary Existent, which is neither a substance nor an accident. A similar intuitive formulation of the second paradox might be presented as follows. The human soul, which is the self-person, is a substance. No substance can be united with any other entity. The self-person, however, can and does achieve ultimate perfection by its union with the Necessary Existent in a so-called "mystical state." If our formulations are accurate, then it is prima facie obvious that Ibn Sīnā's metaphysical system contains two

serious paradoxes dealing with the fundamental theorems of his system. Lets us therefore turn to a detailed textual examination of the passages in which the aforementioned paradoxes appear.

I. The Paradoxes of the Necessary Existent

Although the notion of the Necessary Existent is used in depicting the first cause of every other entity in Ibn Sīnā's system, the term *"wājib al-wujūd"* is not used as a primitive[11] in this text, but rather, as a derived term. In DAI Ibn Sīnā states explicitly that *"hastī,"* translated here as "being-qua-being," is the most primitive, undefined, descriptive sign in: a differentia *(faṣl)*, it cannot have a definition *(ḥadd)*; and (2) since it has neither a description *(rasm)* nor a distinguishing mark *(ishāra)*, it is the most determinable[12] and transcendental term (DAI, p. 8). Moreover, Ibn Sīnā affirms that intentionally, "being-qua-being" has a unique meaning *(yak maʿnā,* DAI, p. 37) which does not acquire a different sense when applied to categories (DAI, p. 36). He assumes that "being-qua-being" is applicable to three different subdivisions: impossible *(mumtani')* entities, contingent *(mumkin)* entities, and the Necessary Existent (DAI, p. 65). Consequently, according to this formulation, the concept of the Necessary Existent must be derived from the concept of "being-qua-being," the ontological significance of the Necessary Existent notwithstanding. In a previous study, we have shown that Ibn Sīnā does adhere to a variation of the ontological argument as stated by Malcolm.[13] Moreover, he does not regard the Necessary Existent as a self-caused universal property which is applicable to many entities (DAI, p. 77). These considerations provide some strong evidence in support of the view that for Ibn Sīnā the Necessary Existent is an actual entity. If our argument is sound, then it follows that whatever is true of "being-qua-being" in general must also be true of the Necessary Existent, since the latter is a determination of the former. But this conclusion contradicts two other explicit statements made by Ibn Sīnā. The first of these

indicates that in its first division (*qismat-i awwal),* being-qua-being is divided into substance *(jawhar)* and accident (*ᶜaraḍ*) *(DAI,* p. 9). The second statement indicates that the Necessary Existent is neither substance nor an accident (DAI, p. 77). These statements lead to an obvious paradox, namely (i) that the Necessary Existent is a substance (since every being is a substance or an accident, and whatever is a necessity cannot be an accident) and (ii) (according to Ibn Sīnā's own assertion) that the Necessary Existent is not a substance. Prior to investigating passages in other Ibn Sīnian texts which shed light on or provide parallels to the aforementioned paradoxes, some remarks are in order in answer to those who would attempt to read this paradox in light of the Greek philosophical influence. Having already disputed in other studies the contention of those who would see in Ibn Sīnā a follower of either Plotinus or Aristotle, we shall concentrate here on no more than a few decisive points which will distinguish the concept of the ultimate being, to which the aforementioned philosophers subscribe, from the Necessary Ibn Sīnā.[14]

With regard to Aristotle it should be noted that his concept of "being-qua-being" (τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὄν) is equivalent to Ibn Sīnā's *"hastī."*[15] Whereas Aristotle's prime mover is a substance (οὐσία) which is coeternal with the world,[16] Ibn Sīnā's Necessary Existence is not a substance (*(jawhar)*. It is said of It that It emanated the world. Objections may be raised to this contrast of the prime mover with the Necessary Existent on other counts, such as translating οὐσία as a substance, a confusion several scholars have avoided by translating it differently.[17] But, in a text entitled *The Book of Definitions (Kitāb al-Ḥudūd),*[18] Ibn Sīnā states explicitly that the term substance *(jawhar)* has been used by ancient philosophers since Aristotle, and that he uses *jawhar* for the same concept. With regard to Neoplatonists we recall that the concept of The One τὸ ἕν is above (ὑπέρ) being according to Proclus; Plotinus affirms that the One is the generator (γενέτης) of being, while Ibn Sīnā states that being-qua-being is more determinable than the Necessary

Existent.[19] In view of these considerations we believe that greater insight into the passages in question may be gained by examining passages in other texts of Ibn Sīnā which shed light on the discrepancy between his view of the ultimate entity and those of the Greek philosophers mentioned. At the outset we acknowledge that a complete examination of this discrepancy falls outside the provenance of this essay;[20] and in the context specified for our inquiry, the writings of the Greek philosophers mentioned will not be of much assistance in settling the argument at hand. Even with regard to Ibn Sīnā's works, one may inquire whether the quotations from the DAI should be viewed as mere isolated remarks unrepresentative of his general philosophy. This question can be answered by investigating the contents of similar passages in three other texts Ibn Sīnā wrote on metaphysics *(Illāhiyyāt)* proper: the *Illāhiyyāt of al-Shifā'* (hereafter *al-Shifā'*), *the Illāhiyyāt of al-Najāt* (hereafter *al-Najāt*), and the last section of *al-Ishārāt wa'l-Tanbihāt* (hereafter *al-Ishārāt*).[21]

In *al-Shifā'* there are two passages specifically related to the problem of the substantiality of the Necessary Existent. In the first passage, he quotes an imaginary opponent (with whom he tacitly agrees) as saying that Ibn Sīnā has been careful not to say that The First (which is a common name for the Necessary Existent) is a substance *(al-Shifā'*, p. 348). In the other passage he indicates that we can talk about the Necessary Existent only by privation and that we cannot make any affirmative statement about It. He shows, for instance, that when we say that the Necessary Existent is a substance, we mean that It is not in a subject; we are not saying anything positive about It *(al-Shifā'*, p. 367). Moreover, in *al-Shifā'*, where motion is discussed in respect to the First Principle, he is careful not to call the First Principle a substance, but calls It instead a power (*qūwwa*). Thereupon he attributes to it all other "features" one finds attributed to the Aristotelian first principle, namely infinity *(ghair mutānahī)*, immateriality *(ghair jismi)* and eternity *(dā'im) (al-Shifā'*, p. 373). It is also mentioned in this text

that no reason *(burhān)* can be attributed to the Necessary Existent *(al-Shifā'*, p. 354). In these passages many similarities can be pointed out regarding the description of the Necessary Existent. For example, in *al-Shifā'* it is mentioned that the Necessary Existent is that for which is possible not to exist *(al-Shifā'*, p. 35); while in *al-Najāt*, considered a shorter version of *al-Najāt*, it is stated that the Necessary Existent is that whose non-existence is impossible to conceive *(al-Najāt*, p. 244), and in DAI (p. 76) it is mentioned that its essence is no other than existence. In *al-Najāt* existents are divided into substances and accidents *(al-Najāt*, p. 200) as in DAI; moreover, in the former text the following enumeration; of the qualities of substances is presented: prime matter, form, and separated entities (viz. Intelligences)—none of these is applicable to the Necessary Existent *(al-Najāt*, p. 208). The doctrine of DAI, that the Necessary Existent has neither differentia nor genus, is also repeated in other texts.

Although some significant differences between the metaphysical texts of Ibn Sīnā must be acknowledged (we have enumerated these elsewhere), few of these are relevant to the specific paradoxes under consideration.[22] Two special differences should be clarified; the first, stated explicitly only in DAI, is that the Necessary Existent is not a substance. Having shown that It has neither genus, nor differentia, nor cause, we can safely deduce that it cannot be a substance (according to the other texts) regardless of Its position in DAI. Only in DAI does Ibn Sīnā use the concept of *hastī* (being-qua-being); in his other metaphysical texts he employs *wujūd* (existence) and *mawjūd* (an existent). This point is crucial to the clarification of his celebrated essence-existence distinction. This distinction and the use of *hastī* do not prevent him from considering the Necessary Existent as a derived concept in his system. In *al-Shifā'* (p. 29), he notes that the primary entities which are *a priori* to the mind *(nafs)* are "being an existent" *(mawjūd)*, "being something" *(shay'ī)* and "being necessary" *(ḍurūrī)*. *As* the last term differs from *wājib*, there is no reason to interpret *ḍurūrī as*

related to the Necessary Existent and to say that in this text It is named by a syntactically primitive name. It is beyond the scope of this paper to compare these texts further; it is our assumption that the texts we have cited show sufficiently that the non-substantiality of the Necessary Existent is a prominent theme in Ibn Sīnā's metaphysical works and that our paradoxes were not taken from isolated passages untypical of the *corpus* of Ibn Sīnā's metaphysics.

2. *The Necessary Existent and Modalities*

At this point it is useful to outline the relationship between Ibn Sīnā's concept of modalities and his views on the Necessary Existent, for it is introduced within the context of modalities (e.g. DAI, chap. 18; *al-Shifā',* book 1, chap. viii; and *al-Ishārāt, vol.* III, chap. V). The argument in these sections may be interpreted as avowing that there are three kinds of being: necessary (*wājib*), contingent *(mumkin),* and impossible *(mumtani').* On these grounds it has been claimed that Ibn Sīnā proves the actuality of the Necessary Existent. This assumption, however, is open to several objections. A closer inspection of the passages (which we shall discuss only on the basis of DAI) shows that Ibn Sīnā's classification refers to the possible realms, specifically to any entity to which "being-qua-being" can be applicable *(har cha warā hastī hast)* (DAI, p. 65) rather then to an existent (*mawjūd*). Thus, his assertion implies that the concatenation of modalities of "necessity contingency," and "impossibility" to "being" is legitimate. Subsequently Ibn Sīnā declares that the "impossible being" cannot denote any actual existent (DAI, p. 65). This passage seems to justify the claim that he is not presupposing that a reference to a name implies the existence of the designatum. Since Ibn Sīnā mentions the impossible being, but does not admit its existence, it may be argued by analogy that we cannot deduce that *wājib al-wujūd* denotes anything on the basis of a mere assumption that it is a legitimately formulated name. So far, our inquiry has not

provided us with the proper tools for naming the Necessary Existent; while we have discovered that Ibn Sīnā assumes that the name is legitimate, we have not yet discovered why this name has an actual designatum. Since traditional justification of the Necessary Existent is presented by analyses of the ontological and cosmological arguments, and since we have mentioned the Ibn Sīnian ontological arguments, let us turn our attention to Ibn Sīnā's analysis of causation.

3. *The Necessary Existent and Causality*

The Necessary Existent is discussed also in the context of causality. For example, in *al-Shifā'* it is mentioned that the Necessary Existent is the reason *(burhān)* for all things *(al-Shifā'*, p. 354). The various references in DAI on this subject can be grouped into four kinds of causal features attributed to the Necessary Existent.

(a) Ibn Sīnā claims on the one hand that the existence of the world *(ʿālam)* is the result of that which is not alike--of that which does not resemble--entities in the world. Like the sun, the Necessary Existent is the source of light, of beings, and of the realization of the world. On the other hand, he states that the analogy is wanting, for unlike the sun, the Necessary Existent has no subject (DAI, p. 38). In another passage he clarifies the nature of this type of a dependence relation. For Ibn Sīnā, a cause is concurrent with the existence of its effect; the former is not a source of becoming, as the cause of a house is not its buttered (DAI, p. 69), but rather the structure and the composition of its constituents-i.e., the form of the house is the holder *(dāranda)* of the house, and not a thing. In this case, the Necessary Existent corresponds to the formal cause of the (contingent) world.

(b) Moreover, since the world, including matter, was ultimately emanated from the Necessary Existent, both the material aspect of the world and the Necessary Existent partake of the same

constituent. Thus, the Necessary Existent, unlike the prime mover of Aristotle, is the (remote) material cause of the world. Likewise, Ibn Sīnā states that in preserving the right universal order, the Absolute Good is receptive to the love It receives from particulars. Therefore, the Necessary Existent may be considered as being the (continuous) efficient cause of the world, for love is a continuous activity of every entity striving for its perfection.

(c) Since the Necessary Existent is the common beloved of whatever exists (DAI, p. 15 1), the Necessary Existent is the final cause of every entity in the world.

(d) Because of the Necessary Existent, an aspect *(rūy)* of every being is a necessity (DAI, p. 115). In this respect the Necessary Existent may be considered as the ground of being, or its sufficient reason, i.e. the cause of its actualization, and therefore, the cause of its realization.

When we consider these passages as a group, the following interpretation emerges: the Necessary Existent is not related to the world as an alienated entity, but rather, as a unifying principle or sufficient reason for the world. An objection could be raised to one assumption implicit in the proposition that one can find a causal solution to the problem - of the specification of the Necessary Existent. The assumption is that the notion of causality, particularly "a teleological" causation, is legitimate. Contemporary philosophy takes a very critical stance towards "causal explanation." Since we do not claim to have "justified" causation in any sense and do not assume its legitimacy, we shall neither expand on, nor press this particular interpretation, but merely point out its various aspects and deductions following therefrom.

4. *The Necessary Existent and the Union with the Self-Soul*

Being unable to find an adequate analytical depiction of the concept of the Necessary Existent, we shall single out a few

passages in which Ibn Sīnā actually asserts something affirmative about this concept.

(i) We begin with a passage in the DAI where he turns his attention from the descriptive analysis of metaphysical concepts to the normative aspects of his metaphysics. He states explicitly that the greatest pleasure *(khwushī)* and the highest happiness *(saᶜāda)* and fortune are found in union *(paiwand)* with the Necessary Existent (DAI, p. 102). An inspection of passages surrounding this statement proves without doubt that it is not an accidental assertion, for arguments are proffered explaining how the highest intelligence (*ᶜaql*) attains to perfection; it is suggested that the Intelligence mentioned sees *(bīnad)* that entity from which goodness, the best order, and happiness come (DAI, p. 106). In brief, here we have an assertion that the person's intelligent-aspect of mind unites with the Necessary Existent. Later we shall clarify the sense in which this union is to be understood.

(ii) In *al-Ishārāt* (vol. III, p. 53) there is another striking passage in which an equally affirmative feature of the Necessary Existent emerges. Here Ibn Sīnā asserts that the only way in which one can indicate or point to *(ishāra)* the Necessary Existent is by mystical intelligence *(al-ᶜirfān al-ᶜaqlī)*. The passage in *al-Ishārāt* is definitely not untypical since the entire text is written in the language of allusion and remarks; and, moreover, the last section of this text, which is devoted entirely to the analysis of mystical experience, includes an enumeration of the process of the stations *(maqāmāt)* of the mystic.

(iii) The third set of selections deals with the nature of the soul after the death of the body. In a treatise entitled *Maᶜrifat al-Nafs (The Mystical Knowledge of the Soul)*, Ibn Sīnā notes that the soul itself belongs to the category of substance, while the feature of its combination with the body belongs to the category of relation.[23] Thereafter he argues that the soul is independent of the body, asserts that it is attracted to the Divine Light as a needle is attracted to a magnetic mountain, and cites Qur'anic passages supporting his

arguments. There are at least two difficulties in this doctrine: determining the category of a person and specifying the nature of the disembodied soul. The first problem, arising out of Ibn Sīnā's assertion that a soul is independent of the body, shares the well known difficulties faced by the Cartesian dualistic mind-body theory: difficulties of depicting the mind-body relation and the nature of a person. We shall leave the analysis of this much discussed problem in Ibn Sīnā's system to a later study and proceed to the second difficulty, which concerns the nature of the disembodied soul. In the work cited, Ibn Sīnā remains on the level of vague analogies and religious similes in describing the actual state of the soul upon disembodiment. In the Ibn Sīnian system, a soul cannot be identified with what it knows. In this connection we recall Ibn Sīnā's attack of Porphyry's view that the knower becomes the known, an attack which may be seen as evidence for the view that Ibn Sīnā holds the individual soul after death to be distinct.[24] But a close reading of his text fails to reveal any one passage in which he explicitly asserts that the soul does in fact preserve its individuality. In an interesting passage in *al-Ishārāt,* he states that the rational soul *(al-nafs al-nāṭiqa)* does not become the soul of the active intelligence *(al-'aql al-fa''āl),* and notes specifically that it becomes connected (*ittiṣāl*) with the active intelligence *(al-Ishārāt,* vol. 3,p. 270). The depiction of the union-like relationship between man and God as a process of self-realization is not peculiar to the passages we have mentioned. For example, in his essay on love, *Risāla fi 'l-'ishq,* Ibn Sīnā asserts that a bipolar movement governs the relation between every entity and the Absolute Good *(al-khair al-muṭlaq).* (a) Since every entity, such as the human soul, depends on the Absolute Good for its perfection, it strives to be assimilated into the later. (b) Manifesting a receptability to the Absolute Good is necessary for implementing the best order in the universe in which all entities are to attain their perfection. In this *Risāla* Ibn Sīnā states specifically that the highest degree to which entities

approximate this perfection (*kamāl*) is explained by the mystic's concept of *ittiḥād*, which can be translated as "being united" or "being in an harmonious affinity."[25]

Another example of the same doctrine is found in *al-Najāt* (p. 293), where Ibn Sīnā states that it is the aim of the rational soul *(al-nafs al-nāṭiqa)* to become united *(muttaḥad)* with the Absolute Good *(al-khair al-muṭlaq)*; here he uses the terminology he employed in the aforementioned works to depict his key concepts.

Accordingly, the passages cited from *al-Ishārāt, Risāla fi 'l-'ishq*, and *al-Najāt* suggest that Ibn Sīnā either attempts to depict a state in which the soul is connected to *(ittiṣāl)* or united *(ittiḥād)* with a higher entity, such as the active intelligence, the Absolute Good, or wishes to assert that the perfection *(kamāl)* of the soul is to be found in such a state. From these passages we can deduce therefore that Ibn Sīnā's aforementioned statement in the *Dānish-Nāma* does not stand in isolation, but that it presents a doctrine recurring in his work, even though a connection *(ittiṣāl*, a union *(ittiḥād)* and a blending *(paiwand)* of a substantial soul with another entity runs into logical difficulties when the argument presupposes the traditional Aristotelian scheme.

We have argued elsewhere that this concept of the process of self-realization and the related union of persons with the ultimate being is a theme common to much Persian mystical poetry. It is pronounced in sufism as well. R. A. Nicholson's remarks on the sufis' attempt to become the perfect man corroborate our findings that the process of self-realization is a prominent theme in Persian mystical poetry and other movements historically related to Ibn Sīnā's philosophical tradition.

> What do the sufis mean when they speak of the Perfect Man *al-insān al-kāmil)*, a phrase which seems first to have been used by the celebrated Ibn al-'Arabī although the notion underlying it is almost as old as sufism itself? The question might be answered in different

ways, but if we seek a general definition, perhaps we may describe the Perfect Man as a man who has fully realized his essential oneness with the Divine Being in whose likeness he is made. This experience, enjoyed by prophets and saints and shadowed forth in symbols to others is the foundation of the sufi theology.[26]

5. *The Paradox of the Concept of the Self*

In the preceding section we stated a positive feature of the Necessary Existent, namely the relation implied by "being in union with" which is attributed to the soul. We should ask, however, whether this relationship is legitimate within the framework of Ibn Sīnā's philosophy. A review of points discussed previously shows that this finding is not a solution, but rather, that it leads to another paradox as follows. There are three kinds of substances: the material body *(jism),* the intelligence (*ᶜaql*) and the self-soul (person, *nafs, jān, ψυχη, anima)* (DAI, p. 119). Like each substance, the self has its perfection *(kamāl, ἀρτεή*), a perfection which resides, according to Ibn Sīnā, in its union (*paiwand*) with or its blending into the Necessary Existent (DAI, p. 102). The body bars the soul from knowledge of the Absolute Good. But after its disembodiment, the soul ascends towards the Absolute Good (DAI, p. 106). Furthermore, in this union the self loses its identity, preserving no longer its status as a substance without being destroyed. No aspect of the Necessary Existent is changed in this union (DAI, p. 80). An examination of these passages and the logical use of the *payvand* sense of a union discloses another paradox in Ibn Sīnā's system, namely:

(i) That the soul can be united with something (since the soul can be united with the Necessary Existent, by existential generalization it can be united with something).

(ii) That the soul cannot be united with anything. A substance persists and preserves its identity while undergoing every kind of change-alteration, diminution, growth and locomotion-that is all,

except generation and destruction. In the *paiwand* sense of the "union of x with *y*," *x* loses its identity, as does a piece of ice, which, melting in water, loses its distinguishability as ice. (While there are obviously many different senses of "union," not all of them correspond to *paiwand* as shall subsequently become clear.) Change, in this sense, cannot be attributed to the soul. From (i) and (ii) we deduce that "the soul can be united with something" and that "it is false that the soul can be united with something."

By way of summarizing this part, we note that if we assume the categorical metaphysical schemata taken for granted by Ibn Sīnā, then two paradoxes emerge from the notions of the Necessary Existent and the soul. We shall now examine some tentative solutions to these paradoxes.

II. ANALYSIS OF IBN SĪNIAN PARADOXES

Even though some of Ibn Sīnā's writings suggest consciousness on his part of such paradoxes in his system, we shall proceed to a direct examination of the paradoxes in question, making use of a few tools of contemporary philosophical analysis.[27] The significance of historical and textual analysis notwithstanding, it is our contention that the clarification of the logic of these paradoxes and their solutions is to some degree helpful in understanding the text.

6. *Difficulties in the Exact Formulation of the Paradoxes in Question*

Let us begin by commenting on the difficulties encountered in naming the Necessary Existent. One may consider the problem in a formal language of the first order predicate calculus, including relations (as two place predicates) and functors.[28]

(1) Among the first types of signs are individual constants of the zero level, named for individuals. Prima facie, if we interpret these signs in terms of traditional metaphysics, individual signs will then stand for primary substances, as they are used as a subject of expressions forming a sentence. Since the Necessary Existent is not a substance in Ibn Sīnā's system, it cannot be the designatum of an individual constant.

(2) Relations and properties are attributes, i.e., properties are one-place attributes, whereas relations are n-place attributes where n is greater than one (1). Ibn explicitly designates these relations and properties as accidents (DAI, p. 28). Since the Necessary Existent is not an accident, it cannot be named by attributes.

(3) The Necessary Existent cannot be designated by so-called secondary signs, such as functors, because secondary signs as such are defined in terms of attributes and/or substances. Such a naming would make the concept of the Necessary Existent dependent on some particular contingent existents. Ibn Sīnā , states explicitly, however, that the concept of the Necessary Existent is in no way dependent on anything other than itself (DAI, p. 67).

(4) Suppose one attempts to name the Necessary Existent by means of a definite description as follows. One may let *a* be the Necessary Existent if and only if *a=((i x))* where x has the intersection of the following properties: unity *(yakī būdan)*, immobility *(bi-taghayyurī)*, power *(qudra)*, eternity *(qadīmī)*, wisdom *(ʿalīmī)*, etc. Furthermore, in keeping with the argument offered by Rescher, one may assert that for Ibn Sīnā *'Øa'* (is true), implies 'E *! a'*. For instance, since Ibn Sīnā states that the Necessary Existent is eternal, one may state that "the Necessary Existent exists" by substituting 'the Necessary Existent' for 'a', and 'is eternal' for '*Ø*.[29] However, neither the description nor the subsequent analysis can apply to the case of the Necessary Existent for the following reasons. We have no guarantee that the Necessary Existent is an individual of such a nature that it could be substituted for *'a' in* 'Øa'. Consequently, the assertion that predication implies

existence in Ibn Sīnā's system does not assist us in this investigation. Moreover, in this very context, predication is significant only in the case of so-called 'genuine' properties. Ibn Sīnā asserts that the so-called properties of the Necessary Existent are mere privations (*bī-ṣifatī*) which tell us at best what the Necessary Existent is not. While they may assist us in approaching a definition, they do not state occurrent properties; the Necessary Existent cannot be named by a definite description of privations. In addition, any definite description may not even be proper, for naming does not guarantee existence. From a syntactical formulation, one may not be able to deduce existential statements without presenting additional evidence. It is not difficult to show how the paradox of the soul can be displayed in another formal language. For example, "substantiality" could be regarded as a predicate, "soul" as an "individual," and "is in union with" as a relation. An axiom could be symbolized so as to express the common feature of substances as follows: the only changes in which the identity of a substance is not preserved is destruction. Thereupon one could show that this axiom is contradicted by the theorem that a soul's eternal bliss is achieved by its union with the Necessary Existent.

Before proceeding any further with a suggested solution to these paradoxes, let us clarify the meaning of the "paradox" and the role that paradoxes can play in philosophical analysis. In an interesting note, W. V. Quine states that:

> . . .a paradox is just any conclusion that at first hand sounds absurd but that has an argument to. sustain it. . .[30]

Likewise, we take paradoxes to be similar to antinomies which display an absurdity. Whereas an antinomy cannot be solved due to a contradiction embedded in the problem, a paradox, against reason) can be solved by means of a logical solution which entails the formulation of a framework of distinctions between: the levels (e.g.,

object and meta), contexts (extensional and intensional), kinds of languages (materic and topological), different senses and uses of words, or other analytic problems.

Our supposition is that a paradox can be constructed only in a precise manner in the context of a semi-formal or formal language, and that the solution to the paradox must relate to the formulation: as such it is a linguistic procedure. (For this reason a paradox is welcomed by the logician who can reconstruct his framework and sharpen his analytic tools by solving it). In light of this discussion, let us inquire into the nature of our paradox. We are interested in the concept of the Necessary Existent, which cannot be named in our substance-event language, and in the concept of the Self, of which a not well-formed attribute is predicated, since a substance cannot be united with anything. Now a modest set of criteria for a satisfactory solution would include:

(a) The formulation of a language as an alternative to the substance-event language in which: (1) the main theorems and concepts of the theory (which were asserted in the paradox) could be formulated, and (2) there would be no contradiction; and

(b) A new formulation, which would be productive in stimulating controversies regarding the rest of the theory. Obviously, a solution lies not in a theory, but is about a theory, and a solution can be limited to the context of the passages in which the paradox is formulated. It should be pointed out that we are not affirming a belief on Ibn Sīnā's part in "processes," or that we refuse to deal with the general question of his intent or motivation. We only proffer the following hypothesis: if one chooses for primitives process-types of words which allow union of two processes, then the difficulties encountered in handling this theory by casting primitives into substance-types of words will disappear. Obviously, the construction of such a process language, which involves temporal indices, is beyond the scope of this paper. It is not our intent to present a formal solution to the paradoxes in question, but rather to outline a general schema by means of which

a solution can be developed in the reconstructionist sense of philosophical analysis.[31]

7. *Processes and Substances*

In order to discover the intuitive meaning of a primitive which can be substituted for substances, we turn first to several texts in the history of philosophy and then proceed to the primary and the extended uses of this primitive in ordinary language. Philosophers refer often to a "process" family of language as an alternative to a "substance-event" language. Frequently, the distinction is made within a context in which the "substance-event" language is regarded as being responsible for considering the subject-predicate form of expression as being primary. Whitehead notes, "In their natures, entities are disjunctively 'many' in process of passage into conjunctive unity. This Category of Ultimate replaces Aristotle's category of 'primary substance'."[32] Broad states, "Here is then prima facie, a distinction between two sorts of substantives, which we will call 'Processes' and "Things" respectively."[33] Ingarden affirms, "The general constituent property of a process as an object is that it is a temporally extensive aggregate of phases";[34] Mead asserts, "I have been presenting the self and the mind in terms of a social process."[35] A similar tendency is found in Dewey's concept of *Experience* and in Heidegger's concept of *Dasein*, among others.

Generally, a thing, and individual concrete entities, such as a chair, are regarded as substances. Corresponding to any substance is a history usually initiated by the generation of the substance and terminated by its destruction. During its history, a substance persists through all changes and does not evolve into other substances. Events are fixed, non-repeatable points in the history of substances; events are fixed by temporal and (for the material substances) spatial indices. A description of processes presents greater difficulty, since as primitives they are happenings-such as playing a tune-they contain events, and they are distinguishable by what is called a rope-cluster of family resemblances. Unlike an

event, a process, such as playing a tune, is repeatable; it has phases and may take a shorter or longer period of duration, as for instance, maturing. A process may be emanated from and may evolve into another process without a discernible temporal cut, as hatred may become love. With respect to this investigation, the interesting feature of the processes considered is that they can be united with each other in many ways, and that they may be used to express Ibn Sīnā's ethics of the process of self-realization in the sense of union *(paiwand)* of the person-soul with the Necessary Existent. It is not within the aim of this inquiry to verge further into a description of process types of entities, and it is unnecessary, as excellent source references are available on this material.[36] But at this point objection may be raised to process-language philosophy on grounds like these: is not the introduction of process language philosophy obfuscation with artificial concepts which could be explained as well in ordinary language? Is it the task of the philosopher to introduce further artificial concepts, such as processes which oppose substances--concepts which may lead to new difficulties? Should he not demonstrate instead the possibilities ordinary language offers for describing in perfectly clear ways situations related to the term "union" which give us difficulty only when we insist on using our narrow notion of substance? But counter-objections may be raised as follows: the ordinary language analysis of so-called process words to replace the substance-event schemata of philosophers is actually a useful first-stage clarification of an inexact pre-scientific concept (the explicandum) formulated for the purpose of providing an exact explicatum of the concept in question.

8 *Various Senses of "Union" Employed to Clarify "the Process of Mystical Union* (paiwand)"

Next let us examine some of the senses in which the concept of the process of union is used in ordinary language, in order to clarify

the doctrine of *paiwand* by means of the primary and the extended uses of process words taken from these cases.

There are several senses of "union" which do not correspond to *paiwand,* as in the relation "a is in union with b," or its mere syntactical variants, as illustrated below.

(a) "A man and a wife are united in marriage." In such a sense of "union," the identity of both a and b is preserved and the relation is symmetrical.

(b) "A quantity of what appears to be blue paint is mixed (united) with what appears to be a yellow paint and results in green paint." In this case of union, the identity of both a and *b* is destroyed, though neither one of the quantities is destroyed.

(c) "A computer sequentially mult'plies a series of numbers (each being different from zero (0) in a set of memory locations) by the content of an accumulator. Each number is subsequently set to zero (0) and the result (sum) of the calculation is united in the accumulator." In this sense of "union," in which the identity of *b* is preserved, the relation is asymmetrical; since the operation is performed in discrete steps, there is a discernible procedure with specifies at any time whether a particular memory cell has preserved its value, and further, whether it has become part of the accumulated sum in the accumulator.

(d) "The letter 'A' is written on a white board, thereupon the board is covered with a white disappearing ink under which 'A' temporarily disappears; during an interval a painted white patch is in a sense 'united with' or 'blended with' the rest of the board; after the interval, the 'A' reappears, thereby destroying the 'union'." Union in this sense is a temporary relation, happening during an interval, and occurring between the persistence and reappearance of individuals.

It is obvious from our analysis of Ibn Sīnā's concepts that the senses of union enumerated do not correspond to *paiwand* union. Without a doubt, there are many other senses of "union" which show an affinity to some usage of "blending" and "evolving" as

well as to other words which express the meaning of *paiwand* more closely.

(e) "An observer sees a piece of ice in a warm water. The ice blends continuously with the water until it is united with it." The following observations apply to this union: (1) the ice, i.e. a has not been destroyed but it has been blended with the water; (2) there is a sense in which we speak of the degree to which the ice is more or less "water" or "water-like"; and finally (3) there is a(n open) neighborhood (of time) during which one cannot distinguish the ice from water.

(f) "An observer watches a piece of wood burning in a fire. As the log blends slowly and continuously with the fire, it finally becomes part of the flame itself." The observation previously made on case (e) applies to this union.

(g) "A wave blends into (is united with) the sea." Again, the,, observations made previously (e) apply to this case, except that a wave is not normally called a thing-, rather, it is an aspect of something to which some philosophers, like Spinoza, refer as a "mode" rather than as a "substance."

Whereas the substance-event language may be used without many complications to explain cases (a) through (d), it is questionable whether cases (e), (f) and (g) can be explained by it. While one could attempt to explain cases (e), (f), and (g) by means of the substance-event language, the cost of such a procedure would be such extreme complexity that the introduction of another category, namely that of "process," is justified on the basis of the simplicity alone in which (e), (f), and (g) can be described in the process language. The difficulties confronted by the substance-event language are due to the following two restrictions inherent in the logic of the use of "substance"; first of all (1), substances do not admit of degree, as Aristotle states, ". . . but substance is not said to be more or less than that which is: a man is not more truly a man at one time than he was before, nor is anything, if it is a substance, more or less what it is. Substance, then, does not admit of variation of degree." *(Categoriae,* 4a-5); secondly (2), substances preserve

their identity through all changes except generation and corruption. "Blending," "evolving," and "uniting" attributed to entities in cases (e), (f), and (g) cannot be attributed to substances, unless the theory is revised to such an extent that its applicability and consistency becomes questionable, as in Spinoza's attempt to designate exactly one "substance" and to use "mode" in naming those entities called "individuals" in ordinary language.

Now one may claim that the meaning of *paiwand,* as well as mystical union and phrases used by the mystics such as "a person," "becoming more and more God-like," "no distinction can be made between the self, the world, and God," can be understood perfectly well in ordinary discourse, since many terms such as "evolving," "fusing," "blending," "uniting," and other clusters of process terms are available in ordinary language.

One solution to this paradox would be to recommend the withdrawal of the "substance-event" language and to disregard premises such as "In its first division being is divided into substance and accident." (DAI, p. 9).

III. CONCLUDING REMARKS

By way of concluding this inquiry we shall point to additional areas of investigation which would benefit from further clarification of the philosophical and the historical topics discussed in this paper. For example:

(1) Is there something fundamentally inherent in substance-event types of languages which prevents them from being adequate frameworks for systems in which the mystical ethics of self-realization are embedded? Could this factor be one reason for the wealth of mystical treatises expressed in poetry and of mystical recitals composed by the writers who were very capable logicians and masters of peripatetic metaphysics?

(2) Since Ibn Sīnā is known to have written both technical and philosophical texts in the Aristotelian tradition, as well as mystical works, which found many imitators, what kind of generalizations can be made about these two kinds of philosophical writing? Mystical texts, on the one hand, deal with practical questions of the ethics of self-realization, in which processes are important constructs in depicting epistemo-normative predicates needed for a theory of personal salvation. The substance-event language, on the other hand, is useful for a descriptive analysis of nature (*ṭabī'a*). If this distinction can be upheld, then we could ask: did philosophers, such as Ibn Sīnā, Ṭūsī, and Suhrawardī use different philosophical styles based on a sophisticated theory of methodology and on views on the role of constructs, such as substances and processes, in metaphysical systems? What, moreover, is involved in constructing an axiomatic process-type language which can interpret theories such as the process of self-realization and ethics in Ibn Sīnā's system? Obviously, such a language would require temporal indices, value functors, and a clear construction of processes as individuals which are unadaptable to any of the presently available standard formal languages.

(3) Was the increase in metaphysical poetry and mystical allegories after Ibn Sīnā influenced by the awareness of philosophers that ordinary language and the language of poetry could more adequately explain some of the significant themes of philosophical ethics than the traditional peripatetic metaphysics with its limited concepts? If this were indeed the case, may the traditional interpretation of "victory of the theologians over the philosophers due to Ghazalī" have been overly exaggerated? After all, the "victory" might have been one which enriched the language of philosophy by integrating ordinary and poetical discourse, rather than by abandoning philosophical works which continued to be written by the very same people writing mystical works.

A consideration of these and related questions will enable us to obtain a better grasp of the possible solution to the paradoxes in

question. We hope that our inquiry has at least formulated the questions in such a way that the philosophical and historical significance of a recently edited text of Ibn Sīnā emerges more clearly.

NOTES

1. Among the most typical studies are: E. Gilson, "Les sources greco-arabes de l'augustinisme avicennisant," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litteraire du moyen age,* 8 (1933), 37-42. E. I. J. Rosenthal, "Avicenna's Influence on Jewish Thought," *Avicenna: Scientist and Philosopher,* ed. G. M. Wickens (London, 1952), pp. 66-83. The wealth of such material is at least in part due to the numerous references made by later western philosophers to Ibn Sīnā's works. For instance, Aquinas, who supposedly referred to Ibn Sīnā's works a few hundred times, does not refrain from commencing the discussion of some of his most important works by making direct reference to Ibn Sīnā. In Aquinas' work, *On Being and Essence,* the second sentence reads, "Moreover, being and essence are what the intellect first conceives as Avicenna maintains in the first book of his *Metaphysics." Selected Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas,* ed. R. P. Goodwin (New York, 1965), P. 33. In connection with this ambiguous reference we note that Ibn Sīnā states that the three primary concepts known by the soul *(nafs)* are an existent *(al-mawjūd),* a thing or an entity *(al-shay'),* and a necessity *(al-ḍurūrī).*

2. Augustine's assertion, "God and the Soul, that is what I desire to know." When asked, "Nothing more?", he answered, "Nothing whatever", attests to the significance of this problem. *Soliloquies, II,* 7, i, in *Basic Writings of Saint Augustine, ed.* W. J. Jones (New York: Random House, 1948), vol. 1. P. 262.

3. His celebrated "I and Thou" doctrine prescribes an I-Thou relation between man and God; in the process of defining this relation ship, the I is favorably modified in contrast to the I-It relationship in which man takes the role of the spectator rather than of the participant in "the phenomenal happenings". Buber states:

> To be sure, whoever knows God also knows God's remoteness and the agony of doubt upon a frightened heart, but not the loss of presence. Only we are not always there. (M. Buber, *I and Thou,* trans. W. Kaufmann, New York, 1970, p. 147)

4. In relating man to God, Buber notes, "Although we on earth never behold God without world but only the world in God, by beholding we eternally form God's form." *I and Thou,* P. 167. Augustine's inquiring mind does not establish a specific relationship between man and God without noticing the affinity between himself and God. He writes, "And how shall I call upon my God-my God and my Lord? For when I call on Him I ask Him to come into me." *The Confessions, 1,* ii, in *Basic Writings of Augustine,.* p. 4. As he ponders further, he is related to God by being uplifted and filled by the Divine:

> And when Thou art poured forth on us, Thou art not cast down, but we are uplifted; nor art Thou dissipated, but we are drawn together. But, as Thou fillest all things, dost Thou fill them with Thy whole self, or, as even all things cannot altogether contain Thee, do they contain a part, and do all at once contain the same part? Or has each its own proper part-the greater more, the smaller less? Or is it that Thou art wholly everywhere whilst nothing altogether contains Thee? (*Ibid., 1,* iii).

Although the last formulation appears to adhere closely to his religious beliefs, we should acknowledge that Augustine does not proffer any argument or rigorous system, but rather, as the title of his work denotes, a confession. His illuminationist theory and other devices have by no means adequately "resolved" the problem of specifying the concept of the self and God or their significant relations.

5. P. Morewedge, "The Logic of Emanationism and Sufism in Ibn Sīnā," *The Journal of the American Oriental Society, Part* 1: 91:4 (1971), 467-476; Part 11: 92:1 (1972), 1-18.

6. For example, in a famous passage in his early writings, Wittgenstein asserts that:

> The Philosophical self is not the human being, not the human body, or - the human soul, with which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject, the limit of the world-not a part of it. (L. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,* trans. D. F. Pears and B.F. McGuiness, London, 1961, 5.641, p. 119)

In contemporary philosophy various aspects of this problem are isolated and treated separately; see for example, S. Shoemaker, *Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity* (Ithaca, 1963). In his later writings, in which he emphasizes behaviorism, Wittgenstein states:

> Doing itself seems not to have any volume of experience. It seems like an extensionless point, the point of a needle. This point seems to be the real agent. And the phenomenal happenings only to be consequences of this acting. "I do . . ." seems to have a definite sense separate from all experience. (L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, New York, 1953, 620, p. 161)

We observe a shift in emphasis here from "a metaphysical Subject" being "a limit of the world" to a process of "Doing" as "the real agent of . . . the phenomenal happening." We note then, that in the writings of several western philosophers, the specification of the self in relation to God is a key problem. We note further that some philosophers, such as Wittgenstein in his later writings, do not emphasize the relationship between the self and the God of religions, but rather the activity, the process, in terms of which they refer to a person. Subsequently we shall find that in Ibn Sīnā's metaphysics there are many passages in which the self can be interpreted as "an agent" of "an emanative process."

7. Descartes offers an example of the philosopher *par excellence* who asserts the epistemic primacy of self-knowledge in celebrated passages such as the following: "I clearly recognize that nothing is more easily or manifestly perceptible to me than my own mind." Descartes, *Philosophical Writings*, trans. and ed. E. Anscombe and P. T. Geach (London, 1963),. p. 75. However, there is another passage in Descartes in which he asserts explicitly that self-knowledge can be based only on the knowledge of the Divine:

> I must not think that my conception of the infinite has come about, not through a proper idea, but by a denial of the finite-as I conceive of the rest and darkness by the way of the denial of motion and light; on the contrary, I clearly understand that there is more reality in an infinite than a the substance, and that therefore in a way my primary concept (perceptionem) is rather of the infinite than of the finite-rather of God, than of myself. (*Ibid.*, p. 85)

8. Kant, among other philosophers, sharply attacks Descartes' doctrine that the person as a soul can be known independently of other entities, holding that, "the consciousness of my own existence is at the same time an immediate consciousness of existence of other things outside me". *Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason,* trans. N. Kemp Smith (London, 1953), p. 245 (B276). While placing both knowledge of the soul and of God as transcendent entities into the *noumena,* Kant like Augustine, attempts to connect the concept of the soul to the concept of God, as is evident from an interesting note added to the second edition of the first *Critique*,

In a systematic representation of the ideas, the order cited, the *synthetic, would* be the most suitable; but in the investigation which must necessarily precede it *the analytic,* or the reverse order, is better adapted for the purpose of completing our great project, as enabling us to start from what is immediately given us in experience-advancing from the doctrine of the soul to the doctrine of the world, and thence to the knowledge of God. (*Ibid.,* p. 325)

9. E. Gilson, *Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages* (New York, 1938), pp. 38-39.

10. An excellent edition of this text, written in Persian, was completed by Mo'īn (Tehran, 1952). Translations of the passages are from my own forthcoming work, a translation of and a commentary on Mo'īn's edition. P. Morewedge, *The Metaphysics of Avicenna* (Ibn Sīnā) (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul; New York: Columbia University Press, 1973).

11. The term "primitive" is used here in the same sense as "the axiomatic primitive constant" in Carnap's usage. R. Carnap, *Introduction to Symbolic Logic and its Applications,* trans. W. H. Meyer and J. Wilkinson (New York, 1954), p. 171. For Ibn Sīnā, of course, *hastī* is primitive in an intuitively epistemological sense of the a priori. However, if we were to translate his theory into modern terminology, then "Necessity" and "being-qua-being" would be primitive, while "The Necessary Existent" would be defined by the two aforementioned terms.

12. For the classical formulation of the notions of determinates and determinables see, W. E. Johnson, *Logic* (New York, 1964), I, Chap. XI. For Ibn Sīnā the concept of being *(hastī)* is more determinable than the concept of the Necessary Existent, as there is actually no "being-qua-

being". All actual, possible but non-actual, and impossible entities are determinations of being in the sense that "being-red" is a determination of "being-colored". For a clearer presentation of a similar concept, see Carnap, pp. 65-69. In these descriptions the most determinate entity would be of level zero; *hastī* would be of the highest level.

13. See P. Morewedge, "Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā), Malcolm and the Ontological Argument," *The Monist,* 54:2 (April 1970), 234-249. In this work we argue that Ibn Sīnā held a variation of the second version of the ontological argument, in which - the Necessary Existent was depicted not as an individual God separated from the word, but as something resembling the concept of the principle of sufficient reason in western philosophy. According to this analysis,, the truth of statements about contingent entities, such as one's self, depends ultimately on the principle of sufficient reason, which results in the peculiar nature of God. Evidently, a fruitful study would be to investigate the parallel doctrines of Leibniz and Ibn Sīnā concerning this issue.

14. P. Morewedge, "Contemporary Scholarship in Near Eastern Philosophy," *The Philosophical Forum, 11:1* (Fall, 1970), 122-140.

15. P. Morewedge, "Philosophical Analysis and Ibn Sīnā's 'Essence-Existence' Distinction," *Journal of the American Oriental Society,* 92:3 (1972). Also see, "Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī's Logic and the Ibn Sīnian Tradition," in *Essays in Islamic Science and Philosophy,* ed. G. F. Hourani (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1973).

16. *Aristotle's Metaphysics,* ed. W. D. Ross, 2 vols. (London, 1958), 1069a 30.

17. For example, in his translation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics,*- Hope uses the term "primary being," while Owens suggests the use of the term "entity"; see Aristotle, *Metaphysics,* trans. R. Hope, (Ann Arbor, 1966) and J. Owens, *The Doctrine of Being in Aristotelian Metaphysics* (Toronto, 1963), especially chapter four.

18. Ibn Sīnā, *Kitāb al-Hudūd,* ed. and trans. A. M. Goichon (Cairo, 1963). Whereas Aristotle uses οὐσία only once for the first of the ten categories, Ibn Sīnā uses *jawhar* throughout his work; see *Topica* 103a 22.

19. *In Elements of Theology,* trans. E. R. Dodds (London, 1963), p. 101; and *The Enneads,* trans. S. MacKenna (London, 1962) "generate" is used for terms relating to γενέτης (begetter) and γένεσις (an origin) while

P. Henry and H.R. Schwyzer's translation, uses "gush" for the same term in *Plotini Opera, II* (Paris and Bruxelles, 1959) p. 291.

20. See, for several significant distinctions between Ibn Sīnā's views and the views of the Neoplatonists, "The Logic of Emanationism . . . " Part II, p. 11.

21. *Al-Shifā' Al-Ilāhiyyāt (La Metaphysique),* ed. G. C. Anawati, M. Y. Moussa, S. Dunya, and S. Zāyed, intro. I. Madkour, 2 vols. (Cairo,- 1960). *Al-Ishārāt wa'l-Tanbihāt,* ed. S. Dunya, 4 vols. (Cairo, 1960). *Al-Najāt* (Cairo, 1938).

22. An unpublished paper, entitled "Three Metaphysical Texts of Ibn Sīnā and a Point of Philosophical Analysis," delivered at Columbia University, April 1971. Basically, *al-Shifā'* was written earlier than the other two works and carries greater religious overtones, evident, for instance, in the tacit acceptance of doctrines, such as punishment and reward after death, of which one finds a *revocatio* in other works; *al-Ishārāt* is the most mystical work, while the *Dānish Nāma* attempts to combine the mystical and metaphysical aspects. There is no way of indicating which of the latter two texts was written first.

23. "Risāla fī Ma'rifat al-Nafs al-Nāṭiqa wa Aḥwāliha," in *Aḥwāl al-Nafs,* ed. F. El-Ehwany (Cairo, 1952), p. 186.

24. J. Finnegan, "Avicenna's Refutation of Porphyrius," in *Avicenna Commemoration Volume* (Calcutta, 1956), pp. 133-146. Also, see M. E. Marmura, "Avicenna and the Problem of the Infinite Number of Souls," *Medieval Studies* 22 (1960), pp. 232-239 and P. Merlan, *Monopsychism Mysticism Metaconsciousness* (The Hague, 1963), pp. 27-30.

25. *Risāla fi'l 'ishq, in Traites Mystique d'Abou'Alī al-Hosain b. Abdallāh b. ou d'Avicenne,* ed. M. A. F. Mehran (Leyden, 1899), p. 22.

26. Nicholson, *Studies in Islamic Mysticism* (Oxford, 1967) pp. 77-78.

27. The term "philosophical analysis" is used in many different ways. As the investigation of this term is beyond the scope of our study, we shall limit our use of it to both the senses specified by V. C. Chappel, as "two different ways in which Wittgenstein himself conceived philosophy and language in the *Tractatus* and in his latter work." *Ordinary Language, Essays in Philosophical Method* (Englewood Cliffs, 1964), p. 2. The first kind is exemplified by R. Carnap's "A Rational Reconstruction" as applied to the explication of the two senses of

probability in his *Logical Foundations of Probability* (Chicago, 1951); see especially pp. 576-577. For a critical analysis of his method see P. F. Strawson: "Camp's Views on Constructed Systems versus Natural Languages in Analytic Philosophy," in *The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap*, ed. P.A. Schilpp (La Salle, 1963), pp. 503-518. According to this method, the problem lies in doing away with substance as the axiomatic primitive constant of an axiomatic system for depicting mystical experience. The problem then becomes: can such a system be adequately formalized, symbolized, and descriptively interpreted? The second approach, following the directions taken by Malcolm and others, presents the problem in a simplified fashion; see N. Malcolm, in *The Philosophy of G. E. Moore*, ed. P. A. Schilpp (Evanston, 1942), pp. 343-368. According to this view, the root of the problem lies in the restricted ways in which philosophers attempt to explain various kinds of experiences by the narrow conception of substance, whereas there are many satisfactory ordinary "process words" which explain the experiences in question as we shall see.

28. See R. Carnap, *Introduction to Symbolic Logic* and *It's Application*, trans. W. H. Meyer and J. Wilkinson (New York, 1958).

29. N. Rescher, *Studies in Arabic Philosophy* (Pittsburgh, 1966), p. 73.

30. W. V. Quine, *The Ways of Paradox* (New York, 1966), p. 1.

31. If processes are value-embedded entities, as is indicated in the later works of Whitehead, then his earlier schemas for a substance-event language would not be satisfactory, in spite of the fact that they allow for temporal indices; see A.N. Whitehead, *An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge (London,* 1955); cf. R. Carnap, *An Introduction to Symbolic Logic, PP.* 229-230, where Carnap suggests a topological and a metric construction for Whitehead's early substance-event language.

32. A. N. Whitehead, *Process and Reality* (New York, *1955),* p. 32.

33. C.D. Broad, *An Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy* (Cambridge, Mass., 1933), vol. 1, 142.

34. Roman Ingarden, *Time and Modes of Being,* trans. Helen R. Michejda (Springfield, 1964), p. 109.

35. George H. Mead, *Mind Self and Society* (Chicago, 1963), p. 186.

36. See L. S. Ford and J. B. Cobb, Jr., "The Prospect for Process Studies," *Process Studies, 1:1* (1971), pp. 3-8.

A PHILOSOPHICAL INTERPRETATION OF RŪMĪ'S MYSTICAL POETRY: LIGHT, THE MEDIATOR AND THE WAY

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to clarify an approach to the analysis of mystical symbolism in Rūmī's poetry. A study of this nature is justified in view of the complex symbolism confronting the reader of Rūmī's works. First, there is a need for a coherent framework by which to initiate inquiry into the possible polyvalent meaning of the symbolism in question. In light of the complexity of the problem at hand our presentation remains of necessity an introduction because of the restraints imposed on the size of this presentation.

Let us begin by mentioning some of the limitations under which we labor in order to better acquaint the reader with the scope of our inquiry. (1) We are focusing only upon a quasi-philosophical approach to Rūmī's texts, since a formal philosophical investigation of a *corpus* of poetry, such as that of Rūmī, would demand many years of investigation which we have not yet been able to devote to the poet. Consequently, we shall forego stylistic, historical, and biographical dimensions of this topic as well as any symbolic axiomatizations of a model-like structure for the domain of Rūmī's poetry. (2) For the sake of brevity we have not included a comparative analysis of Rūmī's work in terms of other figures in his tradition such as Attār and Jāmī with whom he might be compared. (3) Our third limitation is our most serious shortcoming. Our inquiry does not proceed inductively by proffering a listing of all uses Rūmī makes of a

particular symbol, such as a bird or a fish, but it advances deductively by testing the use of an extra-textual model on Rūmī's poetry. What emerges is not symbolism peculiar to Rūmī, e.g. how Rūmī's use of bird symbolism differs from that of Highs. In fact, what we have done is to present a scheme which focuses upon the most general features of many mystical systems in order to expose the fundamental structure of themes implicit in Rūmī's use of symbolism. (4) Finally, the lack of space permits-tus but a cursory justification of our method; in concluding we sham attempt to compensate for this lack by pointing out some ways in which a more developed version of our presentation may be justified.

Since the notion of a "model" or a structure has been used in philosophical literature in so many different ways, we shall apply the term "interpretation" to our scheme.[1] What we mean by "an interpretation" will be clarified in use. Nonetheless, we note the following points relevant to the initiation of our inquiry.

(a). As primitive terms we have selected at least three concepts which we take to be the *sine qua non* of a description of all kinds of mysticism: the unity of being, the mediator, and the way. These concepts are actually schemata for descriptive constants of our metalanguage. By noting the use of their respective designate, we shall arrive at a fist of propositions which will be our axioms and theorems concerning mystical, themes in Rūmī's poetry.

(b). With respect to the content of our analysis, we should point out that we are not assuming that mysticism is essentially religious. For example, even though Christ may function as a mediator figure; a bird, an old sage, a fish, or love may be endowed with the same function without any concurrent religious connotation. For specific contexts our reasons have been argued elsewhere; in addition, we might also note that many writers, such as Stace and Zaehner, admit a non-religious type of mysticism in their own findings.[2] Consequently, if we assume the hypothesis that religion is essential to mysticism, we would be taking a controversial

position without any justification on our part, since we do not wish to sidetrack our discussion to this topic.

(c). We consider our model no more than a pragmatically useful framework which we do not claim to find in Rūmī, but regard as a useful way of interpreting his work. Some of our methodological remarks concerning alternative systems, which may be more suited to the reader's taste, are found in the last part of this study.

(d). Another limitation placed on our presentation is the simple way in which we use the notion of "symbolism" in view of the vast amount of scholarship on this topic in contemporary literature, analytic psychology, phenomenology, and other disciplines. Moreover, contemporary philosophy has contributed much to the pragmatics of natural languages which could be applicable to our domain. It is our belief that an introduction to a schema, which attempts to present a coherent system of all of the mystical elements in Rūmī's poetry in a presentation using ordinary language as we have done, should proceed without the use of elaborate systems, such as the Jungian system of archetypes or contemporary logical syntax for pragmatics. While these approaches might be profitably used at a later time to specify a section of our analysis, they would confuse major features embedded in the issues of first attempt.

Let us begin with some points which will frustrate that in both the Islamic intellectual tradition in general and in Rūmī particular, consider. able attention has been paid to symbolism. The Qur'ān itself contains many cryptic passages whose interpretation assumes a type of analysis which must deal symbolically with the literal wording of the Qur'ān. For example, we cite a most remarkable case, namely the celebrated Sura on light (24:35) to which al-Ghazālī devoted his entire text, *Mishkāt al-Anwār [The Niche for Lights]*.[3] We are told by al-Ghazālī, for instance, that the lamp is the symbol for inspiration, while fire is the symbol for the source of inspiration. He divides the entire world into two realms, the spiritual [*ruḥānī*] and the physical [*jismānī*], a division which

corresponds also to the division between the intellectual and sensible realms. Divine mercy sets up the correspondence between these two worlds, such that every entity in the physical world is but a symbol of the entity in the spiritual world.[4] Accordingly, whatever we perceive with our physical senses is a symbol, and the entire realm of empirical sciences is no more than an organization of symbols whose pragmatic meaning is outside physical observation. Ibn Sīnā, too, mentions the importance of symbols in the context of mystical experience. In the beginning of the mystical section of his *Al-Ishārāt wa'-l Tanbihāt,*[5] where the topic of the stations [*maqāmāt*] of the mystics is analyzed, he affirms that the true meaning of mysticism is found in his allegorical treatise on "Salmān wa Absāl" a symbolic allegory.[6] Here Ibn Sīnā, the greatest analytical philosopher of the medieval Moslem world, recognizes that mysticism is explained better in terms of a symbolic treatise than in terms of a deductive system. In accordance with his explanation, he thereupon proceeds with the former. Contained in the Persian commentary to his *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* are sets of rigid correspondences between the symbols used in the allegory and the philosophical doctrines expressed in the commentary as shall be illustrated later.[7] Rūmī himself points out that stories play the most significant role in describing his own *state* [*ḥaqīqat-i hāl*], namely that of a poet *(Mathnawī,* I, 35).[8] He points to another story to clarify the difference between an observable fact and an analogy *(Mathnawī, II,* 111). Well aware of the fact that words have not only semantic meanings but are performative utterances (as J. L. Austine has also noted), Rūmī claims that fire can be ejected from speech *(Mathnawī, I,* 1593);[9] a speech is both fire and hay *(Mathnawī, I,* 1598). Words are expressed for the effect they have on the reader as well as for their semantical use, limited to mere description of the world. Often it is not the aim of a mystical work to depict the world as a map or a picture lie model, nor to present a deductive argument as in philosophical analysis, nor to insist on a specific ritual as in organized religion, but rather achieve an attitude-a

weltanschauung, which mystics claim will result in a non-alienating way of life, a feature which is to constitute the last stage of a person's self-realization. In view of these considerations we need to discuss the texts in question with emphasis on the content's meaning-in-use, as much content is conveyed through symbols. For literal translations of the poems in question we refer the reader to the various readily available sources.[10]

Rather than discuss the numerous approaches to symbolism in literature, we shall simply make a distinction between a symbol, such as a bird, the imagery surrounding the *symbol,* such as the flight, and the *tenor* of the bird's flight, namely "the mystical ascent of the soul" conveyed through the *vehicle* of a particular bird. In the case of a poet like Rūmī, it is advisable not to confine oneself to isolated images, but to look instead for clusters or families of images which evolve into symbols manifesting parallel isomorphic structures, and to examine how their meaning-in-use depicts specific contents.

Accordingly, instead of isolating syntactically, for instance, the sun [*aftab*] as a symbol, we shall follow interlinked symbolic networks, including, for instance, fire [*ātish*], light [*nūr*], the inflamed state [*sukhtan*] of the mystic, as well as the mirror [*āyinah*] referring to an imitation or reflection of the one in the self-heart of the mystic.

We specify a mystical symbol in terms of its relation to three possible contents: the unity of being, the mediator, and the way of salvation. A mystical symbol is a sign used in such a way that its content makes an essential statement about one of our three sign-schemes. For example, if both fish and bird are used to depict the ascent of the soul by the imagery of swimming or flying, then these symbols are used mystically in these specific contexts. We shall apply our three schemas to the work of Rūmī, knowing full well that we cannot prove the total applicability of our structure within the limits established. At best we can hope to clarify our major themes by demonstrating their meaning in use.

THE INTERPRETATION OF Rūmi'S MYSTICISM

1. The Unity of Being; the Case of "Light"

The final hallmark of mysticism we take to be the concept of "unity of being" or *waḥdat al-wujŭd.* This choice is not ours alone, as other writers have pointed to this feature as the *sine qua non* of mysticism. In this tone, W. T. Stace notes:[11]

> The most important, the central characteristic in which all *fully developed* mystical experiences agree and which in the last analysis is definitive of them and serves to mark them off from other kinds of experiences, is that they involve the apprehension of *an ultimate* unity in all things, a oneness or a One to which neither the senses nor the reason can penetrate. In other words, it entirely transcends our sensory intellectual consciousness.

It should be carefully noted that only fully developed mystical experiences are necessarily apprehensive of the One.

A similar observation has been made by Zaehner, Otto, and others.[12] Nicholson, a well-known interpreter of Islamic mysticism, expresses the doctrine of *waḥdat al-wujŭd* in its application to Jili follows: "Jili belongs to the school of sūfis who hold that Being is one, that all apparent differer[illegible] modes, aspects, and manifestation of reality, that the phenomenal is the outward expression of the real."[13] In the oldest Persian text on sūfism, *Kashf al-Mahjŭb,* we note that "unification" [*tawḥid*] is taken to be the second veil or stage in the process of self-realization. Hujwiri, the author of this text, explains the doctrine as follows:[14]

> Real unification [*tawḥid*] consists in asserting the unity of a thing and in having a perfect knowledge of its unity. In as

> much as God is one, without any sharer in His essence and attributes, without any partner in His actions, and inasmuch as Unitarians *[muwaḥḥidān]* have acknowledged that He is such, their knowledge of unity is called unification.

Al-Ghazālī illustrates this "unity" in its most extreme sense when he says that there is a difference between the view that is held by the common many *[ʿamm]* and the learned few [*khāss*]; the former say that "there is no deity but God," which means for the latter that "there is nothing but It" when both comment on the meaning of unity [*tawḥīd*].[15]

Having pointed out these cases, we shall attempt now to clarify the meaning of some of the possible interpretations which we can proffer for the concept of the unity of being. (1) This view may arrive at a monistic metaphysics in the manner of Spinoza, who held that ultimately there exists exactly one substance;[16] what we in ordinary language call "individuals," such as the piece of paper on which this sentence is printed, or a particular chair, are merely modes or aspects of this unity. (2) Another interpretation of "the unity of all being" may be that there are many different entities made of the same kind or "stuff," such as bodies or ideas.[17] Distinct individuals are in fact nothing but a temporary combination of the atoms (be they mental monads or physical atoms) which wig eventually dissolve into the One or derive their persistence from the One (e.g. by a pre-established harmony). For instance, all entities are emanated from the One and ascend, or can in principle return, to their original source. (3) Another variation of the doctrine of the unity of being is the view that there are two aspects to the world: appearances and a reality. In naive modes of experiencing we note only the apparent phenomena consisting of many different kinds of entities. Among these each of us observes an alienated self, a self alienated from the creator. Through some practices and experiences we realize that ultimately an inherent connection links entities; that this connection leads to a unity as its most significant aspect, a unity which is the only beholder (according to Ibn Sīnā),[18]

and that distinct persons are not metaphysically primary entities.[19] (4) A fourth and for our purpose final interpretation of the doctrine of the unity of being is a variation on the third view, which affirms that the afore-mentioned appearance-reality distinction is only a pragmatic one. We do in fact feel alienated and fail to notice an all-comprehensive connection in the world. But if we follow a supposedly correct "mystical" way of life, we shall experience a union with the word and relate to the world in a non-alienating way. The positive aspect of this experience, which is not an affirmation of an ontological view but the adoption of the pragmatics of useful acts, is described by Stace as follows: "Moreover, all mystics affirm that it [the positive side of mystical experience] is pure peace, beatitude, joy, bliss, so that it has a positive affective tone."[20] In this state we need not identify, define, or know the One substance as we can only point to it *[ishāra]*--a term used by both Ibn Sīnā[21] and al-Ghazālī.[22]

Having clarified some different senses of the idea of the "unity of being" let us show how a particular "universal" symbol, namely "light," is used in Rūmī's system.

With regard to the universality of fight symbolism we note that a recurring medium in medieval cosmology to depict both the physical and the spiritual world as an orderly universe, a cosmos, is the concept of "light." Several investigators have arrived at this conclusion. Franz Rosenthal, for example, has shown "light" to have been a favorite concept in the spiritual terminology of Islam, where it served as the medium depicting various senses of *ᶜilm* or knowledge for the mystics.[23]

In a similar vein, on the basis of a study of Jewish, Christian, Islamic, Indic, Iranian, Chinese, and other traditions, Eliade has found this concept to be universal among world religions and mystical traditions.[24] Eric Neumann has corroborated this and concurs with Ernest Cassirer's findings that all creation myths make use of light.[25] In the book *Zohar* it is stated that "the primal center of the world is the innermost light."[26] In the book of *Revelations* reference is made to the mediator figure as follows: "His

head and his hair were white as white wool or as snow, his eyes like a burning flame."[27] The overriding importance of fight symbolism is established in Manichaeism beyond the need of comment.[28]

Extensive use of light is also noticeable in many philosophical systems. Aristotle's celebrated account of the active intelligence is rendered with the aid of light images.[29] Further references to light in Eastern philosophy, Plato's use of the sun as the symbol of the Good, [30] and Augustine's doctrine of the inner light[31] as well as Descartes' doctrine of the natural light of reason[32] are sufficiently well known to permit us to conclude that fight figures prominently as a universal medium in philosophical and religious texts.

Now let us note how Rūmi uses light and its associated concepts to depict the unity of being. In approaching the signs associated with light, we note the presence of at least four meaning-in-use possibilities governing the pragmatics of symbols depicting the unity of being-our first theme.

1.1 Emanation from Light

Traditionally the relationship between an ultimate being, such as the God of mysticism, and the rest of the world has been depicted in one of the following three ways: creation *ex nihilo*, emanation, and coeternity. As we have shown elsewhere, the theme of emanation is best suited to a presentation of a mystical system because in such a system the unity of being is preserved even though a distinction between a divine source and the rest of the world can be maintained. In such a scheme exactly one source is identified as that source from which all other entities have emanated; to it all entities return, and through it all entities are preserved. This one entity is often depicted as the essence, the cause, or even the unifying element of all other elements in the world. Through it the whole world is visioned as one entity. Light symbolism is used to describe this emanation, particularly the rays emanating from the sunk of which we are mere particles or golden

dust. light imagery often constitutes the means by which the theme of the unity of being can be depicted in the cosmological emanationistic schema. Rūmī resorts to light symbolism in several passages to express his doctrine of the unity of being. For example, he notes that the sun of the mystical gnosis has as its orient [*sharq*] both life and intelligence [*Mathnawī*, II, 43]. Particle by particle his entire existence is described as being in love with the sun (the divine existent) so much, indeed, that his particles dance like the ṣūfī (*Shams*, III, 1271-1274). In another passage he points to It (the mediator of the Divine) as the source of fight and intelligence; this mediator is called the Divine Gabriel *(Mathnawī, II,* 817). According to Rūmī, life arises out of the delicate light of the Divine in comparison to which we are particles of rotating dust *(Shams*, VIII, 1231-1232). As a candle burns in the night of alienation [*farāq*] until the light of the day dawns (ms, 111, 12729), the lover should bum (with love). The Divine constitutes our inner eye and our lamp *(Shams*, VI, 29410). According to Rūmī, particles and drops of water should participate in the intoxicated dance of divine love as it is led by that sun to which the physical sun is but a cup *(Shams*, IV, 20603). Rhetorically, he importunes the Divine, asking why he should not partake of Its light, which has given rise to all other lights. *(Shams*, VII, 34076). Elsewhere he interprets himself as darkness (as a privation) and It (the Divine) as light, or again, himself as the body and the Divine as life *(Shams*, VII, 2, 35926). He praises the Divine as the fight of the life of life *(Shams*, VII, 36051). If we would but annihilate our shadowy selves under the glow of the sun, we should see Its light instead of our own shadow *(Shams*, IV, 20394). In these and other poems in which fight imagery is used, the highest goodness is associated with the Divine, which often appears either as God or as the mystical figure *Shams*. In Rūmī's theophanic doctrine, in which all entities become a Christlike incarnation of the Divine, no two entities, including *Shams* and the Divine Itself, are ultimately distinct. Consequently, Rūmī does not contradict himself when he refers to both *Shams* and the Divine as *the* source of light. As we

shall clarify, in many poems the mystical sage *Shams* is not a physical entity but a divine representation in the world as well as a symbol for the Divine. A monistic system must of necessity equate the mediator with the ultimate being, at least in the last stage of self-realization, represented often as intoxication [*mastī*], to preserve the all-important unit-and to avoid the suggestion of two essentially distinct entities. The belief in the identity of various aspects of the apparent world is wen illustrated in other systems of mysticism. Al-Ghazālī, for example, equates the angels, or the light substances of the other world, with the stars of this world.[33] Accordingly, the sun is called the monarch and the moon the minister of the heavenly entities.[34] Allusions to the all-embracing One as the source of individual persons are not restricted to those using light symbolism. Rūmī calls the Divine our *aṣl,* a term which may best be rendered as *arche,* or as our origin or source, to which phenomenologists like Neumann refer as the *Uroboros.*[35] Rūmī affirms that he who is separated from his source will once again seek to return to union [*waṣl*] with this origin *(Mathnawī, I,* 4). The nature of this tendency to return to one's origin shall be discussed in the context of our third theme, the way of salvation. At this point we wish to do no more than to single out one aspect of this "return to the origin." A return depicted as a completion, a perfection, the attainment of one's virtue (in the Greek sense of *arete* or the Arabic sense of *(kamāl)* does not allow for a union of two distinct entities, but rather for the synthesis of an aspect of the all-embracing One with our lost selves. As a wave blends with the river from which it originally came, so our selves may be said to blend with the One. The legitimacy of the use of this concept of union in the context of the analysis of the term *paiwand* has been demonstrated in an analysis of Ibn Sīnā's concept of mystical union.[36]

1.2 The Concept of the Mystical Ascent: The Fire of Love

The philosophical aspect of this feature of the concept of the unity of being is not complicated. We note first that if all entities were ultimately derived from one source by emanation and yet some kind of unity were to be preserved, then the parts would either be compelled to return to their origin or to remain intact with the origin in order to preserve some kind of unity among the many. Obviously, it is difficult to justify this philosophical view, even though it underlies implicitly the premises of many mystical systems. An exception to this rule is found in many passages of Proclus' *The Elements of Theology*,[37] where explicit mention is made of some of the aforementioned themes in reference to supposedly true metaphysical theorems. For example, Proclus's statement that whatever exists proceeds from a single first cause[38] accounts for emanation from the one entity, as we shall explain in the last section. The next proposition germane to our discussion holds that "every producing cause brings into existence things like to itself before the unlike;"[39] It points out that the heavenly entities, such as angels or stars, resemble the Divine more than do terrestrial beings. finally, several propositions in Proclus' work corroborate Proposition 31, which reads: "All that proceeds from any principle reverts in respect of its being upon that from which it proceeds."[40] This proposition offers the clue to an important aspect of the Neo-platonic scheme which served as a model for many mystical schemes, namely that a mystical ascent is one in which a part reverts to its own source. Like Proclus, Rūmī deploys the essential relationship between fire, light, and the effervescence (lit., the boiling)[41] of the intoxicated lover in depicting the ascent towards the beloved as a return to his source. Both the melodious lament of the reed as well as the effervescence resulting from the intoxicating wine are attributed to the fire of love *(Mathnawī,* I, 9-10). In being interpreted as the life of our life and as the morrow of all lives, the Divine attracts us towards our own true selves *(Shams,* V.2, 35791). From the heart of a lover a sun emanates, which can

enlighten both the past and the future of the world and in so doing provide an eternal perspective *(Shams, III,* 12874). Moreover, Rūmī advises the mystic to become receptive [*mustaʿidd*] to light; and in order to attain the ultimate, remote state of blessedness, the mystic should note the significance of his alienated state as a particular self and remove himself from a non-universal type of perspective *(Mathnawī, I,* 3606). This theme presents a doctrine later formulated by Spinoza that the proper mental perspectives for modes such as ourselves are universal considerations which concern the type of substance we call the ultimate being -- God. The highest virtue which renders us almost godlike is, as Spinoza states in proposition XXXXVI of *The Ethics,* an intellectual love of God.[42]

> The intellectual love of the mind toward God is the very love with which He loves Himself not in so far as He is infinite, but in so far as He can be manifested through the essence of the human mind, considered under the form of eternity; that is to say, the intellectual love of the mind toward God is part of the infinite love with which God loves Himself.

St. Augustine's quest for two kinds of knowledge: knowledge of one's own soul and of God[43] emerges in Rūmī's mystical vision, for self-knowledge implies knowledge of our origin which Rūmī portrays as Divine. The way of ascent, upon which we shall elaborate later, is depicted by fire burning in the heart of the beloved, but also by love *[ʿishq, amora, eros],* which Rūmī identifies with the ladder of salvation *[najāt]* itself, adding that love is also the way of the prophet. Love is shown to be all-embracing, for, as we were born due to love, love can be said to be our mother (ms, VII, 491). Moreover, since love is salvation, we are in love with love as a process.

Love as the means of attaining immortality can be compared to the water of life consumed by the prophet *Khizr*, who achieved immortality through it. *(Shams,* VIII, 151). The role of love [*eros*]

in the creation of the orderly universe [*cosmos*] out of *chaos through logos,* as well as love as a ladder leading to immortality, has been discussed by Plato in his *Symposium.*[44] Others, such as Schopenhauer, have depicted love as a way in which a species preserves itself.[45] Ibn Sīnā's own theory of love points to love as the necessary ingredient of all entities having intelligent design in their structures; the highest love, according to the sūfī, is a desire for union with the ultimate being, which is the Necessary Existent in Ibn Sīnā's system.[46]

The agent who becomes active in this erotic ascent, prescribed by Rūmī, Ibn Sīnā, and many others, is not an alienated man but a man figuratively related to the Divine. Thus, a connection, which is the ultimate aim of the ascent, is made possible. Using this model as his point of departure, Rūmī portrays the mystic as a dancing wheel, who imitates in his rotation the prime mover in Aristotle's cosmology. In imitating the circular motion of the heavens caused by the One, the mystic reflects like a moon the glory of the sunlike, Divine entity; like a candle, the mystic glows from the shining rays of the Divine; and because of the qualities of the One, the mystic is pure intelligence, love, and life (*Shams*, IV, 2293).

As we shall note later, imagery associated with intoxication [*mastī*], dancing, and love is more often than not interrelated. In a final observation on the significance of the love theme, we note that the state of love does not allow for a dualism, for the ultimate aim of the lover is to be in an intimate union with the beloved. In this vein Rūmī states that love obliterates any differences between blasphemy and faith, body and intelligence, heart and life; whoever is not in such a state is not a lover (*Shams*, VIII, 7861-7862).

Here a remarkable distinction is observable between the Monism of the mystic on the one hand and the Aristotelian model of the prime mover with a world independent of the prime mover on the other. In the case of the former the aim is to achieve an ultimate union, whereas in the latter, the prime mover as a non-physical entity cannot move, even though the heavens move in an eternal circular motion due to their love for the prime mover.[47]

One may argue at this point that in addition to our model of mysticism there exists another prevalent tendency among religious mystics labeled by R. C. Zaehner as theistic rather than monistic mysticism.[48] According to his view, the aim of the theistic mystic is not to bring about the integration of the entire person with nature as the monistic mystic advocates, but rather to isolate spiritual aspects of the self.[49]

The main difficulty with the application of the religious models of mysticism to Rūmī lies in the message embedded in the poems cited and in many others we could cite. If the body and the soul are identical for the mystic who envisions all entities as being derived from the Divine, then it follows that the need for isolating the spiritual aspects from the self is gone, because there is nothing which is not a non-spiritual manifestation of the One. Unfortunately, Rūmī does not examine this particular philosophical doctrine and hence does not take a definite stand on it. In consideration of this reason and Rūmī's Muslim context, we cannot retract our monistic interpretation of Rūmī; nonetheless we wish to alert the reader to the difficulties of our interpretation and refer him to relevant passages in Zaehner's works where a reasonable alternative to our own system is presented.

1.3 Keeping Intact with the One: the Light of Faith

If we uphold the dogma of the unity of being, then in addition to emanation (1.1) and the return (1.2) a procedure is necessary by which to keep our relationship with the Divine intact. Franz Rosenthal presents an excellent account of faith as that link in the Muslim tradition which keeps the relationship between God and the believer intact. This faith is symbolically presented as a fight which shines from God into the heart of the mystic:[50]

> According to the Qur'ān, fight provides guidance and is given by God, and by God alone (24:40/40, 57:28/28). Knowledge, guidance and a book giving fight are the things

> that together provide for true religious insight (31:20/19). And a light accompanies the faithful, representing their perfect faith (66:8/8). Faith thus is a light in the heart, and a later mystic writer could very well describe the gnosis of God as a fire, and faith as a fight.

Rosenthal illustrates that the doctrine of the symbolic identification of faith with light is not peculiar to Islam.[51]

> The gnostic concept of the "*Pistis Sophia,*" to give one specific example, was identified with light, its primal abode. In one sweeping statement that seems to encompass much of later Muslim mystical thought, we find *Pistis* ("faith") emanating a picture called Sophia ("wisdom," it would perhaps not be inappropriate in this context to think of "knowledge") which develops "work" that is similar to or identical with the first existing light.

References in Islamic philosophical texts confirm Rosenthal's assertion. Mullā Ṣadrā corroborates it, for instance, in *Si Aṣl:* "A true faith [*īmān-i ḥaqīqī*] is a light which the creator of the world [*pavardigār-i ᶜālam*] shines upon the heart of the creature."[52] In a later passage he clarifies his views by pointing out that this light shining from God to man is the cause which attracts man to God.[53] The clue to an understanding of the tie which keeps us intact with the Divine is found in Suhrawardī's depiction of the active intelligence, *al-ᶜaql al-faᶜᶜāl, nous poetikos,* as the residue of Divine light in man. Suhrawardī regards the rational soul [*nafs-i nāṭiqa*] as a light which ultimately issues forth from the Divine.[54] Thus, the active intelligence becomes the secret key [*tilism*] of humanity. Suhrawardī states that this light, an aspect of our soul, is our father in heaven, who is the bestower of our soul as well as a ladder towards our perfection.[55] He also describes the rational soul as a heavenly substance whose full potential as a spiritual entity is withheld by the body.[56] Consequently, the element which is

preserved from the Divine by means of which we know archetypal and universal forms is the wisdom received via this particular element which keeps us intact with the Divine.[57] From numerous instances we cite only a few to show how Rūmī depicts the intelligence [*ᶜaql*] as the source of our Divine allegiance. He contrasts the dust-seeking soul [*nafs, psyche, anima*], which represents the formal aspect of the person connected with the organic faculties, with intelligence [*ᶜaql*] in which there is nothing but a passion for a union with the Divine (*Mathnawī, II,* 2621). In another passage he notes the effect of the illumination of the universal intelligence [*ᶜaql-i kull*] upon his own intelligence as one of rugged intoxication (*Shams*, VII, 2, 35091). He points out, however, that in the absence of a prophetic soul, our own intelligence constitutes the wings of our ascent (*Mathnawī,* VI, 4075). While embodied, the intelligence warns us against placing value on the physical eye (*Mathnawī, VI,* 2962) and indicates that it is moved by love alone from a brasslike state to a state of golden illumination (*Shams,* VII, 2, 36313). He points to the Divine as the ultimate of our intelligence. The road to such intelligence implies for him the achievement of a disembodied state making possible the union of two spiritual entities (*Shams,* IV, 17103). While love induces an intoxication with the Divine, Rūmī points out that it is the intelligence which enables the individual to persist as an eternal actual entity (*Mathnawī,* VI, 4075).

1.4 Light and Its Reflection: The Mirror

In a theophanic system every entity reflects the Divine. Consequently, the best mode of existence is that which reflects the Divine in the most unadulterated way. Rūmī uses the mirror as the symbol for the pure [*safā*] heart of the mystic which reflects the Divine. In this sense truth is an expression which corresponds to the ultimate reality-truth [*ḥaqq*]. In this connection Rūmī relates the story of the handsome Joseph who was given a mirror in which he could perceive his own inner beauty (*Mathnawī, I,* 3192-3227).

Here the beautiful face of Joseph (who stands for the perfect man) is related to the Sun, described as the candle of the sky (*Mathnawī, I,* 3198). Subsequently, Rūmī affirms that the mirror of existence [*hastī*] is in fact a state of not-being-an-existent [*nīstī*] and enjoins us to seek out this state in our reflections *(Mathnawī, I,* 3201). Perhaps his message can be interpreted as follows: As we perceive our own ultimate state in a mirror atemporally, we comprehend that we cannot eternally exist as alienated individual entities and grasp the need for reconciling ourselves to a state of not-being-an-individual-existent, the so-called state of *fanā*'. But this state of non-existence is ultimately related to a state of persisting [*baqā*] as an eternally existing entity [*hastī*], which is an aspect of the One. Thus, the physical mirror here serves as a medium allowing us to reflect upon our own fate in time and to seek out this state. Accordingly, Rūmī associates this reflection with enlightenment by noting that the mirror given to Joseph was like the fight in the hearts of the faithful [*nūr-i* sīnā] *(Shams, I,* 3196). Joseph's story must be seen not in isolation, but as standing in a context in which the act of reflecting on the Divine is depicted as a morally virtuous mode of existence. The same point is illustrated in another celebrated story. The Chinese and the Romans compete in building the most beautiful house for a kind. The elaborate Chinese structure is surpassed by that of the ṣūfīlike Romans, who merely design a medium to reflect the beauty of the Chinese edifice. The self should be a mirrorlike entity in which the divine light may be reflected. The mirror of the heart should be formless form [*ṣūrāt*] *(Mathnawī, I,* 3486) without limitation [*ḥadd*] caused by determinate [*maḥdūd*] and multiple [*ma ʿdūd*] particular entities *(Mathnawī, I,* 3487). The mirror imagery may be said to correspond to our last sense of the concept of the unity of being for the following reason: We do not automatically reflect on the multiple states in which the world appears as one entity, even though we should reflect on it as one entity, since each of us possesses the potential of becoming the beautiful Joseph, the

perfect man; each of our works holds within it the possibility of becoming the receptacle of all divine glories.

1.5 Concluding Remarks on the Unity of Being

Taken as a group, this cluster of interrelated symbols has that meaning-in-use which results in the depiction of the world in terms of a unity. The sun constitutes the source from which the world emanates; fire of love quickens our aim towards a return to the One; the light of faith keeps our connection with the divine intact; and, in becoming like a mirror, we are able to reflect the glory of our source of origin.

2. The Mediator Figure

The second theme by means of which we wish to give a coherent interpretation to Rūmi's poetry is the so-called mediator figure who forms a link between man and the Divine. Before turning to Rūmi, let us note a few representations of this figure in Western and Eastern literature.

Eliade points out that in many primitive religions the Supreme Being plays no part in religious life, even though His existence is acknowledged.[58]

> In addition, little is known about him [the Supreme Being], his myths are few and, in general, simple. This Supreme Being is believed to have created the World and man, but he soon abandoned his creation and withdrew into the Sky. Sometimes he did not even complete the creation, and another Divine Being, his "son" or his representative took over the task.

In Eliade's view, the mediator figure as the son of God actually replaces the Supreme Being in the functional operation of religions, without however replacing the Supreme Being ontologically as the creator. Consequently, this mediator figure

helps to complete the relationship with the all-powerful Being who cannot be imagined by man. A classical interpretation of the mediator figure in western literature is the figure of Christ seen in light of Jungian psychology as a symbol of the Self Jung asserts:[59]

> Christ exemplifies the archetype of the self. He represents a totality of a divine or heavenly kind, a glorified man, a son of God *sine macula peccati,* unspotted by sin. As *Adam secundus* he corresponds to the first Adam before the Fall, when the latter was still a pure image of God.

In analytical psychology the process of self-realization is labeled a process of individuation which requires the integration of a savior-like archetypal figure such as Christ within us. Similarly, in mysticism the presence of a sage is a necessity for traversing the *ṭarīqa,* the path of mystical self-realization. Islamic sources make numerous references to the perfect man, the person who has achieved the integration of the savior figure within himself. An examination of these references is specially interesting as they reveal correspondences between religious, philosophical, mystical, and cosmic domains depicted as different aspects of the same process of self-realization. Disclosed as well is a unitary connection supporting a monistic view of the world. For example, in his text entitled *al-Insān al-kāmil,* Nasafī, a thirteenth century mystic, states that the perfect man has been called by many different names, among them are *shaykn, pīshvā* [exemplary guide *hādī* [leader, director], *mahdī* [the rightly guided), the twelfth Imam of Shīᶜæ who was expected to return to purity Islam, *dānā* [the learned], *bāligh* [the mature], *kāmil* [the man perfect in virtue], *mukammal* [the perfected], *imām, khalīfa, quṭb* [the pole, polar star], *ṣāḥib-i zamān* [the beholder of time or eternity], *jām-i jahān* [a cup reflecting the world], *ā'yinah-i gītī namāī* [a mirror showing the universe], *ṭiryāq-i buzurg* [a great theriaca], *aksīr-i aᶜzam* [the great elixir, the philosopher's stone].[60] Nasafī mentions that the perfect man is also caged by the name of Jesus

who revived a dead man, by the name of Khizr the prophet who drank the water of eternal fife, and by Solomon who knew the language of the birds (the bird being the heavenly messenger). In *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* and its Persian commentary we note an explicit correlation between an allegory in which a traveler meets an illuminated sage and the interpretation of this figure as a heavenly angel, as well as the philosophical active intelligence *[al-ᶜaql al-faᶜᶜāl,* and the angel Gabriel.[61] In Suhrawardī mystical recitals such as *the Fiery Intelligence,* the illuminated sage figure also serves as guide for the traveler seeking self-realization.[62] In sum, the concept of the mediator figure, constituting a link between man and God or the ultimate being, is well-known and can be illustrated by reference to Western and Islamic traditions. Let us now return to Rūmī and note how the mediator figure is deployed in some representative mystical poems.

To begin with, the key mediator figure in Rūmī's poem is the mystical shaikh, *Shams*-i Tabrīzī, who is well-known to anyone familiar with Rūmī's works. Rūmī points out that *Shams* is the heavenly *sīmurgh,* or the mystical bird, who is in fact a sun, albeit in no specific location *(Shams, I,* 775). Rūmī refers to the aspacial nature of the Divine element again when he notes that we should not inquire into the location of this or that place, for the Divine is everywhere (*Shams*, VII, 35156). In addition to the poetical use of *Shams*' name, meaning the sun, Rūmī refers to this sage in many passages as mediator of light or as source of the Divine light. He is called the light of the perceptive aspect of our soul *(Shams,* VI, 32823), a sun towards which our soul moves as a shadow *(Shams,* VI, 32824), a vortex in whose light we are drowned *(Shams,* IV, 19176), the light of the sky *(Shams,* IV, 18017), the sun of life whose body is the entire world (ms, IV, 21055), the light of truth-reality [*ḥaqq*] *(Shams,* VII, 31824), the light of the heavens and the earth, as whose eyes and lamp he reveals the concealed [*ghayb*] *(Shams,* IV, 19038), the twilightlike sun of Rūmī's life *(Dams,* VII, 39040), and the source of strength on whose shoulders lie a hundred moons and kings (*Shams, VII,* 39042). Evidently, an

ample number of references establish This sage figure as a symbol of light. But *Shams* is not the only mediator figure Rūmī connects with light symbolism. In the famous story telling of the relationship between a king and a slave girl, a heavenly sage appears to the king in order to assist the king in his quest for love. Here the sage figure is surrounded by vivid light imagery. First, the king waits at an assigned place for the appearance of the guide while the light of the sun rising in the East extinguishes the stars in the *sky*. *(Mathnawī, I,* 66). Then, the sage himself appears at the scene as a sun which has arisen in a world of shadows *(Mathnawī, I,* 68). The sage thereupon appears as the crescent of the moon, whose appearance in the world of imagination borders on the realm of the actual entity [*hast*] and that of non-reality (a mere image) *(Mathnawī, I,* 69). The poet then relates that the realm of imagination, in which this sage is perceived, is a reflection of the moon-faced mediators of the sun which belong to God *(Mathnawī,* I, 72). In this context Rūmī refers to the traditional Islamic philosophical doctrine that the prophetic imagination receives knowledge of universals and archetypal messages in a state of wakefulness, while we receive the same data via a dream-like world. The sage figure, as was pointed out earlier, is not only a non-spatial entity, for it is his task to represent that divine image within us which will guide us towards self-realization.

Imagery rendering the function of the mediator figure most clearly is related to flying, particularly to the flight of a bird which represents the ascent of the soul towards immortality. Numerous references indicate either that our soul is a birdlike entity or that the sage figure himself is depicted as a heavenly bird. *Shams,* Rūmī tells us, is an eastern breeze, a heavenly bird, a light coming from God which returns to God *(Shams,* VII, 27455). The relationship between the bird and life depicted in many other poems, such as *(Mathnawī, I,* 310), where the bird in the cage represents man's imprisoned state, or in *Shams,* VII, 34994), where a release from the physical body is conveyed through a release of the bird from the cage and a flight towards the throne of God, or in

(Shams, III, 12627), where the bird of the heart is identified with the sīmurgh who resides in Mount Qāf, and finally in *(Shams*, VII, 31986), where the bird of life, like man, can find no rest until it has found its original, archetypal source, In these and other poems the flight of the bird indicates that the most significant aspect of a person is his spiritual self, represented by the Divine, and connected to the Divine. The mediator figure, such as *Shams*, is the source of the Divine within us, able to assist us in this mystical self-realization.

But, we may inquire, why is a union with the ultimate so desirable? Rum's answer might be the following: Since the ultimate being is our origin, the *aṣl, arche* constituting that aspect which makes possible our realization in time, an eternal separation from it entails an alienation [*farāq*] from our original state. Such an alienation disappears only with a union with the One, resulting in peace and rest. Eliade claims that the desire to "return to one's origin" is a universal element in all cosmogonies[63] -- a thesis which is of interest to those wishing to uphold the universality of Rūmī's doctrine. Rūmī rejects all possible dualism and allows for a depiction of the mediator as the prophetic bird in union with the ultimate being, especially when the mediator stands for the spiritual part of the person. Accordingly, Rūmī notes that as we seek unity [*waḥdat*], we should become entities independent of space, i.e., by becoming spirits while placing ourselves into annihilation [*fanā'*]; moreover, he reiterates that we should give up all dualism. The soul, to which he refers as a prophetic parrot caged in the physical state of existence, should be dedicated to God *ms*, IV, 19763). Rūmī is aware of the metaphorical use of bird as a symbol of the soul and of flight as salvation; he notes in *(Shams*, VII, 3741-3742) that to these birds motion "upward," the act of the "fluttering of the wing," and similar activities do not in fact apply. Were one to ask for the direction of the flight towards the Divine, he would answer that what is sought is not to be found in a place [*ānjā*].

But the bird is not the only sign used by Rūmī for the mediator. Even though the sky is an expansive medium, well-suited to the manifold aspects of the imagery of the ascent by the bird, like all symbols, it labors under limitations. Other aspects of the union emerge in other images taken from natural realms (water, fish, drowning) and their meanings, such as the limitlessness of the One, the dependence of individual lives upon It, the annihilation of the state of being a particular self, i.e., an ego, and the blending into the One, into the sea, or into thy God of religions.

Accordingly, Rūmī notes that we should not remain isolated as drops of water from the ocean. Giving up our consciousness of being alienated, we should discover ourselves as part of the entire unity and blend with the sea. *(Shams,* VIII, 14652). The life of a fish is made possible by water. How can we endure patiently the separation from the One while remaining embodied? *(Shams,* IV, 20784).

In addressing the Divine *(Shams, I,* 3189), Rūmī recalls the qualities we have mentioned. Why are you endless like a sea? Why are you illuminated and gay like a jewel, he exclaims. The heart should demand without patience to be drowned in the water of truth-reality [*ḥaqq*] *(Shams,* IV, 24314); to become a non-existent entity; and to be destroyed as an alienated particular for the sake of truth-reality.

Continuing the water imagery, man becomes active as a swimmer in the river of the Divine, and as a speck of light in the sunlight of the Divine *(Shams,* VII, 31490). In another passage *(Shams,* IV, 19109), Rūmī importunes the Divine to pour the water of the eternal life of love into his veins.

In sum, the mediator figure, as we have discovered, is multifaceted. He is the perfect man who possesses human virtue [*kamāl, arete*] to the maximal degree; a religious prophet who reveals messages from the ultimate Divine as Jesus did, or as Gabriel presented this message to Muhammad; he is the active intelligence containing a residue of the light from the ultimate being by means of which we can understand the eternal universals;

and finally, he is the mystical sage--*Shams*-i Ṭabrīzī. He has been called, as we have seen, the Christ within us, the teacher of the inner light according to St. Augustine, and *the imago Dei* by means of which we can relate to the source of the unity of our being. Such natural, organic symbols as the heart, the self-soul depicted as bird, the fish, as well as other symbols, function ultimately as mediators for individuals in their quest for a union with the Divine. Our analysis is able to resolve some of the apparent contradictions between Rūmī's description of *Shams* and of other figures. In the first place, as a medium of light holding an essential connection to the Divine light, the person *Shams* is merely a symbol for the Divine mediator, an interpretation which finds support in Rūmī's contention that *Shams* as an archetype is not in space or time.

Secondly, since Rūmī*'s* account of his experience with *Shams* becomes a means of depicting his own salvation, *Shams* is presented as a bird, as a fish, or as a heart-soul. These images are appropriate because they are used to depict an ascent describing his own process of reaching divinity by means of a union with the Divine. Moreover, *Shams* is presented as the life of Rūmī, for that aspect of the person which survives is precisely the spiritual aspect which is emphasized in the mediator figure through whom it results in a union with the Divine. Consequently, the theme of the unity of being introduced as the first theme of this presentation is here restated and clarified. This unity of being is achieved, according to our understanding of this concept, by means of the mediator figure who plays that essential role which we have designated in our depiction of mysticism.

3. The Way of Salvation: Love [*ᶜishq*] and Intoxication [*mastī*]

The third theme by which to decipher Rūmī's mystical message deals with some significant elements of the so-called "way" [*ṭarīqa*] of mysticism. The view that a mystical life can be depicted as a process of self-realization, especially in the Islamic

context, is held by most investigators. For example, Nicholson notes:[64]

> The mystics of every race and creed have described the progress of the spiritual life as a Journey or a pilgrimage. Other symbols have been used for the same purpose, but this one appears to be almost universal in its range. The ṣūfī who sets out to seek God calls himself a 'traveler' *(sālik);* he advance; by slow 'stages' *(maqāmāt)* along a path *(ṭarīqat)* to the goal of union with reality *(fanā' fi'l-ḥaqq).*

In the same vein, Rice notes:[65]

> The ṣūfīs spoke of themselves as travelers or wayfarers, faring upon a way *(rāh, ṭarīqa)* which was staked out, but on which, nevertheless, a guide, in the person of an experienced spiritual man, a *Pīr or Murshid,* was indispensable.

Rice goes on by stating that "the goal or destination is defined in various ways: as *Ma ʿrifat,* or gnosis, or as union with God [*vuṣūl viṣāl, ittiḥād*], as vision of Him, in His unveiled beauty and glory, or again, as utter consumption in the fire of love, or simply as perfection."[66] Others, like Rudolph Otto, have gone so far as to affirm that mysticism is not a metaphysical doctrine but a way of salvation.[67] In Islamic mystical texts there are numerous references to the various means of delineating the "way." Hujwīrī lists eleven "veils" which are considered as steps in the process of mystical self-realization.[68] In Nasafī's *Insān al-Kāmil*[69] at least eight different stages occur, and eight states [*aḥwal*] and seven stations *[maqāmātt]* are listed by Sarrāj.[70] Arberry has detected ten in al-Ghazālī.[71] *In Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* and its Persian commentary we note a correspondence between the nine stages of the heavens and the nine countries through which the mystic should travel.[72] In

sum, there is no doubt that emphasis is placed on the concept of depicting a mystical way of salvation as a way consisting of different but interrelated stages. Our problem is to note the peculiar ways in which the various features of the mystical way emerge in Rūmī-s work and how our three themes (the unity of being, the mediator, and the way of salvation) can facilitate the understanding of a cluster of related poems in Rūmī which offers difficulty to the readers. For the sake of brevity we shall concentrate on but two aspects of the way which recur in the poems: the way of love and the state of intoxication.

We have already noted the significance of the way of love in relation to the theme of the unity of being and have pointed out that love is due to the fire of light which directs us as free agents to seek the mystical ascent. In many passages Rūmī points out that the aim of this love is the annihilation of the self (as an alienated ego). For example, Rūmī openly seeks a state of love which he calls "the love in which there will no longer be an '*I*'" *[ᶜishq-l bīmanī] (Shams*, VII, 36155), whereby he does not mean that love destroys all aspects of the self. In another poem he notes similarly that he receives the beloved in a love which destroys him; this destruction is welcomed because the lover, *Shams*, is no other than the sun (which generates life) *(Shams, VII,* 33260). The life of love, Rūmī points out, consists in the physical death of our particular state, for we cannot find the eternal heart unless we first lose our own finite heart *(Mathnawī, I,* 1751). In addition to this theme of death and rebirth by love, many other aspects of Rūmī's views on the phenomenology of love are found in the following poems. The inner source of the intoxicated lover is the sun of life *(Shams*, IV, 20748). He contrasts love with intelligence, observing that intelligence leads to reason, while love leads to sincerity. This sincerity [*Khalīl*] is equated with Abraham, the Friend of God, the water of eternal life *(Shams,* VIII, 1098). Love is compared to an endless ocean and an eternal secret (*Shams*, VIII, 13341). The form of eternal love is to be the guide of that love which emancipates us from this state of individual imprisonment (ms, I, 385). The love of

the beloved *(Shams) is* said to be like a sun radiating upon the fruit-bearing tree, for this love develops the perfect man to his ultimate potential (*Shams*, IV, 17849). A lover is said to bum in the night of imprisonment like a candle in the dark night *(Shams,* III, 12718). Our own illuminated heart is in love with that divine light. *(Shams*, VI, 32133). A life which is passed without love does not count, according to Rūmī. As love is the water of eternal life, it should be received into our hearts and our very life; those who are not lovers are like fish cast out of the water *(Shams,* III, 11909-11910).

Much has been written about the nature of love which is applicable to this context, such as the role of love in the process of self-realization and love as a medium leading to immortality, as is the case in Plato and in Ibn Sīnā.[73] In an ontology in which the unity of being is assumed, the love of the Divine ultimately resolves into a self love, when "self" is defined as embracing its own "cause" or "source," which is the Divine. In such a model many of the apparent dualisms and problems encountered in constructing a coherent cosmological system disappear, while new problems, e.g., the justification of the monistic model itself come to the fore. To begin with we note that even in a pluralistic model, such as the Aristotelian system, love is introduced to account for the relationship between two different kinds of entities, namely a non-physical static prime mover and the heavens circulating eternally because of the love they have for the Divine. Their mode is an attempt to imitate the Divine to the best of their ability. In a unitary, mystical model there is one apparent contradiction which can be resolved in our opinion by placing the emphasis on love; this contradiction revolves around the dilemma of the free will of the individual in the face of the deterministic order of the universe. Technically, these problems might be solved by various constructs embracing these two tenancies, as is evident in modern philosophical literature, but perhaps none of these solutions is satisfactory intuitively. In mysticism God determines the world order and bestows grace upon the mystic in the various states

[*aḥwal*] the latter experiences; during this time the mystic performs supposedly freely his own task to achieve a certain station [*maqām*] in his attempt to attain self-realization. The assumption is that only in love do we feel free, even though our actions are in a sense "compelled" by some aspect of the loved object, such as the beauty of the beloved or the way in which the beloved "completes us" (in a platonic sense which permits immortality through creation and atemporality). The reason for the presence of both will and determinism in love is due to the fact that the lover and the beloved are essentially one; consequently, in being determined by the beloved, the mystic is in fact propelled by self-determination to achieve his own completion and to reach his own perfection. Therefore, for Rūmī the *Shams* is not a person different from himself but his own idealized self. To Rūmī's question, "Who are you?" the *Shams* answers, "I am yourself, I am yourself." (*Shams*, III, 16061-16066). Consequently, the apparent dualisms present in mystical stations such as "poverty" and "riches," "propriety" and "sobriety," "annihilation" and "persistence" are eliminated when through so-called introspective mystical knowledge of our own selves we come to realize that these dualities are merely due to an alienation [*farāq*] of the God-mediator aspect from our origin and that our individual selves are separate entities-separated from the One.

Another theme emphasized by Rūmī in his depiction of the mystical states is the condition of intoxication [*mastī*]. In addition to this peculiar state, Rūmī advocates a state of not-being a particular existent [*nīstī*]. In order to discuss the phenomenological significance of these conditions for the theme of the unity of being, let us first notice some paradigm cases of intoxication which are mentioned by Rūmī before coming to our own analysis. Numerous references which present the state of intoxication as a virtuous one clarify its major features. He who is intoxicated retains conscious awareness, for one can note his *khwash dastī* (a reference to the dancing performance) (*Shams*, VIII, 751 1). Related to the inner state of an intoxicated person is a

hidden sun *(Shams,* IV, 20748). One who brings himself to the state of intoxication connects his existence with the source of the eternal existence *(Shams,* VII, 34417). In addition to these themes a few other lines may help to illustrate further Rūmī's concept of intoxication. He requests the cup to be idled, the sorrow to burn away, so that life may be intoxicating until the caravan of salvation arrive *(Shams,* IV, 20735). Because of his constant intoxication, his self-person has been ejected out of his throat, a symbol of the bodily aspect of the person *(Shams, III,* 12616). Elsewhere Rūmī notes that he is intoxicated to such a degree that his state of happiness places him outside himself (i.e., outside the separated physical entity).

One feature of this intoxication is that each moment of the mystical search could be termed in Aristotelian language an activity rather than a movement. In other words, a mystical quest is complete in itself, in spite of the fact that it aims towards a final state of self-realization. Consequently, when Hallāj asserts, "I am truth-reality [Ḥaqq]," or when Abū Yazīd Bisṭāmī says, "Glory be to me," they state that each one of the mystic's moments is an ecstasy, a complete divine like state [*ḥāl*], which is symbolized by a circular dance in imitation of the circular movement of the perfect heavens. Moreover, as the mystical model is a theophanic one, the mystic's dance depicts the joy and the movement of the entire world. Rūmī notes accordingly that he is intoxicated to such a degree that he cannot distinguish between Adam and Eve; from his *shawr* [agitation, perplexity, excitement] the ocean is *shawr*; from his intoxication, the whole world is intoxicated *(Shams, III,* 16195). It appears then that the mystic's intoxication relates him to a selfless state in which he can display the joy of the entire world in his dance as he becomes the symbol of the unity of being and thus reaches a connection with the Divine. With reference to this state Stace notes: "But in mystical consciousness all distinctions disappear and therefore the distinction between 'I' and 'you' and 'he' and 'she'."[74]

In monistic mysticism rather than in Buber's depiction of a mysticism which is akin to Judaism, there cannot be a difference between "I" and "Thou," for both "I" and "Thou" are envisioned as an aspect of the One.

A minor point, which may also clarify the prescriptive, "favorable" features of intoxication, is the observation that from at least two perspectives the intoxicated state resembles a more favorable state than a "sober" one.

Muslim philosophical writings often affirm that only in a dreamlike state are we able to grasp the archetypal messages from the supralunary world, e.g., from the active intelligence. The exception is the prophet with his prophetic imagination and prophetic soul [*rūḥ-i qudsī*] who grasps in a state of wakefulness what others grasp only in sleep in dreamlike messages. Consequently, in an intoxicated state we approach more closely the dreamlike prophetic state in which particular bodily sensible [*maḥsūsāt*] are not stimulated and in which this lack of preoccupation allows the imagination to respond to its archetypal data.

In sum, we may note that at least two parameters of our mystical system, namely love and intoxication, are aspects of the way of mystical self-realization. They may be used to explain and to connect some of those themes which we take to be the paradigms of Rūmī's mystical poetry.

PROBLEMS OF JUSTIFYING OUR METHOD

Two factors have forced us to present but a sketchy outline of an analysis of mystical symbolism in Rūmī's poetry; the first is the complexity of the field; the second and more immediate one are the limitations placed on the length of this essay. These constraints prevent us from constructing a formally satisfactory model and from justifying this model by relating it by contrast and comparison with alternative systems of interpretation. Reserved for the future is a study of the following kind:

First, it will have to specify how the constructed model is representative, of mysticism (taken in the ordinary sense) as it emerges in representative works, for instance, in the ontology of Plotinus and in the *Ishārāt wa l Tanbihāt* of Ibn Sīnā.

Secondly, all divergent uses of symbols must be taken into account. Such divergences can be studied after the various uses of symbols have been entered into concordances constructed for that purpose.

Thirdly, such a study must show that of an structures in question, or at least of the most important ones, our structure explains the symbols in question in a more comprehensive and clear way than any other structure is able to do.

Since these aims have not been achieved in our paper, we cannot present proof for our thesis, except to point out that it is one of the best likely stories available. It may constitute the foundations of a workable initial perspective on the basis of which Rūmī's works can be deciphered in a more satisfactory way than has hitherto been possible. Only on the basis of a systematic cataloguing of all symbols in question and an investigation of their contextual use can the interplay of theoretical structures and the textual domain be observed when these structures direct our attention to the specific data, namely, Rūmī's poems. It goes without saying that our model will constantly be refined on the basis of these poems.

Now we wish to draw attention to a theme, developed by John Dewey, that the proper methods of inquiry in all fields are similar.[75] High among such methods ranks the view that the test of the construction of a theory, such as our own definitions of mysticism and symbolism, lies solely in its application. In our case it means that any system of mysticism faces its ultimate test in its applicability to data, such as Rūmī's poetry and the symbols used by him. Theories concerning mysticism are first phase-prima-facie-constructs which shall be modified in series of applications based on their usefulness in leading to an understanding of the domain in question.

It is our conjecture that a variation of our method can be applied not only to Rūmī's poetry or to Suhrawardī's mystical symbolism, but also to possible parallel domains of philosophy and literature, for instance, to the works of Plotinus or Avicenna in attempting an analysis of 'Attar's mystical poetry, or to religious texts, such as the *Kabbalah,* and Zoroastrian eschatology. It will be recalled that al-Ghazālī has already attempted something similar with mystical passages found in the Qur'ān. Hopefully, by the use of such constructs, we may gain a better understanding of these mystical and religious texts.

Having stated the limitations of our presentation, let us note how our axioms may be justified, or at least what kind of partial justification we can provide for them at this point.

First of all, our axiom like structures have been found to be complementary, rather than inconsistent and incompatible with one another. The unity of being is not a state into which one comes to by accident, but it is a state achieved by the mystic who is initially alienated. A mediator figure is thus necessary who partakes of divinity and of humanity, who brings the message from one to the other and serves as a ladder linking man to God or to a godlike state of being. Moreover, since the first stage of alienation is markedly different from the last stage, namely, that of union with the One, a way of salvation is required in which the seeker's initial stage of alienation [*farāq*] is progressively transformed in time into a final stage of union [*waṣl*] with the One.

We cannot provide any proof for the second requirement we set for our system, the requirement of comprehensiveness and completeness. We conjecture however that our three axiomlike structures are applicable to the domain of mystical writings and can explain as many mystical symbols as any alternative three axioms. Most of the theories of mystical experience can be derived from the metaphysics of the unity of being, the use of the mediator figure as the moving agent [*pneuma, rūḥ, spiritus*] in the ethics of self- realization, and the psychological topology of the way of salvation, the *ṭarīqa*.

Thirdly, one can argue hypothetically that the domain to which our mysticism can be applied is not empty. Many Marxists and psychologists have isolated alienation [*farāq*] as the main problem of man. If they are correct, then our system does point to a non-empty significant problem, since it devises a method and a theory of the self dealing with alienation.

Finally, we wish to point out that our structure focuses upon significant variables-for our symbols are both universal and essential, even though we cannot prove this point in the space allotted to us. Our claim is that light symbolism, the mediator, the way, the bird, the fish, and fire occur sufficiently in archetypal representations to demonstrate that we have *not* directed our attention to minor and tangential signs. It is our conjecture that other symbols developed by Rūmī may be of a stature equal to those treated in our paper, though the constraints placed on this paper have prevented us from treating them. Minor symbols have not been touched on in this essay, although they clearly function in Rūmī's poetry.

Finally, we should like to point out that our study of religious, philosophical, and mystical symbolism does not imply that we are advocating mysticism or that we have any categorical proof for it. Being a poet, Rūmī does not proffer arguments or specific evidence for the mysticism we claim to find in his work. If one concurs with the claim of existentialists that despair is an authentic experience of life, or with the dialectical materialists that economic factors shape behavior most significantly, or with the claim of psychoanalysts that social man is doomed to live in a state of discontent because incestual sexual factors are of primary concern to him, then the possibility of a unity of being and a process of self-realization is either precluded altogether, or it is of a very different character than to the medieval domain of Rūmī. Advocating neither mysticism nor any of the above mentioned schools of belief, we wish to point out that if psychoanalysts and Marxists are correct in their finding that alienation is the most important problem of modern man, then Rūmī's version of

mysticism claims to proffer a solution to this problem. For this reason alone, if for no others, it deserves an intensive study. The correctness of any particular school, limitations placed on philosophical approaches, and a defense of mysticism are topics far beyond the scope of this paper.

NOTES

1. For example, Mary Hesse notes that "the term 'model' has become fashionable in literature and philosophy of science, with the result that the many different senses of the term need to be distinguished before philosophical problems connected with models in the sciences can be understood." *Encyclopedia of Philosophy,* ed. P. Edwards (New York: Macmillan, 1967), vol. 5, p. 354-59. She distinguishes between "logical models," replicas and analogue machines, simplifying models and "theoretical models." Ibid. Consequently, according to Hesse, a "model" has many extended uses which are different from the usual motion of a logical model and entails the application of a formal syntax often to mathematical or logical domains as is illustrated in A. Robinson, *Model Theory* (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1963). Another case which shows different variations in the use of 'model' is found in M. Black, *Models and Metaphors* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962). Black points out in his essay on "Models and Archetypes," pp. 219-243, that there are various types of models such as scale models, analogue models, mathematical models, and theoretical models; subsequently, he proceeds to clarify the relationship between models, metaphors, and archetypes. Finally, Black uses his arguments to urge the integration of scientific methodology, including the use of models, into the humanities. Our paper follows a similar direction. In R. Carnap, *Introduction to Symbolic Logic and Its Application,* trans. by W. H. Meyer and J. Wilkinson (New York: Dover, 1958), pp. 171- 172, we find an interesting distinction between the "axiomatization," the "formalization," and the "symbolization" of a theory. Our method is the first step in the attempt to axiomatize a theory for mysticism which in turn could be applied to the mystical themes embedded in Rūmi's

poetry. For Carnap's notion of "model," see Ibid., p. 173. In our attempt we are taking "the unity of being," "the mediator," and "the way" as what may be called " sign schemas" from which non-logical axioms (using instances of these signs as descriptive constants embedded in these logical axioms) could be constructed.

2. W. T. Stace points out that we need not identify the Absolute with the God of monotheistic religions. *The Teaching of the Mystics* (New York: Menton, 1960), p. 23. For Stace's major treatment of this subject and clarification of "God," see his *Mysticism and Philosophy* (Philadelphia, 1960), p. 178. R. C. Zaehner makes a distinction between a religious theistic mysticism and a monistic secular mysticism. The mjor difference between these two opposite views is that the former advocates isolating the spiritual aspects of persons in order to relate them in a non-union sense to a transcendent Divine entity, while the latter advocates integrating persons into nature along the line of Jungian individuation process which includes the integration of the so-called shadow archetype. *Mysticism, Sacred and Profane* (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), pp. 153-174.

3. al-Ghazālī, *Mishkāt al-Anwār,* trans. W. H. Gairdner. (London: 1924)

4. Ibid, p. 12.

5. Ibn Sīnā, *Al-Ishārāt wa'-l Tanbihāt,* Sulaiman Dunya, 4 vols. (Cairo, 1960).

6. Henry Corbin, *Avicenna and the Visionary Recital*, trans. W. R. Trask (New York: Bollingen Foundation, 1954).

7. Ibn Sīnā, *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān,* ed. and trans. H. Corbin, *Avicenne et le recit visionnaire* (Tehran, 1952).

8. *The Mathnawī of Jalālu'ddīn Rūmī,* ed. and trans. R. A. Nicholson, 8 vols. (London: Luzac, 1925-1940). vol I., p. 4.

9. See J. L. Austine, *How to Do Things with Words,* J. O. Urmson, ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1965). For an analysis of Austine's view on this subject, see *Symposium on J. L. Austine,* K. T. Fann, ed. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969), pp. 351-468. The significance of the use of language for the user of signs in contrast to the purely "syntactical" and "semantical" dimension has been called "pragmatics." *See Pragmatics of Natural Languages,* Y. Bar-Hillel, ed. (New York: Humanities Press, 1971) for examples of works on

pragmatics; in this volume the place of pragmatics in the science of signs (semiotic) is clarified in an essay entitled "On Subdividing Semiotic," by H. Lieb, pp. 94-119.

10. We have not used any translation of Rūmī's poems but only the original sources in the Nicholson and Furuzanfar editions. Literal translations and detailed analyses of various meanings of the poems in question have been omitted. In each poem we have focused on the use of the symbol in question. In addition to Nicholson's translation of the entire *Mathnawī,* there are other collections of translations of Rūmī's poems, e.g., *Rūmī: Poet and Mystic,* trans. by R. A. Nicholson (London: Allen and Unwin, 1950), *Discourse of Rūmī,*trans. by A. J. Arberry (New York: Samuel Weiser, 196*1), Tales from the Rūmī,* trans. by A. J. Arberry (London: Allen and Unwin, 1961), and *Mystical Poems of Rūmī,* trans. by A. J. Arberry (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968).

11. W. T. Stace, *The Teaching of the Mystics,* p.15.

12. R. C. *Zaehner, Mysticism, Sacred and Profane,* pp. 168-184, 198. In both monistic and theistic versions the element of the unity of being is present; only in the latter case is God the transcendent ultimate being, while in the former nature is the ultimate being. See also R. C. Zaehner, *Hindu and Muslim Mysticism* (London: Athlone Press, 1960), pp. 21-40, 45; Rudolf *Otto, Mysticism East and West* (New York: Macmillan, 1932), pp. 19-32. In this section Otto points out three major parallels between Sankara and Eckhart on their views concerning the unity of being, which for Otto is the most significant aspect of mystical experience.

13. R. A. Nicholson, *Studies in Islamic Mysticism* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1921), p. 83.

14. *The Kashf al-Maḥjūb, the Oldest Persian Treatise on Ṣūfism,* trans. by R. A. Nicholson (London: Luzac, 1967), p. 278.

15. Al-Ghāzalī, *Mishkāt al-Anwār,* p. 60.

16. For instance, in Proposition XI Spinoza states: "God or substance consisting of infinite attributes, each one of which expresses eternal and infinite essence, necessarily exists." *Ethics,* trans. by J. Gutmann (New York: Hafner, 1967), p. 48. In Spinoza's system there is exactly one substance with two attributes (mental and physical) and many modes which include persons.

17. In a materialistic theory one may consider every entity to be either a simple atom or composed of combinations of atoms. An example of such a theory is that of Lucretius, who holds that all combinations eventually dissolve into the rest of the material world which is situated in the void. Consequently, a person is not more than a temporary gathering of atoms and should consider "death" nothing but a return of his parts into the ultimate being which is the collection of atoms in the void.

18. See P. Morewedge, *The Metaphysica of Avicenna (ibn Sīnā)* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), pp. 204-211, 221-229.

19. The concept of a person or the self is posterior to "phenomenological state of being-in-the-world." When one is authenticially involved in an experience, one is not aware of him/her self as a subject. For example a worshipper who participates in the time of *Aushra,* he empathetically identifies himself with the pain of Imam Hossein. Thus here the I-Thou evolves into a single experience of being with the Imam. Consequently, experiencing being-in-the-world is the primary metaphysical entity, not alienated persons. Many Western philosophers hold a similar view. See Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time,* trans. by J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1962), pp. 67-71. In Heidegger's phenomenological approach the primitive by which he describes metaphysics is the so-called *Dasein,* which means "being in the world." Individuals, including so-called substances in the Cartesian sense are mere abstractions from experience and do not constitute the basic elements of a phenomenological system.

20. W. T. Stace, *The Teaching of the Mystics,* p. 22.

21. Ibn Sīnā, *al-Ishārāt wa'l-Tanbīhāt,* III, 53.

22. Al-Ghāzalī, *Mishkāt al-Anwār, p.* 112.

23. F. Rosenthal, *Knowledge Triumphant, the Concept of Knowledge in Medieval Islam* (Leiden: Brill, 1970), pp. 155-193.

24. M. Eliade, *The Two and the One* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), pp. 19-77.

25. E. Neumann, *The Origin and History of Consciousness,* p. 6. See E. Cassirer, *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), vol. 2, pp. 94-104. Cassirer states: "And in the creation legends of nearly all people and religions the process of creation merges with the dawning of the light." Ibid., p. 96.

26. *Zohar, the Book of Splendor,* G. Scholem, ed. (New York: Schocken Books, 1949), p. 28. Note also how light from God was shown to Adam. "Consuming fire" is a symbol for God. Ibid., p. 38.

27. *Revelation 1:* 14-15. There are many references to light and related terms, such as the "flame", e.g. Ibid. "... his eyes like a burning flame," and Ibid. 8: "Then the angel took the censer and filled it with the fire from the water."

28. See, for instance, G. Widengren, *Mani and Manichaeism* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), pp. 43-73, especially pp. 43, 54-56, and 68-69. For Mani "light," "God," and "truth" were closely related in meaning in opposition to what is named either "darkness, matter," or "lie." The task of salvation was depicted by the imagery of rescuing the light elements which remained in darkness.

29. Aristotle, *De Anima* 430a 17-20. Referring to the active state of intelligence *(nous, ᶜaql, Khirad),* Aristotle points out, "this is a positive state like light." *Aristotle, On the Soul. Parva Naturalia, On Breath,* trans. by W. S. Hett, ed (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936).

30. In the celebrated allegory of the cave in the *Republic* 516, Plato uses the sun as a symbol for the Form of the Good and describes the enlightened state of the philosopher who is aware of the significance of the sun as follows: "And now he would begin to draw the conclusion that it is the sun that produces the seasons and the cause of the year and controls everything in the visible world, and moreover is in a way the cause of all that he and his companion used to see." *The Republic of Plato,* trans. by F. M. Cornford (New York: Oxford University Press, 1945).

31. For Augustine, God impresses concepts on man's mind without making Himself known. This process is achieved by a kind of a "Divine illumination." For difficulties in Augustine's theory and various interpretations of Augustinian illuminationism, see *Introduction to the Philosophy of Augustine,* John A. Mourant, ed. (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1964), pp. 18-21. For the influence of Augustinian illuminationism on Islamic philosophy, see E. Gilson, "Les sources greco-arabes de l'augustinisme avicennisant," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litteraire du moyen âge,* 4 (1929), 5-149. As an anti-Manichaean, Augustine does not deify light but draws an analogy between light, the inner truth and the teacher within us, who is Christ.

Augustine notes: "Moreover, He who is consulted teaches; for He who is said to reside in the interior man is Christ, that is, the unchangeable excellence of God and his everlasting wisdom, which every rational soul does indeed consult." *Concerning the Teacher [De magistero] and On the Immortality of the Soul [De immortalitate animæ]*, trans. by G. G. Leckie (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1938), p. 48. Subsequently, Augustine compares light to this teacher who cannot be responsible for our mistakes, as light is not responsible for our mistakes in vision.

32. Descartes makes frequent mention of "the light of nature," which teaches him many things, among them that a cause can be no less than its effect; see, for example, *Descartes. Philosophical Writings*, trans. by E. Anscombe and P. T. Geach, eds. (New York: Nelson, 1963), pp. 81, 82.

33. Al-Ghāzalī, *Mishkāt al-Anwār*, p. 67-72.

34. Ibid., p. 69.

35. E. Neumann, *The Origin and History of Consciousness* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954), pp. 5-38.

36. P. Morewedge, "Ibn Sīnā's Concept of the Self," *The Philosophical Forum*, IV: I (Fall, 1972), 49-73.

37. *Proclus, The Element of Theology*, trans. and ed. by E. R. Dodds (London: Oxford University Press, 1963).

38. Ibid., p. 13.

39. Ibid., p. 33.

40. Ibid., p. 35.

41. The Persian word is *jūsh zadah* which literally means boiling, but in its mystical use it represents a state prior to *sūkhtan* which means to be enflamed with the love of the Divine.

42. Spinoza, *Ethics*, p. 274.

43. *Soliloquies, 11*, 7, i, in *Basic Writings of Saint Augustine*, W. J. Jones, ed. (New York: Random House, 1948), 1, 262.

44. For a reference to the "heavenly ladder" of love (*eros*), see *Symposium 21* 1 c-d; for references to immortality due to love see Ibid., 206-a-207 a., passim.

45. Schopenhauer holds that love for the sake of the immortality of the species acts against individual interest. At any rate, he joins Plato and others in recogniting both the universal and the atemporal object of

the lover who loves a particular beloved. See "Metaphysics of Love of Sexes," in *The Philosophy of Schopenhauer*, I. Edman, ed. (New York: Modern Library, 1928), pp. 337- 376, especially pp. 341, 362.

46. See Risāla fi'l-ᶜishq, M. A. F. von Mehren, ed. in *Traités mystiques d' Aboū Alī-Hosain b. Abadallāh b. Sīnā ou d'Avicenna*. 3 vols, (Leiden, 1894).

47. Aristotle states: "It is clear then from what has been said that there is a substance which is eternal and unmovable and separate from sensible things." *Metaphysica* 1073a 3-6. *The Works of Aristotle*, W. D. Ross, ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1908), vol. VIII.

48. R. C. Zaehner, *Mysticism*, pp. 153-197. Zaehner notes: "That 'nature mysticism' exists and is widely attested is not open to serious doubt." Ibid., p. 199.

49. Zaehner admits that many cases of Islamic mysticism do not completely fit into his own monistic-theistic structure, Ibid., p. 160. Consequently, his "religious" version of mysticism is more applicable to Christianity than to Islamic mystics.

50. F. Rosenthal, *Knowledge Triumphant*, p. 157.

51. Ibid., p. 156.

52. Mullā Ṣadrā, *Sīnā-i Si Aṣl* (Tehran: Tehran University Press, 1340 A.H.), p. 88.

53. Ibid., p. 94.

54. Shihabaddin Yahya Sohrawardi, *Oeuvres philosophiques et mystiques*, S. H. Nasr, ed. (Tehran, 1970), p. 89.

55. Ibid., p. 97.

56. Ibid., p. 107.

57. Ibid., p. 431.

58. M. Eliade, *Myth and Reality* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), p. 94.

59. C. G. Jung, *Aion, Researches into the Phenomenology of the Self*, trans. by R. F. Hull (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 37.

60. A. Nasafī, *Kitāb al-Insān al-Kāmil*, M. Mole, ed. (Tehran, 1962), pp. 4-5.

61. Ibn *Sīnā*, *Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān*, p. 4-6.

62. Suhrawardi, Ibid., p. 228.

63. M. Eliade, *Myth and Reality*, p. 34.

64. R. A. Nicholson, *The Mystics of Islam* (Beirut: Khayats, 1966), p. 28.

65. C. Rice, *The Persian Ṣūfis* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1964), p. 31.

66. Ibid.

67. Otto, *Mysticism East and West, pp.* 33-46.

68. Hujwīri, pp. 267-420.

69. Nasafī, op. cit., p. 28.

70. *Kitāb al-Lumaʿ fi'l-Taṣawwuf of Abū Naṣr al-Sarrāj,* ed. with a commentary by R. A. Nicholson (London: Luzac, 19 64), pp. 41-71.

71. A. J. Arberry, *Ṣūfism* (New York: Harper & Row, 1950), p. 82.

72. *Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān,* pp. 47-58.

73. See notes 45-47. G. Vlastos in *Platonic Studies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973) supports the view that in Plato's system only a universal type of entity can be the object of our love, ibid., p. 34.

74. W. T. Stace, *The Teaching of the Mystics,* p. 27.

75. See Dewey's remarks in his section on "The Continuum of Ends Means," in his *Theory of Valuation,* printed in *Foundations of the Unity of Science, 0.* Neurath, R. Carnap, and C. Morris, eds. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), vol. 2, pp. 379-446. For Dewey the reasonable method of inquiry is the same in all domains. For a critical evaluation of Dewey's logical theory and his philosophy of science, note the articles by B. Russell and H. Reichenbach in *The Philosophy of John Dewey* (Evanston: George Banto, 1939), pp. 137-192; for Dewey's reply, see ibid. p. 534-549.

SUFISM, NEOPLATONISM AND ZAEHNER'S THEISTIC THEORY OF MYSTICISM

AIM AND SCOPE OF OUR INQUIRY

This inquiry focuses on a methodological problem in contemporary scholarship concerning Sūfism. Specifically it argues against two types of "reductionalistic" programs. The first see Sūfism as a practical expression of Neoplatonic themes in Islamic philosophy; the second reduces Sūfism to a dimension of Islamic religion.

The arguments used in this essay are related to the following findings of our three previous studies on methodological problems in the contemporary scholarship of mysticism and Islamic studies:

a) There is an unwarranted tendency on the part of many western scholars to underemphasize in Islamic intellectual thought those Arabic and Persian ideas and texts which did not travel into Arabic and Persian medieval Latin and Hebraic writings, as well as those original and particularly Sūfic themes which are not essentially related to Greek philosophy or to monotheistic traditions. Perhaps this is because most western investigators have approached Islamic studies from the perspective of their own primary interest, which has generally been either Greek philosophy, Christianity, or Judaism. But regardless of why this happens, it tends to reduce Sūfic themes to an outgrowth of Greek philosophy or a mere dimension of Islamic religion.1

b) A significant number of philosophers who study mysticism of any kind treat mysticism primarily either as a special kind of "experience" or as a search for an ontologically presupposed mystical object, e.g., the Absolute or the One. We have shown that neither one of these approaches is satisfactory and that neither belongs to the philosophical study of mystical texts, such as Sūfi writings.2

c) Instead of a "psychological" approach, an "ontological" approach, or a reductionalistic approach to mysticism, we have proposed a method of "meta-mysticism," which applies the "reconstructionalistic" method of explication to mystical texts. Specifically, for the study of philosophical themes in Rūmi's mystical poetry, we have proposed the following fourfold schemata to depict the salient features of Rūmi's mysticism: (i) the doctrine of the unity of being *(al-waḥdat al-wujūd);* (ii) the role of the mystical sage (*murshid*), who, as a mediator figure, links man with the Divine in a phenomenological confrontation that depicts the unity of being for a person; (iii) the way of self-realization *(ṭarīqa),* with its various stations (*aḥwāl*) and states (*maqāmāt*), including the initial stage of alienation and the final stage of union; and (iv) finally, the use of symbolism and allegories, such as the flight of a bird to express that stage in the soul's process of attaining a union with the Divine when the soul ascends to active intelligence.3

We shall here apply some of the conceptual tools of these earlier studies to the following two domains, which are especially important for the study of mysticism.

1. *Sūfism and Neoplatonism*

It has been acknowledged that both historical and thematic links exist between Neoplatonism and Islamic thought. Moreover, general Neoplatonic themes, such as emanationism, form the cornerstone of sūfic types of philosophy. However in spite of a general similarity, there are significant disagreements between Sūfism and Neoplatonism on the issues of "the unity of being" and

"the mediator figure." Consequently this school of Greek philosophy which is most akin to Sūfism cannot be considered the theoretical basis of Sūfic thought.4

2. *Sūfism and Theism in the Context of Zaehner's Theory of Mysticism*

R. C. Zaehner's well-known approach to mysticism, when applied to Sūfism, divides it into "monistic" and "theistic" types and criticizes the theoretical basis of the former. This article examines the soundness of Zaehner's argument and the validity of his "religious reductionalistic" approach to the study of mysticism.

It should be noted that we have not refuted the general program of reductionalism as applied to mystical domains; at best we have shown that the two cases under consideration do not prove that reductionalism is correct or even useful.

1. SŪFISM AND NEOPLATONISM

There is the tendency to link Islamic philosophy and mysticism with Greek philosophy. R. Walzer, for instance, considers it legitimate to approach Islamic philosophy "exclusively as a part of the legacy of classical Greece,"5 while F. E Peters singles out Neoplatonism as the most influential Greek basis of Islamic philosophy;6 finally, M. Fakhry calls both al-Fārābī and Avicenna "Islamic Neoplatonists."7

Obviously there are some good reasons for supporting a strong link between all aspects of Islamic philosophy and Neoplatonism. To begin with, there is a large body of Islamic Neoplatonic texts, especially the paraphrases of Neoplatonic texts by Sijistāni and Shahristāni, as indicated by the findings of Badawi, Kraus, Rosenthal, and Henry and Schwyzer.8 Moreover many central themes of Neoplatonic systems are repeated and isomorphically embedded in Islamic mystical doctrines. For example, Proclus states that "all that proceeds from any principle reverts in respect of

its being upon that from which it proceeds."9 Nine hundred years later A. Nasafī, a Persian mystic, quotes the Islamic version of this theme verbatim in Arabic and designs a Neoplatonic system of "emanation and return" as a mystical depiction of the world.10 The Neoplatonic doctrine of emanation is the most fundamental thesis underlying the systems of Muslim philosophers such as al-Fārābī and Avicenna.

We have argued in an earlier study that the Neoplatonic emanation scheme is better suited to the depiction of mystical union and other features of mysticism than the Qur'ānic theory of creation or the Aristotelian doctrine of the eternity of the world.11 It is in the general Neoplatonic form of cosmology that Islamic mysticism finds its natural home. But in spite of this and other similarities between Neoplatonism and Islamic mysticism, the systems are indeed different in many crucial points, as the following discussion will bear out.

To begin with, as we have pointed out elsewhere, the doctrine of the unity of being (i.e., *"waḥdat al-wujūd"),* which advocates an absolute type of monism, is a key ontological premise of Islamic mysticism. Often this "unity of being" is described as an inner secret open only to a few. Al-Ghazālī affirms that there is a difference between the common many (*ᶜāmm*) and the learned few *(khāṣṣ);* when the former say that "there is no deity but God," it means for the latter that "there is nothing but It."12 The ṣūfī doctrine of the unity of being needs to be expressed in terms of stages of self-realization divided into states *(aḥwāl)* and stations (*maqāmāt*). In the first phase our apparent phenomena consist of unrelated entities. Each of us presupposes among these an alienated self-subject which is separated from God or the ultimate being in the system in question. By participating in some practices we come to the realization that ultimately an inherent connection links all entities or should relate us *(waṣl)* to our divine origin. Eventually this unity leads the mystic into an affinity with the beholder (*dāranda*, in Avicenna's language).13 It is alleged that if

we adopt a mystical perspective, then the result will not lead to the adoption of the formal dimensions of the monistic ontology, but to a pragmatic attitude in which all opposites like life and death or the finite and the infinite are related as a unity. Stace calls the essence of the mystical experience a feeling of "undifferentiated unity,"14 which he holds to be the hallmark of all mystical traditions. According to Avicenna, in such a state we can only point to *(ishāra)* the ultimate source of all being, which constitutes the grounds for the actualization of all beings.15 Consequently a salient aspect of Islamic mysticism is the normative prescription that we should follow a path of self-realization in which all entities become interrelated through their affinity with their origin, which is God or the One.

Having clarified a key doctrine of Islamic mysticism, let us examine its counterpart in some Neoplatonic doctrines. Obviously, the main problem is how to interpret the One (το εν) of Plotinus and Proclus, which is beyond existents (υπερουσιοζ). If we emphasize the differences between the One and the world, then we move to a dualistic ontology which removes Neoplatonism from Sūfism. On the other hand, if we emphasize the dependence of the world on the One, then we move towards a monistic ontology, which is more in keeping with what we take to be an adequate interpretation of Sūfism. In this vein Armstrong holds the One of Plotinus to be "a First cause, a ground of being, a self-sufficing source and director of all things, a primary reality which can act as an explanation of the universe."16 According to this model, the One of Plotinus is analogous to the supreme monad of Leibniz, because a total description of any entity would involve a reference to the One.

Let us explore further, at least to the extent to which it is relevant to our own comparison of Neoplatonism and Islamic mysticism, the controversy surrounding the presence of a mystical monism or a theistic dualism in the Neoplatonic system. DeVogel holds the position that Plotinus is an extreme monist. She points

out that the imagery used by Plotinus consists of an "over-flowing source and that of a light illuminating all about it."17 Consequently the creation of the world from the first principle is a byproduct of its self-oriented internal activity, which is a mark of monism.18 Taking an opposing position, Rist scrutinizes the significant passages which deal with the relationship between the soul and the One in *The Enneads.* We call to mind the familiar passages, such as 6.7.35-36, where Plotinus states that "the two become one" and 5.5.8.2, "being one with that and not two." Despite the recognition of such affinities, Rist points out that the mysticism of Plotinus is a theistic one.19 On the basis of his analysis, Rist refers briefly to the refuted claim that Plotinus' mysticism is of the monistic kind found in some Indic and Islamic mystics. Rist agrees with Arnou on the crucial issue of contact between the soul and the One in the following manner:

> As Arnou has pointed out, likeness is obtained as far as possible, and in the Plotinian world this means that while the soul as a spiritual substance can be enveloped by the One, enraptured, surrendered, wholly characterized so as to become infinite and not finite, it is neither obliterated nor revealed as the One itself, nor as the only spiritual substance.20

Finally, based on such an interpretation of the *Enneads* and his study of mysticism, Rist finds two equivalencies of the monistic "Atman [the soul] is Brahman [the Absolute]" in the Islamic world. Rist states "Hallāj's 'I am the Truth' (i.e., God), and Abū Yazīd's 'Glory be to me! How great is my Glory!" The Plotinian equivalent would be 'I am the One'. Yet nowhere do we find such an assertion."21 It follows that at least some of the contemporary scholars of Neoplatonism support our view that Neoplatonism is different from some form of Sūfism.

When we turn to a philosophical type of Sūfism, such as that expressed by Avicenna in texts like "A Treatise on Love,"22 we discover that the distinction between this type of Islamic mysticism

and Neoplatonism becomes explicit. We observe here at least six differences between his system and Neoplatonism. (1) Avicenna bases all metaphysical theses in the *Shifā'* and *theDānish Nāma* on the language of the Aristotelian categories.23 His treatment of the categories in the sections on metaphysics in these texts, however, is far more extensive than Aristotle's own use of them. Plotinus, on the other hand, rejects the Aristotelian categories (Enneads VI 1 [1-24]). Consequently the Avicenna system is based upon a set of assumptions which are directly opposed to Neoplatonic ideas. (2) Avicenna's Necessary Existent is conscious of Itself,24 while in the works of Plotinus there are many passages in which the One is not described as being conscious of itself (e.g., *Enneads* VI 9 (9), chap. 6 III 9 [13], chaps. 7,9). Plotinus even attacks Aristotle for making the One conscious of itself *(Enneads V* 1 [9]). Numerous passages in the works of Aristotle confirm that the nonsensible eternal substance is conscious.25 (3) The separation which Neoplatonists make between the realm of intelligibles and sensibles is not made by Avicenna. Whereas Plotinus holds what might generally be called a "realistic theory" of universals, Avicenna rejects this position.26 The views Neoplatonists and Avicenna take of numbers illustrates this point.27 The latter regards them as accidents and follows Aristotle in this position.28 Plotinus, on the other hand, calls numbers substantials and associates them with the soul *(Enneads* VI [9] 5). (4) There is a striking difference between Avicenna's portrayal of the relationship between the philosopher and his community and Plotinus' depiction of the philosopher as someone who is remote from practical life. (5) Avicenna is not at all receptive to the doctrine of Porphyry, who is considered a Neoplatonist.29 On one key issue, namely, the nature of "being-qua-being," Avicenna's views are opposed to those of Proclus, another Neoplatonist, and perhaps different from those of Plotinus, depending on how we interpret the position of Plotinus. In his Persian texts, e.g., the *Dānish Nāma*, Avicenna states that *hastī* is the most determinable sign in his language of metaphysics.30 He

distinguishes between *hastī* ("being") and *wujūd* ("existence") and equates *anniyya* with *wujūd*. Avicenna regards every existent, including the Necessary Existent, as an explicit determination of "being-qua-being." By contrast, Proclus places the One and even God above being, υπερουσιοζ.31 Even if one should translate it as "supra-being," his doctrine would still diverge from that of Avicenna, Plotinus' view is rather vague on this topic. In the *Enneads* V 2 he asserts that the One generates being. However with this view one must compare the different translations of this passage by S. MacKenna, *The Enneads,* where τὸ ογ is rendered as "being" and γενντηζ as "generates,"32 and by P. Henry and H. R. Schwyzer, who use "things" for the former and "gush" for the latter.33 But regardless of how we choose to interpret this crucial passage, the difference between Avicenna and the Neoplatonists cannot be obliterated. According to Avicenna, "nothing" is "beyond" and "nothing" "generates being," whereas the Neoplatonists view the One not as a determination of "being," but as something that transcends it in some sense.

In light of these distinctions a simple ontological identification of Neoplatonism with Islamic mysticism becomes highly questionable. While in the experiential forms of Sūfism the unity of being is achieved through a process of self-realization, in Neoplatonism the One is always outside man's experience; moreover, in the philosophical forms of Sūfism as depicted in the Avicennan system, we see very sharp differences between his version of emanationism and the Neoplatonic version.

Another difference between the Neoplatonic system and Sūfism lies in the specific nature of the mediator figure which links man with the divine in all mystical systems.34 Let us first note some findings that contemporary scholars of Neoplatonism have made on this topic which Plotinus did not formulate clearly.

Brehier notes that:

> The system of Plotinus differs in principle from all philosophical systems and religions of his time because of the almost complete absence of the idea of a mediator figure or savior destined to bring man into relation with God.35

Armstrong and Inge both attempt to modify Brehier's thesis by showing that the mediator figure in Plotinus is not a person, but rather that it is love. Armstrong points out that the negative aspect of the "One," which is "the last stage of self-realization," occupies a relatively small place in the *Enneads;* it is, in Armstrong's words, "the source of vitality in his thought."36 Moreover the path to the One, in Armstrong's language, "goes through the realm of *Nous.* It seems to be true that in this world, at least, perfect love casts out clear knowledge. It does not, or should not, deny that it is a way to Reality."37 Inge, too, supports this view. "[Though] mysticism has indeed been defined as 'an extension of the mind to God by means of the longing of love'; and there is nothing to quarrel with in this definition. But it is 'the *Spirit* in love of Plotinus, the armor *intellectualis Dei* of Spinoza, which draws us upward."38 This interpretation of love as the mediator and the gnostic interpretation of love as the mediator figure obviously trace their roots to Plato's Symposium; Plotinus follows the same path, as is evident in many passages, such as in *Enneads* VI.9.9, when he speaks of the need of the soul for love and the fact that this love is inborn. In Islamic mysticism the mediator figure can take on different roles; for example, Avicenna identifies him with the active intelligence, Gabriel, as well as with the mystic sage.39 The personal feature of the mediator figure is crucial to the entire tradition of *murshid* (mystical master) and *murīd* (the novice student). It is through such personal encounters that the entire process of self-realization becomes possible. Even though Islamic philosophy makes much use of the Platonic "ladder of eros" as a link between man and the divine, the complicated tradition of the relationship between the

mystical master and his follower can never be accounted for in Islamic mysticism by the mere presence of an abstract theme of love as mediator, as culled from the cryptic passages of the *Enneads.* Consequently we note that not only does Neoplatonism differ from the basic theses of Islamic mysticism in the theoretical and ontological dimensions we have examined, but also that it cannot explain the rich practical tradition of Islamic mysticism.

It follows from our findings that contemporary scholarship of Sūfism may safely proceed to deal with Sūfic texts directly. We question the necessity of reducing every aspect of the Islamic tradition to Greek thought, as in Walzer's "Greek-into-Arabic" type of research and Wolfson's heuristic attempts to find a chain of words to tie every Arabic term to its Greek "basis."40 There is no doubt that Islamic intellectual thought grew through the rich nourishment it received from the Neoplatonic spirit in the same sense that Aristotle's philosophy flourished on a Platonic basis; in both cases, however, the similarity does not warrant a total reductionalism.

2. SŪFISM AND RELIGION; THE CASE OF ZAEHNER

There is no doubt that the study of the Sūfic dimension of Islamic religion or the religious aspects of Sūfism are both legitimate inquiries, especially so if they are carried out by those interested primarily in the study of elements common to monotheistic religions. The problem arises, however, in specifying the extent to which one may consider Sūfism to be dependent on Islam. If the two are to be identified, then there is no "philosophical analysis of mysticism in Islam" outside of "the philosophy of religion in Islam." Moreover an authority in Islamic religion would be able to rule on the legitimacy of types of Sūfism held or practiced.

Also problematical is the important issue underlying the question: what is the nature of the relationship between not only

Islam and Sūfism but mysticism and any other monotheistic tradition, viz., Judaism and Christianity? An extremist would identify "mysticism" with "religion." But this identity cannot be upheld on prima facie impressions. It is well known that many mystics, such as Hallāj41 and Suhrawardi,42 were put to death by a religious orthodoxy that opposed at least some types of mysticism. A more moderate position would recognize an essential connection between mysticism and religion. For example, a distinction may be made between two aspects of religion -- between the personal element and a set of institutional theological doctrines and rituals.43 In the context of such a distinction one may state that the personal dimension of religion must be "mystical" in *part* or in *toto*. In this connection James states, "One may say truly, I think, that personal religious experience has its roots and center in mystical state of consciousness."44 Somewhat differently R. A. Nicholson, a most prolific translator of Arabic and Persian mystical texts,45 defines "Sūfism" as "the religious philosophy of Islam."46 Nicholson bases his observation on the fact that selected passages from the sacred book of the Muslims, the Qur'ān, were often quoted by those Sūfīs who *philosophized* about the inner meaning of the passages in question, passages such as "God is the light of the heavens and the earth," or "we come from God and return to God."47 Other reasons are often advanced by those advocating an essential relationship between mysticism and religion. For example, G. Scholem,48 who single-handedly made the Kabbalah academically sound for the study of Jewish mysticism, holds that there is no "mysticism" outside the religious context. Scholem asserts,

> ... there is no such a thing as mysticism in the abstract, that is to say, a phenomenon of experience which has no particular relation to other religious phenomena. There is no mysticism as such, there is only the mysticism of a particular religious system, Christian, Islamic, Jewish mysticism and so on.49

Scholem goes so far as to designate all types of mysticism as definite "stages" in the historical development of a religion.[50]

In opposition to James, Nicholson, Scholem, and many others who have attempted to connect religion and mysticism, stand the statements of other writers. For example, W. T. Stace holds that religion and mysticism are essentially distinct.[51] While Stace approaches this position from the perspective of the areligious philosopher -- at least as one who does not uphold the doctrines of Judaism, Christianity or Islam, few writers who take a religious perspective agree with the distinctions he draws between religion and mysticism. Buber, for one, regards it as important to preserve both the individual unity of persons and the transcendent feature of a supra-natural God, because the mystic and the gnostic alone, he believes, render "God into an object in whose nature and history one knows one's way about."[52] Criticizing such theories which identify the world with God, Buber states, "God embraces but is not the universe; just so, God embraces but is not my self."[53] In a similar manner J. Finnegan adheres to a Christian perspective in upholding the transcendent status of God. Taking God's grace as an essential feature of any man-God relation, he identifies the mysticism of Avicenna[54] as a non-Islamic doctrine, which "teaches a monistic order of being," where "there is no room for distinctions between the natural and the supernatural" realms.[55]

These contrasting positions demonstrate that there is some confusion on how mysticism and religion are related. It is evident that philosophers and students of religion disagree on the nature of this relationship. For a possible solution of this difficulty we might look to the works of R. C. Zaehner, a learned defender of monotheistic religion in its Roman Catholic garb. We should mention that Zaehner has contributed extensively to the study of many religions, including the Zoroastrian, Islamic, and Indic religions.[56] He has even taken mescalin to gain firsthand information about the relationship between drugs and Mysticism;[57] his experiences and his analyses of various mystical

expressions led him to reject outright two theses held by A. Huxley that all mysticism is one and the same, and that drugs used to induce "mysticism" should be deployed in religious institutions to provide us with "mystical" experiences. Consequently although we concern ourselves with but one point of Zaehner's views on "mysticism," we should note that we are not dealing with the typical case, where a believer attacks nature mystics, but we are confronted with a distinguished scholar, who is the spokesman of a respected tradition. As it is our aim to illustrate a monotheistic approach to the study of mysticism, we shall subordinate all other considerations to this goal and focus only on one isolated argument, leaving aside many examples cited by Zaehner as well as his extended analyses of the Indic tradition.

Mystical experience, Zaehner informs us in one passage, is "the realization of a union or a unity with or in something that is enormously, if not infinitely, greater than the empirical self."58 According to Zaehner, there are three theoretically distinct types of mysticism in which such a union is sought. Their upholders are the following:

(1) Those who hold the view that "All is one" (Zaehner's expression is '*pen-en-hen-ism*', literally, "all is one-ism."59 According to these mystics, the self, nature, God, and any other entity are in fact representations of an ultimate reality.

(2) A special group which holds that one's own soul is the absolute in a given system, e.g., Brahman.60 What the mystic experiences is in fact his own soul and not what appears to be the external world.

(3) The Christian mystic, who holds that the human soul can be united, but not identified, with God.61 Being monotheistic, Jewish and Muslim mystics supposedly hold the same view. For the purpose of mystical union, Christianity is held to be superior to other monotheistic religious because of its unique features.62

Having made these initial distinctions, Zaehner further distinguishes between "religious mystics" (resembling Christian mystics) and "nature mystics" (resembling the mystics described in categories 1 and 2). A formulation of his position must, in

addition, clarify two pairs of terms: *"theistic vs. monistic"* (types of mysticism), and *"integration vs. isolation"* (programs of actions). With respect to the first pair of contrasting terms Zaehner states:

> Here, then, are two distinct and mutually opposed types of mysticism -- the monist and the theistic. This is not a question of Christianity and Islam versus Hinduism and Buddhism: it is an unbridgeable gulf between all those who see God as incomparably greater than oneself [theists] and those who maintain that soul and God are one and the same and that all else is pure illusion [monists].63

According to Zaehner, for the theist the entire world is composed of two realms: (i) of nature, and (ii) of a God Who transcends nature. By contrast, the monist claims that duality, e.g., that between "mind and body" or "self and God," is but a mistaken illusion. In some fashion he asserts the existence of exactly one ultimate entity. According to Zaehner, having experienced Nature as being one with himself, the nature mystic is all too prone to identify Nature with God, he accepts without question the *Deus sive Natura;* "God or Nature", of Spinoza, for him must be interchangeable terms."64 Since a dimension of man, i.e., his body, exists within nature, the theist views man as being essentially different from God, while the monist feels that in an important sense all men are, or should be, identified with God.

The implication of these themes emerges from the meaning of the distinction between "isolation" and "integration," which Zaehner interprets as exclusive methods in terms of which one can achieve self-realization or mystical union, the well-known goal of all Mystics.65 Whereas the monist advocates "integration," the theist advocates "isolation." To quote Zaehner,

> It [isolation] holds that man's spirit is an immortal, immutable, and passionless monad, and that neither the body nor reason, nor what Aristotle and the Muslim philosophers call the lower soul,

> really belongs to him. He is essentially other than they, and his eternal destiny is to rid himself for ever of the whole psycho-physical apparatus. This is the reverse of integration. There is no vision of the unity of man with nature, nor is it a case of his vision being utilized to build up the whole man.66

Consequently while the method of integration leads to the self-realization of the entire person, which includes his body and his passions, the method of isolation seeks to separate-isolating in the process only that which has affinity to the Divine. For example, a monistic mystic, such as the Muslim Hallāj, can utter "*Anā al-Haqq*" (I am reality, God, Truth), whereas such an identification of man and God -- an extreme integrationist position, is considered blasphemy for one adhering to the Muslim, Christian, or Jewish faith. The distinction between the nature mystic (the monist, who advocates integration) and the religious mystic (the theist, who advocates isolation) is clear and applicable to many cases cited by Zaehner.

After outlining the distinctions between the two types of mysticism and the method proper to each, Zaehner supports the theistic view and rejects the monistic doctrine of mysticism. One of the arguments he presents in support of his choice is based on the assumption that nature is in itself void of all value; in this context he states, ". . . it is an observable fact that in Nature there is neither morality nor charity nor even common decency."67 Consequently if one follows those who identify God with Nature, as monistic mystics do, then God ". . . is reduced to the sum-total of natural impulses in which terms 'good' and 'evil' have no meaning. Such a God is sub-human, a God fit for animals, not for rational creatures." In addition to this "normative premise" which empties nature of all value, Zaehner holds another assumption which should be stated explicitly. The hypothesis in question deals with the problem of exactly "when" and "how" this "isolation" of theists is to occur.68 There are only two possibilities: isolation can take place either after the death of individual or while his soul is

still "embodied" in the person. The context of Zaehner's argument rules out the first alternative, for if he meant "life after death" by "isolation," then "isolation" could not be compared in any way with "integration," which obviously applies to this life. Zaehner must then, mean the following: while we are alive, i.e., while our souls are embedded in our bodies, we should isolate the spiritual aspect of our person so as to be able to relate to the Divine. In practical terms this simply implies that we should forego those passions which relate us to animals. Zaehner himself is quick to point out, however, that many philosophers assume that man is incapable of isolating his spiritual self from other aspects of himself. To support his position, Zaehner quotes passages from Avicenna, who singles out the various passionate faculties of the soul and shows how man must deal with them, as he cannot free himself from his so-called lower soul (*nafs*) as long as he is alive.[69] Consequently the existence of a free will capable of cutting off the passions from the self is another one of Zaehner's assumptions which does not underlie the arguments of many other writers on mysticism.

Reviewing our analysis, the structure of Zaehner's argument can be depicted as follows:

(1) A mystic is either a monist or a theist
(2) A monistic mystic advocates the integration of the entire self and of nature into a unity
(3) A theistic mystic advocates the isolation of that which has spiritual value, so that it may be related to the Divine
(4) Nature, specifically certain aspects of man, contains undesirable features which, if integrated, would make it impossible for a person to become virtuous
(5) Man is free to isolate himself from his nonspiritual features, such as his passions

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therefore: the theistic mystic is correct and the monistic mystic is incorrect in his respective course of action.

In this reconstruction of Zaehner's argument there is the following logical difference between the first three and the last two premises. The first three premises are but definitions or syntactical specifications of the meaning of the terms 'monist', 'theist', 'isolation', and 'integration'.70 Moreover the data Zaehner provides are sufficient to support his contention that his construction of these terms is adequate insofar as these names are applicable to the wide domain of texts in mysticism, which includes Judaic, Christian, Muslim, as well as nature mystics who did not restrict their adherents to a particular creed. No one could disagree with the truth of his first three premises, as they do not point to a fact (they are neither true nor false propositions), but propose a model by means of which one can clearly distinguish between distinct types of mysticism. The last two premises enter philosophically controversial ground; their veridical status has not unequivocally been established. For example, the truth of premise (4) would obviously be questioned by any monist, such as C. G. Jung, as Zaehner himself recognized. The monist may, for instance, consider man's physical nature as a normatively favorable entity and therefore view the integration of man with his natural aspects as a goal of life to be embraced rather than rejected. What the theist disparagingly calls "passion," the monist might call either "a necessary evil" or "a natural sentiment."71 For example, in the analytical psychology of C. G. Jung "the shadow," which is the archetype of what might be called the "nonspiritual" aspects of the self, must be fully integrated, if a satisfactory self-realization (Jungian 'individuation') is to be attained.72 Let us now turn our attention to premise (5). It can be documented that Zaehner's account of Avicenna's rejection of premise (5) in the above argument is correct. While admitting the normatively lower status of the so-called "passionate faculties" in question, the Persian text clearly states: "One must know that as long as our soul is mixed within the body and is occupied with physical affairs, it cannot know truth, and take cognizance of the other world in a complete manner."73 Consequently, following the authority of Avicenna,

one may hold isolation to be desirable in principle, but one may consider it for all practical purposes impossible, since man may be incapable of subduing all of his nonspiritual passions.

In sum, even though Zaehner's argument appears to be valid, i.e., since its conclusion follows from its premises, it may not be sound, for no conclusive evidence has been brought forth in support of his last two extralinguistic premises.

There is support for the following theses:

(1) Zaehner's distinctions and refinements of different senses of "mysticism" and the relationship between the designata of these terms and monotheistic religions are useful tools by which to probe into the nature of mysticism.

(2) Zaehner correctly points out that one believing in a monotheistic religion -- be it Judaism, Christianity, or Islam -- who holds a transcendent view of deity, cannot consistently uphold the views of naturalistic mystics, who reject the existence of any transcendent entity.

(3) Zaehner's isolation-type-of-mystical experience must apply either to "life after the death of the body" (which is rejected outright by many nature mystics) or to "life on earth." If the latter is true, then isolation is no true alternative for mysticism in the sense that "integration" is a program by which we may conduct our lives. However if Zaehner purports to proffer "isolation" for this life on earth, then his arguments hinge on two traditional premises which he has not supported: man's free will to subdue his passions and a nature devoid of value.

It follows that Zaehner's reductionalism is not sound if one holds the psychological view that man in fact cannot subdue his passions or if one holds, like many Sūfīs, the belief that nature itself contains manifestations of value.

In light of our findings we note that both types of reductionalism of Sūfic thought to other domains are inadequate. In investigating the nature of Sūfism, we should undoubtedly make

use of and take account of Neoplatonic themes as well as of Islamic beliefs, but we cannot assume, prima facie, that these constitute the theoretical basis of Sūfism.

NOTES

1. P. Morewedge, "Contemporary Scholarship on Near Eastern Philosophy," *The Philosophical Forum* 2, 1 (Fall 1970): 122-140.

2. P. Morewedge, "Critical Observations on Some Philosophies of Mysticism," *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* 7,4 (1976): 409-24.

3. P. Morewedge, "A Philosophical Interpretation of Rūmī's Mystical Poetry: Light, the Mediator, and the Way."

4. Other possibilities include an Indian source for Sūfic thought; a sexual basis, as illustrated in Freudian psychology; a natural tendency towards the process of individuation; or a Marxist view that all "spiritual" acts are part of "the super-structure."

5. R. Walzer, "Early Islamic Philosophy," in A. H. Armstrong ed.; *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy*, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1967), p. 645.

6. F. E. Peters, *Aristotle and the Arabs: The Aristotelian Tradition in Islam* (New York and London, 1968), p. 14.

7. M. Fakhry, *A History of Muslim Philosophy* (New York, 1970) pp. 125-83.

8. P. Kraus, "Plotin chez Arabes," *Bulletin de l'Institut d'Egypte* 23 (1941): 266-79; A. Badawi, *Aflūtīn ᶜinda al-ᶜArab* (Cairo, 1955). A. Badawi, *Neoplatonici apud Arabes* (Cairo, 1955); F. Rosenthal, "*As-Sayh al-Yūnānī and the Arabic Plotinus* in three parts: Part I: *Orientalia* 2,41 (1952): 461-92; Part II: *Orientalia* 22,4 (1953): 370-400; Part III: *Orientalia* 24,1 (1955): 42-66; and *Plotini Opera: Enneads IV-V*, ed. P. Henry and H. Schwyzer (Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1955), vol. 2.

9. Proclus: *The Elements of Theology*, ed., tr. R. R. Dodd (London: Oxford University-Press, 1953), p. 35.

10. A. M. Nasafī, *Kashf al-Haqā'iq*, ed. A. Mahdawī-Dāmghānī (Tehran, 1965).

11. P. Morewedge, "The Logic of Emanationism and Sūfism in Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna)."

12. Al-Ghazālī, *Mishkat al-Anwar,* A. Afified. (Cairo, 1964), p. 60. For the clarification of four senses of "unity of being," see P. Morewedge, "A Philosophical Interpretation of Rūmi's Mystical Poetry."

13. See P. Morewedge, *The Metaphysica of Avicenna* (NewYork: Columbia University Press, 1973), pp. 204-11, 211-29.

14. W. T. Stace, *The Teaching of the Mystics* (New York, 1960), p. 21.

15. Ibn Sīnā, *al-Ishārāt wa'l-Tanbīhāt,* S. Dunya ed., (Cairo, 1960), Vol. III, p. 53. See, also al-Ghazālī, *Mishkat al-Anwar,* p. 112.

16. A. H. Armstrong, *The Architecture of the Intelligible World in the Philosophy of Plotinus* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1940), p. 2.

17. C.J. De Vogel, *Philosophia, Studies in Greek Philosophy,* (Assen, 1969), p.405.

18. *Ibid.* p.406.

19. J. M. Rist, *Plotinus, The Road to Reality* (London, 1967), p.228.

20. *Ibid.,* p. 227.

21. *Ibid.,* p. 229

22. Ibn Sīnā, *Risāla fī l-^{c}ishq,* ed. M.A. F. von Mehren in *Traités mystiques d'Abou Ali al-Hosain b. Abdallah Sina ou d'Avicenne; texte arabe avec l'explication en français,* 3 vols. (Leiden, 1894).

23. Ibn Sīnā, *Al-Shifā' Al-Illāhiyyāt (La Métaphysique),* ed. G. C. Anawiat, M.Y. Moussa, S. Dunya, and S. Zaid, 2 vols. (Cairo, 1960), Vol. I. pp. 12, 93; *Metaphysica of Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā),* pp. 30-32.

24. *Metaphysica of Avicenna,* p.100; *Ishārat,* vol. III, p. 279.

25. See, Aristotle, *Metaphysics,* tr. W.D. Ross (London, 1908), 1074^b 15-1075^a10.

26. *Metaphysica of Avicenna,* Chap. 12; *Al-Shifā',* bk.5, Chap. 1-2.

27. *Ibid.* Chap. 10.

28. Aristotle, *The Categories,* tr. E. M. Edghill (London, 1928), 4^{b}31.

29. J. Finnegan, "Avicenna's Refutation of Porphyrus," *Avicenna Commemoration Volume,* (Calcutta, 1956), pp. 187-204.

30. *The Metaphysica of Avicenna*, chap. 3. For a more detailed analysis of this topic, see P. Morewedge, "Philosophical Analysis and Ibn Sīnā's 'Essence-Existence' Distinction," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 92,3 (1972). Also see P. Morewedge, "The Analysis of 'substance' in Tūsī's *Logic* and in the Ibn Sīnian Tradition," in G.F. Hourani, ed., *Essays in Islamic Philosophy and Science* (Albany, 1975), pp. 158-88.

31. *The Elements of Theology*, p. 101.

32. *The Enneads*, tr. S. MacKenna (London, 1962).

33. *Plotin, Enneads*, p. 291.

34. For a detailed analysis of mediator figure in the Islamic tradition, see P. Morewedge, "A Philosophical Interpretation of Rūmi's Mystical Poetry."

35. E. Brehier, *The Philosophy of Plotinus*, tr. J. Thomas (Chicago, 1958), p. 112.

36. Armstrong, *The Architecture of the Intelligible World*, p.44.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 47

38. W.R. Inge, *The Philosophy of Plotinus* (New York, 1918), vol. I, p. 5.

39. Ibn Sīnā, *Hayy ibn Yaqzān*, ed. and tr. H. Corbin, *Avicenne et le récit visionnaire* (Tehran, 1952), p. 6.

40. See P. Morewedge "Contemporary Scholarship on Near Eastern Philosophy."

41. Mansūr Hallāj (857-922), a Persian mystic, was arrested, imprisoned, and killed by the authorities, who accused him of teaching mystical doctrines conflicting with orthodox Islamic doctrine. Hallāj's teachings included the doctrine of *hulūl*, according to which God is thought to be incarnated in the mystic and the person himself is thought to become identical with God without the mediacy of a mediator. See P. Morewedge, "The Logic of Emanationism and Mysticism in the Philosophy of Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna)," where *"hulūl"* (incarnation) is distinguished from other modes by which man may relate to the ultimate being, *viz.*, God, namely, from *"ittihād"* (harmony) and *"ittisāl"* (connection). Differently from the *"hulūl"* type of relation, in the harmonic relation a person lives merely a life in harmony with the divine will as it is outlined by a given creed. In distinction from the *"hulūl"* relation, some sūfis hold that only an aspect of us, e.g., our intelligence

or spirit, can be connected with the Divine. It is our contention that only the relation of "harmony" can be compatible with a religious system. For Hallāj's biography and his doctrines, see *The Encyclopaedia of Islam* new ed., ed. B. Lewis et al., Leiden-London, 1960, vol. III, pp. 99-104 and L. Massignon, *La Passion d'al Husayn ibn Mansour al-Hallāj* (Paris, 1922).

42. Shahāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī (d. 1191), a Persian mystic, who founded the school of illuminationism in Near Eastern philosophy, was also killed after being accused of teaching mystical doctrines which conflicted with orthodox Islam. The fact that nothing in his writings shows an anti-Islamic point of view is irrelevant to our argument: that the condemning voice of popular opinion may be sufficient grounds for the orthodoxy to accuse a mystic of being a heretic and even for killing him. For a description of the life and works of Suhrawardī, see, S.H. Nasr, *Three Muslim Sages* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1964).

43. A paradigm of a distinction between "two" meanings of religion is found in some of the writings of H. Bergson, e.g., *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, tr. R.A. Audra and C. Brereton (New York, 1954), and *Creative Evolution*, tr. A. Mitchell (New York, 1911). Bergson claims that there are two types of religions: a *static* religion of a closed society dominated by ritualistic and mechanical patterns of behavior, and a *dynamic* religion of an open society in which not the intellect but "the vital creative impulse" is dominant. True mysticism for Bergson helps transform a closed society with a static religion into an open society with a dynamic religion, in which the vital creative impulse can become the prominent feature of the world.

44. W. James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (New York, 1923) p. 379.

45. Nicholson's translations of Arabic and Persian mystical texts include *Kashf al-Mahjūb of Al-Hujwīrī* (London, 1967), and *The Mathnawī of Jalāluddīn Rūmī* (London, 1925-71), 8 vols. The most comprehensive account of Nicholson's own position vis-a-vis Islamic mysticism is found in his *Studies in Islamic Mysticism* (London, 1961).

46. *The Mystics of Islam* (London, 1914), p. 1.

47. The doctrine of the "return to God" is reiterated in the Qur'ān, vi: 67,72; x: 45-6; the celebrated Sūra on Light is found in the Qur'ān, xxiv: 35-36. While the theme of the "return to God" assumes that man's

perfection rests ultimately on some kind of a union with God, the analogy of light suggest that God is the only source of reality in the world and that man depends on God, as rays of light are ultimately entities derived from the emanation of the sun. Both the return to God, our source, and the emanation from God, resembling the movement of the rays of the sun, are themes compatible with the beliefs of the so-called "monistic" mystics, as will become apparent.

48. G. Scholem single-handedly brought the Kabbalah from obscurity into its present prominent position in the scholarship of Jewish intellectual history. See On *the Kabbalah and Its Symbolism* (New York, 1969). An English translation of the most important source of the Kabbalah is found in *The Zohar,* tr. H. Sperling and M. Simon (New York, n.d.), 5 vols; abridged translations of key passages are found in *Zohar, The Book of Splendor, Basic Readings from the Kabbalah,* ed. G.G. Scholem (New York, 1963).

49. *Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism* (New York, 1946), pp. 5-6.

50. *Ibid.,* p. 7.

51. W.T. Stace expresses the same theme in different words. He states, for example, "There are several grounds for insisting that intrinsically and in itself mystical experience is not a religious phenomenon at all and that its connection with religions is subsequent and even adventitious." *The Teachings of the Mystics,* p. 23. In *Religion and the Modern World* (New York and Philadelphia, 1960) he equates "mysticism" with the "essence of religion" (p. 313). However his account of mystical experience, which does not distinguish between "I" and "you," shows clearly that he differentiates between monotheistic religions and mysticism *(Ibid.,* p. 315) In another one of his works entitled *Mysticism and Philosophy* (New York-Philadelphia, 1960), Stace points out that mystical experience occurs in the context of "religious feeling," but if "undifferentiated unity" is the essence of mystical experience, then it follows that it is different from religion *(Ibid.,* p. 341). His general conclusion in the aforementioned texts is that mysticism is independent of organized religion; even if it tends to be associated with religion, mysticism can exist without the latter *(Ibid.,* p. 343).

52. *The Philosophy of Martin Buber,* ed. P.A. Schlipp and M. Friedman (La Salle, 1967), p. 716. For a clear discussion of Buber's views on mysticism, see E.L. Fackenheim, "Martin Buber's Concept of

Revelation," *Ibid,*. pp. 273-96; H. Bergman, "Martin Buber and Mysticism," *ibid.*, 297-308; and Buber's reply to these critics, *ibid.*, pp. 712-17. For an excellent summary of Buber's general philosophy, see M. Wyschogrod in "Buber, Martin" in *The Enclopaedia of Philosophy,* ed. P. Edwards (New York, 1967), vol. 1, pp. 409-11.

53. *I and Thou,* tr. W. Kaufmann (New York, 1970), p. 143.

54. Avicenna holds a significant position in mysticism because he represents the most sophisticated synthesis of Greek, Islamic, and Iranian traditions. Moreover he influenced Aquinas to the extent that Aquinas referred in his writings to Avicenna about five hundred times.

55. J.J. Houben, "Avicenna and Mysticism," in *Avicenna Commemoration* Volume, p. 220.

56. R.C. Zaehner's contributions to the study of Zoroastrianism have become classics in the field, e.g., *The Dawn and Twilight of Zoroastlianism* (New York, 1961); *The Teachings of the Magi* (New York and London, 1956); and *Zurvan, A Zoroastrian Dilemma* (London, 1955), the most thorough survey of Zurvanism ever to be published. His works on Indic religions include an edition of his own translations of passages from various Indic texts entitled *Hindu Scriptures* (London-New York, 1960), and an analytic survey of eight key concepts entitled Hinduism (London, 1962). His major works on mysticism are *Mysticism, Sacred and Profane* (London, 1960); and *Zen, Drugs and Mysticism* (New York, 1972). In addition, he has written numerous philosophical books on religion, e.g., *Matter and Spirit, Their Convergence in Eastern Religions, Marx, and Teilhard de Chardin* (New York, 1963), and *At Sundry Times* (London, 1958).

57. A. Huxley in *The Doors of Perception* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1954) claims that mescalin brought on a mystical state. According to Huxley, this implies that the Christian Church should make use of this drug in its rituals. Zaehner's experiential and analytical refutations of Huxley's views are contained in *Mysticism, Sacred and Profane.*

58. *At Sundry Times,* p. 171.

59. *Mysticism, Sacred and Profane,* p. 28.

60. *Ibid.*, p. 28.

61. *Ibid.*, p. 29.

62. In favor of Christianity Zaehner states that the doctrine of the Trinity constitutes the mystics' most effective goal leading to a

legitimate union with God, e.g., "Man, having crucified the 'ego' on the Cross, ascends into heaven where He is eternally united with the Father through the force of attraction which is the Holy Ghost Who is substantial love and substantial joy." *Ibid.*, p. 207.

63. *Ibid.*, p. 204

64. *Ibid.*, p. 34

65. Whereas "monism" and "theism" afford spectator-like views on the kinds of entities that exist in the world, "integration" and "isolation" take a programmatic stance on what types of actions are correct or incorrect. There is obviously a logical relationship between the monistic view of the world, which claims that there is exactly one entity, and the doctrine of integration, which claims that any duality (e.g., God and man are unlike) is an illusion which should be avoided. Likewise, from theism, which holds that only a transcendent God is the total source of value and that only an aspect of man's soul has an affinity with the Divine, it follows that man should isolate his divine feature to achieve a union with God.

66. *Ibid.*, p. 125.

67. *Ibid.*, p. 200.

68. The topic of "salvation through death" is discussed by Zaehner in *Zen, Drugs and Mysticism*, pp. 172-94. In this work Zaehner describes the choice between the two kinds of mysticism in question, i.e., nature and religious mysticisms, as a "death by the dissolution" of matter and as an "ultra-differentiation" of the spiritual aspects of man; he expresses an obvious preference for the latter, which points to a monotheistic way rather than a program for monists. However the trouble with this argument is that for monistic mystics self-realization, or perfection (Jung's individuation), is a program for this *life*. Consequently we cannot adequately correlate Zaehner's arguments on this issue and his later work on *Zen, Drugs and Mysticism* with his earlier classical formulation of nature and religious mysticism in *Mysticism, Sacred and Profane*, the source of the argument in question.

69. *Mysticism, Sacred and Profane*, p. 106.

70. These concepts may be introduced as linguistic tools to construct a theory in terms of which mysticism may be understood. A classical philosophical essay which makes liberal use of theoretical and abstract terms is R. Carnap, "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology," in *Semantics and the Philosophy of Language* (Urbana, 1952), pp. 208-21.

Accordingly, the decision to adopt these terms does not depend on whether or not they are names of actual things in the world, but on their pragmatic use.

71. Here we have in fact two distinct theories: according to one view, some of man's characteristics, e.g., his passions, are in fact undesirable, but since we cannot do anything about them, we might as well accept them via integration. The other view rejects no actual characteristic of man as bad; it may, however, attribute "evil" to the misguided efforts of those wishing to control man's "natural sentiments." A person holding either of these views may accept integration.

72. A point of disagreement between Jung and Zaehner illustrates clearly Zaehner's assumption. Jung accepts "the feminine principle" in relation to man's anima, which must be integrated if individuation is to be achieved; Zaehner's account of the feminine principle and the function of this principle in our happiness disagrees sharply with Jung's views. Zaehner states, "The symbolic significance of the dogma of the Assumption is not [Jung's view that] the deification of the 'eternal feminine', a collective unconscious, or whatever it may be, but the deification of the human soul as represented by Mary, who in common with all human beings, is the daughter of the One Father, and is, in her own right, the spouse of the Holy Ghost and Mother of the Son. Through the Immaculate Conception she is sinless and therefore 'whole', an integrated personality already" (*Mysticism, Sacred and Profane*, p. 120). By contrast, Jung explains the feminine archetype in man as follows: "She [the anima] is not an invention of the conscious, but a spontaneous product of the unconscious." Thereupon he proceeds to delineate both the practical negative and positive effects of the female counterpart of the male without any normative reference to nature or God (Jung, *Aion*, tr. R.F.C. Hull [Princeton, 1968], pp. 13-14). Consequently while the Jungian view of individuation -- viewed by Zaehner as a monistic integration -- rests upon a psychological description of human nature, Zaehner's view rests on an ethical perspective of what he holds to be Divine in man.

73. Ibn Sīnā, *Hayy ibn Yaqzān*, ed. H. Corbin, p. 25.

PART II

Mysticism & and the cosmic

consciousness

By

prof. Ibrahim yaseen

Introduction

For a long time I have been searching for the vague way by which Mystics of Islam have a knowlege of the universe ; and how they could see beyond the power of eyes ; and how to hear beyond the power of the ears. Most Moslem Mystics spoke about what we term "Extereme states of Mystical consciousness" they also mention what modern psychology terms "The deeper sense " or the "Insight" The great Mystic Al Gazali" told Us about his "Mish kah"-or a kind of universal or cosmic Heart. The Heart that is a kind of light that lightens earth and heaven and is considereded a capacity that extends to receive the Image of God. Ibnul Arabi mentioned a heart of more and more abilities. It is 'a Heart of all abilities and of powerful authority. The questions which we have to examine are roughly the following :- Do the Mystical concepts rendered to a special kind of senses? Do senses occupy any special position? or perform any special functions? in the world of kowledege? What is the difference if any between ordinary senses and extraordinary senses?. In what way they extend and become wider and wider range?. We are going to discuss what some researchers call spiritual consciousness or The Heart which Moslem Mystics call the seat of the "Absolute", or the centre of that deep transendental feeling. Such sense professor "Stewart" calls

Solmn sense of Timeless being".(1)

Here were are going to explore the zone at which man's nature touches The absolute; The point where the natural system meets the alesolute system. We are also going to explore the area at which the external world.

Therefore I'll explore the area where the man's transendental powers are to have their full chance, the kind of the limitless Heart; the deep sense and the kind of the limitless abilities of hearing or listening to the sounds of the world. The capacity of perception. Here I'll concentrate mainly on the way a sense extends and becomes wider. I'll also examine states of mind and forms of senses that work beyond the limits of ordinary senses.

I'll try to give an answer to the question "What is Enlightenment"?

What is the point toward which all creation drives ?

How will man respond to the invitation from unknown?

The following papers represent on effort toward exploring see the senses and the faculties We speak about as psycho-physical powers and the real way to the universal life or the cosmic communication.

See J.A. Stewart; The Myths of Plato p.p. 41-43 see too E.underhill . A study in the nature and development of Man's Spiritual Consciousness, London; 1949, P 54.

The expansion of the Heart, or The Heart and the cosmic consciousness .

what kind of Heart We are trying to search for ?

it is not the normal heart or the physical one . it is not a heart of flesh and blood as the great Mystic AL Gazali says.(1)

It is a kind of a heart that is found only when there is no-self the heart We refer is : soft and offers no resistance to the universal and absolute influnces . This does not mean the absence of all Sensitivities or emotionalities. I'll. mention here the same sentence of christams Humphery'(2)

"They - senses - are controlled in the totality of a spiritual outlook on life" .

In Repentance and purification there lies satori and spiritualism; for repentance has a double value, to purge the Heart of the errors which coused our sins;(3)

I'll also repeat what the "Theroyada school" (4) says "Cease to do evil, learn to do good cleanse your own heart". This is the way to build a new and expanded heart. The heart that is filled with light of Enlightenment.

« ١- أبو حامد الغزالي: احياء علوم الدين ، تحقيق د. بدوي طبانه - طبع عيسى الحلبي ، جـ٢٢ ص ٧٠٦. راجع أيضا لنفس المؤلف مشكاة الأنوار ، ضمن مجموع القصور العوالي، مكتبة الجندي -القاهرة ١٩٧٢ص٧٠٦

» 2- Christams Humphery , Exploring Buddhism; London, 1974.,p.112.

» 3- Exploring Buddhism; P.112.

» 4- Exploring Buddhism; P.113.

The aim of that kind (1) of heart is to see God who is described in the Holy Koran as the light of heaven and earth.
Allah is invisible to the bodly eye. He is visible only to the inward sight–

According to a mystical interpretation the heart is like a candle burning in a lantern of transparent glass which is placed in a niche in the true bleiever's heart; therefore his speech is light and his works are light and he moves in light. Thus R.A. Nicholson quoted Gazali–(2) When the heart reach's this stage, by being purged of sin and evil thoughts, the light of certainty strikes upon it and makes it shinning mirror so that the devil cannot approach it.(2)
Ghazzal (3); Explains that the light is necessary for a seeker to see or to get knouledge of the absloute. He speaks about a kind of spirit by which a seeker receive.

١– راجع فى معنى النوع الربانى من القلب – معارج القدس فى مدارج معرفة النفس ، لأبو حامد الغزالى مكتبة الجندى القاهرة ص٢١، يقول" و المعنى الثانى الذى نحن بصدد بيانه هو الروح الانسانى المتحمل لأمانة الله – المتحلى بالمعرفة المركوز فيها العلم بالفطرة الناطق بالتوحيد"
hazzali says:
The second kind of the Heart is "The human spirit that bears the charge of God – On which knowleage and the learning of God is found by instinct.

2– R.A. Nicholson; The Mystics of Islam; London; 1975– P– 51

٣– الغزالى (أبو حامد) مشكاة الأنوار ضمن رسائل القصور العوالى تحقيق الشيخ محمد مصطفى أبو العلا ، القاهرة مكتبة الجندى ١٩٧٢م ، ص٦ ص٧

the vision of God. It is the way of God to let the hearts of those who love (Him) have vision of Him.

The heart of a seeker extends and there in issuese a most powerful sense that goes far byond the bodily bonds and barriers- of physical senses .

Such kind of transendental senses grow in the heart through states of divine love for in the rapture of love a heart attaions to such a degree that it becomes wider and absorbed in the thought of "Allah". the universe becomes at the hand of the heart- The inner and transendental sense gose byond the barries of the natural body and physical heart .

Such transendental heart is described as "AL-Sir" or the secret.

2- Alatifah " Al Rabaniah" or the Sacred faculty.

3- The inner eye of the soul.

4- "Al Gowhar Al Nurani" or the essence of light.(1)

5-In "Buddhism" (2) the heart as an expanded and spiritual Faculity is greater than any part, the all, But "heart" is very much more. The interrelation of human faculities is subtle in the Extreme; The intiution irradiates the higher levels of thought, so does it give point and purpose to the promptings of heart which, where they argue against pure reason or physical Faculities.

١- اصطلاحات الصوفية للقاشاني ، مادة قلب

2- Exploring Buddhism, P.82.

The heart becomes the law of the laws, the eternal harmomy, and a shoreless universal essence, the light of ever lasting right; the fitness of all things . (1)

"Richard M.Bucke" (2) expresses the condition of the seekers heart saying "persons possessed" the "Cosmic sense" or the expanded heart knows and feels so much byond the limits of the mind and the natural senses.

"Richard Bucke" gives us the marks of the heart when it becomes a cosmic sense.

The are as follow:

1- They subjective light.

2- The moral elevation.

3- The intellectual illumination.

4- The sense of imortality.

5- The loss of fear of death.

6- The loss of the sense of sin.

7- The suddenness, istaneosness of the awakening.

8- The character of the man - intellectual, moral and physical.

9- The age of illumination.

1- Exploring Buddhism, P.83.

2- Richard Bucke; From self to Cosmic Consciousness, An essay in What is Enlightenment, Edited by Jhon White; London; 1984. p.12.

We her add that among the very important marks of the heart when reaches the state of sprituality or when it expands to become a cosmic sense.

10- The added charm of the personality so that men and women are always attracted strongly to the person "who owns the comic sense".

11- The transfiguration of the suliject of the change as seen by others when the cosmic sense is acctualy present.

we her add that among the very important marks of the heart when reaches the state of Spr:tuality or when it expands to become a cosmic sensc.

1- It becomes the Wesia of "Al-ilm" (1) or a limitless faculity that knows God in the most perfect way.

2- "Wesia" Al mushahada" or the faculty of having a very cleear image of the God , and the place where the beauty of Gd's names and attributes seen throught their manifistation

3- "Wesia Al Khilapha" or the faculity that extends or expands to attain oneness with the names and attributes of God therfore the heart can act frealy like a vice ger nt of God.

١- عبد الكريم الجيلى، الانسان الكامل فى معرفة الأوائل و الأواخر القاهرة ١٩٧٠م، ص٢٢ راجع ايضا كشاف اصطلاحات العنوان و العلوم للتهانوى، مادة قلب راجع أيضا صدر الدين القونوى، الرسالة المرشدية، نسخة خطية بدار الكتب، مكتبة طلعت، ١٣٦٨م ق ٥٢

The heart becoms an inner sense; it becoms a sense of Reality. This faculty is concerned with a kind of sudden realization of the immediate presence of God .... "accompenied with a sense of being bathed in a warm glow of ligh, as though the exernal-condition had brough about the internal effect-a feeling of having passed beyond the body.. according to "Whitman" (1)

This kind of Cosmic Consciousness Contain two cheif elements according to Bucke too"(2)

a- Added Consciousness

B- Added faculty.

This means that when an organism possesses simple consciousness only attains to self consciousness it becomes aware for the first time that it is separate creature, or self existing in a world which is apart from it. That is, the oncoming of the new faculty that Muslim Mystics call "Al Latifoh Al Rabaniah" or the very illumenated faculty that issues in the heart of the Mystic by the light of God.

So when a person who was self conscious only enters into cosmic consciousness,

A) He knows "From the mere fact of illumination" certain things as for instance:-

1- The univese is not a dead machine but a living presence

2-That in its essence and tendency it is infinitely good;

1- W.James; The varieties of Religious Experience; London; Seventh Impression May, 1975. P.383
From self to Cosmic Consciousness, p.10.

3- That the individual existence is Continuous beyond what is called death.

B) He takes an enormously greater Capacity both in Learning and initiating. (1)

In the some way Ghazzali, expresses his state of Cosmic Consciousness as if it were an "absorption in God"

it seems that he means that absorption in God, is the Goal the sufi seeks and reachs Even underhill quotes him as saying "the end of Sufism is total absorption in God" (2)

Here; we can say that great Mystic tended to interpret their own experiences monistically or panatheistically without distinguishing between the human heart and what they imagine the universal Heart, or what we can call with them "The melting away into the infinite.

In this state some have imagined themselves to be associated with Him; but all this is Sin, or a big mistake,. Mr Claud Field quates the great Muslim Mystic Al-Ghazzali; as Condemning such extravagant utterances as those of Mansur Al Hdlaj and other Sufis who used the same sort of

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1- Bucke, from self to cosmic-consciousness., p 13.

أنظر ، أبو حامد الغزالى ، معارج القدس فى معرفة النفس ، مكتبة الجندى القاهرة ص٢١، ٢٢.

2- W - Stace, Mysticism and philosophy; Ph: phiLadeLphia & lippincot, 1966 P.P.226,227

See too; Margaret Smith, Readings from the Mystics of Islam, London, P.110. Evelyn underhill; Mysticsm paperbacked; New York, Meridian Books, Inc 1955, P.171

wild language, and adding the matter went so far that cartain persons boasted of a union with the Diety, and that they .... beheld Him, and enjoyed familiar converse with Him (1)

Al Ghazzali expresses such a state of absorption saying "when the worshipper thinks no longer of his worship or himself; but is althougether absorbed in Him whom he worships, that state, by gonstics is called the passing away of mortality "Fana", when a person so passed away from himself feels nothing of his bodily members, nor of what ispassing without, not what passes withim his own mind ... Perfect absorption that he is unconscious not only of himself but of his absorption. (2)

Richard Bucke (3) describes this state of deeper consciousness as a kind of passing of stepping from self to Cosmic Consciousness, This can only be realized, therefore only described by those who have passed through the experience;

We can read about this Spiritul experience through Buddhism; we can read what Goutama (Buddha) and the illuminati of Buddhists tell us of Nirvana; namely that is the highest happiness "Says the unknown, but unquestionably illumined writer in the "Mahabbha-rata" the devotee, whose happiness is withim himself becoming one with the Brahman, obtains the Brahmic

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1- Mysticism and philosophy, P.P.227.228.
2- Margaret Smith; Readings from the Mystics of Islam; P.70
see too stace w.; Mysticism and philosphy P.228.
3- From self to Cosmic Consciousness, P.II.from, what is Inlightenment P.P. 8:II-

bliss" Note the dicta of Jesus on the value of the "Kingdom of Heaven" to purchase which a man sells all that he has, remember the worth that Paul ascribe to "Christ" and how he was caught upinto the third heaven reflect on Dante's transhumanization from a man into a God" (1)

It is . known that the name the christ gives to the "Cosmic Sense" is Beatrice -"Making happy".....

Above all, bear in mind the testimony of Walt Whitman - though given in evervarying Language...I am satisfied - I see dance, Laugh, Sing "Wandring, amazed at my own lightness and glee" O the jay of my spirit, it is uncaged, it darts like lightning .. with joy to thee O death" And that forecast of future taken from his own heart-that future" when through these states walk a hundred millions of superb Person" that is, persons possessed of the Cosmic sense, And finally the ocean filled with Joy - the atmosphere all joy, joy, joy in freedom worship love, joy in the ecstasy of life. (2)

in this way "Walt Whitman" describes the experience, of passing from self to Cosmic Consciousness or what we described as a kind of expansion of the Mystical sense.

But how dose the sense of cosmos work ?

1- From self to Cosmic Consciousness P. 11-

2- From self to Cosmic Consciousness P. 12-

According to Al Ghazali " Man has been truly termed a microcosm or little world in himself;-therfore his heart extesnds - to attain to a more intimate knowledge of God.

The tradition of " India " (1) speak of the Divine, Cosmic Man whose dispersal into fragments Constituted the Greation of the wold and whose re-collection in the sole essential task of human life. In Buddhism we find that all the levels of being are contained in Man - Man the centre and Man the all embracing void.

The tradition of "china" revolve around the king, the great Man who governs the parts of existence.(2)

Her we can conclude that the heart of the Mystic is the same every where.

nearly all Religions and Mystical views think that there is a kind of limitless Heart, a universal Heart, A Heart that extends and becomes wider to be able to attain to a divine knowddg^ of God and the universe.

Such kind of Heart works as a Comic sense; or as a very strong and very deep Consciousness. what may drive us to say that the Heart is the ground of such extereme states of Mystical Cosciousness.

1- Jacob Needleman; Asense of the cosmos, New york 1975 London 1988 - p.39

راجع معارج القدس ، ص ٢١ ، ٢٢
راجع أيضاً احياء علوم الدين ، ص ٣ ، ص ٦ ، ٧

2- Asense of the cosmos, P.P 22 - 23

The state of inner vision which results from lack of attention to the external world is described as "Alternate states of Consciousness" (1)

2- The Idea of Microcosm :

The stats that are related to the idea of "microcosm"; or the big Heart .

Thus our understanding of The microcosmos (2) severely constricted by our preconceptions about the cosmos- for , when we think about the universe, what do we picture to ourselves ?

simply repeating that it is unimoginably vast and great has the invitable effect of allowing our thought to come to rest which is equivalent to the illusion of having grasped something about the whole .

The idea that the universe is in man therefore leaves us untouched. but it is enough actively to imagine the little we know of what takes place on this small planet earth for us to glimpse the power in the idea of micro-cosm .

In this way the idea of Microcosm interprets the laws that governs our human processes , the intelligence that adapts, reacts , creates and desroys whihin ever larger and more fundamental scales of intelligence.

1- HILARY EVANS; Alternate states of Consciousness, England 1989, P.54.

2- Asense of cosmos; p. 24-

it also shows how wide is that kind Microcosmic heart ; how deeper is that kind of cosmic awarness;how sacred is the way the heart works.

Here we come to a very important reslut; that is : the heart as described above is the most important sense ; it is the spiritual cosmic sense . the sacred sense ,the widest strongest ; the deepest and the most powerful sense.

I should add here that one of the most important facts is that : muslim mystics believe that such kind of heart owens A powerful Mind , a mind of strong and wide capacity , A mind that has a sacred way through which it connect heaven with earth. it represents a sacred channel to the trancendental knowledge ; the knoledge that comes by illumination (1), revelation and inspiration. and because there is a strong relation between modern man; mind and the Religious mind whether he awares this fact or not, the Symbols of ancient traditions take on an entirely. new meaning when one entertains the idea of consciaus universe containing levels of intellgence that far exceed the highest states experienced by the ordinary healthy mind (2). if sacred symbols are understood to be the communication of a higher Consciousness, they can be a bridge between the rational ego and the forces of the unconciousness psyche. that is clear in

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1- R.A.Nicholson;the Mystics of islam, p.70.

2- A sense of cosmos; P. 131.

the Mystical philosophy of Sadr Al Din Al Qunawi, who asserted that the healthy mind; and the perfect mood are necessary to a good understanding; a complete preception and a clear imagination of the real universe (1)

but let us ask what kind of intellectual power does the heart use to fly to the area of the unknown.

that is what we are going to explain in the following pages.

(3)- The intellectual powers
and The cosmic consciousness.

Our minds contain The faculities That provide us whith a set of starter conceptions it is The source of dreams , visions and imagention-it is also The power of judgement and common sense(2)

Our memntal faculities represent a very important channel That connect man whith his creator. To speak about The faculty of imagination we should speak about dreams, vision , day dreams; and the phenomena of spiritualism or speaking someone at any time even he is dead or far away from his desciple. but what is Imagination?

According to Thomas ried and others "imagination" means ,all

١- صدر الدين القونوى ، الفكوك على فصوص الحكم ، نسخة خطية رقم ٣٤٣ م تصوف طلعت ، دار الكتب المصرية ، الورقة رقم ٦١ ، ٦٢

2- Keith lehrer , Thomas reid, essay on the intellectual powers; London & New York; P. 144.

the operations of the mind like conception; imagining apprehending thinking the proper senses signify an act of mind (1)

Muslims used the word imagination in different meaning. according to the great sheikh Ibnul-arabi and "sadr al-din al qunawi" the term "khayal"or imagination is used to express a theory of creation and to express the metaphisical theory of the Spirtual and visible world . mental images are khayal, dreams also are khayal because they are a stage between the real and the phenomenal world .(2)

khayal or imagination in this theory is considered a way to the heaven.

It may work as wireless station or like television set , through which a great mystic sends or receive the supreme and the divine knoweldge . therefore ' qunawi describes the hunan kind of "imagnation "as a branch of the"ilm" or the sacred hidden realities in the mind of "allah" the metaphysical kind of imagination is divided by ibmul (1). "Arabi" into two kinds ;

A) separable " munfasil"which is seen in the plane of the imagination as having an external corporeality , like the form of gabriel seem by mohammad, and the serpent which was seen in the place of moses staff

B) "inseparable" (muttasil)by which ibnul-Arabiseems to mean

1- essay on the intelleclual powers , p-83

2- A-Affifi; The mystical philosoplhy of muhyid-din ibnul arabi, cambridge, 1939. p-129

ordinary mental images. Images which are consciously recalled to the mind ,and images which come to the mind of their own accord certain condition e.g.in dreams .

The inseparable imaginations belong to the "essential presence " and are always ready receive neanings (ma "ani "spirits whatever thismaymean. they are forms in which Reality reveals itself to the human mind as higher forms than those of sensifle world.(2)

The result is that the man's spiritual , intellectual experiessce ras always been a kind of universal prevalence of those astonhing moments of msight which richard buke called "cosmic conswousness "

In such moments oof cosmic imagintion; the real form of the universe comes is the mind of the seeker clearly Hence great mystic is the only the person who has the ability to imagine the real form of the universe ,to make akind of communication bettween heaven and earth , and to grasp the symbols received by the heart , the ears ,the eyes or by mind

That is why the research in "jungianism" (3) makes room for religous man.

1- A. Affifi; The Mystical philosophy of ibnu'l Arabi, p.130

2- the mystical philosophy of ibnul Arabi ; p.131

3- Jungiansism is a psychological system; it makes room for religious trends like yaga, Buddhism; and Sufism. see Asense of Cosmos; P. 130

A leading jungian analyst assert that traditional disciplines such as yoga, contemplative christianly, sufism, and Zen Buddhism; are actually concerned with the deepst sense of what Jungians term "personality development" (1)

Therfore Qunawi and his sheikh ibnul - Arabe spoke about a very important facuty that is "Himah" (2) or the power of making a connection between heaven and earth through a kind of deep contemplation and concentration.

THey could describ successfully what modern studies term " Materialising " (3) or spiritualism. That is the moment the power of Himah can create living creatures from the mere imagination.

Therefore "Qunawi" added another modern term to his very advanced terms, it is "Al Mashahid Al Mithalia" (4) or "the ideal images of imagination" .

In this way Qunawi and his Sheikh" could magine a living picture of their Sheikhs and could argue them, they also could ask them and get an answer from them even if they we-e dead . They confessed that their "Sheikhs" were visiting them from time to time after their death; They thought that the dead spirit

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1- Asense of cosmos ;p. 131.

٢- صدر الدين القونوى ، النفحات الالهية ، نسخة خطية رقم ٧٧٤ تصرف طلعت ، دار الكتب المصرية ورقة ٥٨

3- The Mystical philosophy; P. 134

٤- النفحات الالهية ، ورقة ٥٨
راجع ابن عربى ، تنزل الاملاك من علم الأرواح
تحقيق أحمد زكى ، طه عبد الباقى ، القاهرة ١٩٦١ ، ص ١٨

returns to the world of living people to talk to some of her beloved friends

Sadr Aldin Al Qunawi says that "our shaykh - his shaykh - Ibnul Arabi had the power to meet the spirit of any dead prophet or saint, either by causing the spirit to decsend to this world and seeing in incorporated in similitudinary form "sura Milthaliyyah" resembling the sensible form of the person wanted or by causing the spirit to appear in his dreams or by disembodying himself and meeting the spirit. (1)

Here we find out that great Mystics likes ibnul Arabe and his disciple Qunawi knew so many deeper faculities ; through which they established bridges that connect our world with the world of the absolute oneness

The power of inner intellect, the power of imagination, the hypnotic power "Al Himah" which is the cause of every movement and every change in the world and the power of creating and receiving living picuteres of the dead persons even while awakining or as dreams by day and night all these faculities are good channels to heaven, they work together to attain a clear knowledge of the sacred world of inner and outer world seen and useen universr.

1- The Mystical philosophy of ibnul Arabi; P. 133 - This part should be read in conjunction with what has been Said by Sad Aldin Al Runawi; that is " while I was walking between Adn and Tursos my Shyaik appeared in the sky like what was happing when he was still alife - and gave me very important information from the world of "Al Ghaip " Gensis.
راجع النفحات الالهية ، النفحة بالورقة ٥٨

now that is the way to see and to receive the forms in which reality reveals itself; what then is the way the Mystic has a perfect control over the sounds coming from the deepest part of the human soul, and the farthest part of the world ?

That is what we are going to make clear in the following pages.

(4) Listening as a Cosmic Sense

The Muslim Mystics refer to the sense of listening as if it were a cosmic sense; A sense that pentrates the deepest depth of the univers. Such Sense hears soundless sounds and sounds that ears can not hear.

ears in such system leave there role to the inner ears of the heart.

Listening therefore becomes a means of communication. It connects the sounds coming from the universe and the Mystic inner heart.

Mystics refer to listening in three kinds.

First of all "listening instinctly"

Second; is the psychological listening, that is controlled by the psychological state of the Mystic.

Third is the listening by Allah; it is the right listining and the transcendental sense of the true belivers heart. (1)

١- الهجويرى ، كشف المحجوب ، ترجمة داسعاد ماهر ، القاهرة ١٩٧٤ ، ج٢ ، ص ١٥٤

states are spirtual feelings and dispositions over which a man has no control, They descend from God into his heart, without his being able to repel them when they come or to retain them when they go-

see, The Mystics of Islam; P 29.

Such kind of sacred lestening Comes through states of Meditation, nearness to God, love, fear, hope, longing intimacy, tranquility, contemplation, and certainty.

Mortification of the "nafs" is the chief work of devotion and leads to the cosmic lestening, The nafs should be weaned from those things to which it is accustomed. fasting silence, and solituds to lestening

lestening "Sama" is a result of possing away "fana" of individual self in universal Being .

Mystics of Islam knew what we can term a modern way of troining the Mystic to support the cosmic sense of lestening, it is lestening to Music.

Some Mystics think that Music is a divine influence which stirs the heart to seek God. Those who listen to it spiritually attain unto unbelief.

One whose heart is absorbed in the thought of God can not be corrupted by hearing musical instruments and voices (1)

The divine lestening is not available unless the Mystic listens to every voice in the universe, to open every faculty to the flashes of light coming from the heaven, to concentrate on the absolute , and to contemplaate the sacerd secrets of creatures. ears in this system become a secrad divice of listening, a limtless listening.

1- The Mystics of Islam, P. 65.

راجع فى السماع

١- ابن القيم ، مدارج السالكين ، ج١ ، ص ٤٨٢

٢- أبو القاسم القشيرى ، الرسالة ، طبع صبيح ، ص ١٧٢

٣- أبو نصر السراج الطوسى ، اللمع، تحقيق طه عبد الباقى سرور ص ٣٦٧.

A mystic hears beyond the boundries of the physical senses. The nature itself responds to the abilities of the new cosmic ears. that the voices of birds, the silince of mountains, the sounds of rain drops and the least voice of any microscopic creature become a coll for God, a kind of " Recallection". or an intense concentration of every faculty upon The religious formula of remembering God – one almighty God.

It is also a connection with the absolute oneness.

In this way ears work as a cosmic, sacred sense.

Concolusionn :

The cosmic sense is a combination of different faculities; like the heart of the Mystic, " the illuminated heart"; The intellectual power of dreams and visions

It is an instincd faculity; it is created to every one; but it does not reveal itself without effort.

It becomes known to the Mystic after long practice of contemplation and concentration on the absloute oneness.

This kind of cosmic consciousness which is found to every human being is a good proof of the unity of Man kind

This kind of cosmic consciousness help great Mystics realize things as if they were in a melting pot. The sense of evil, the sense of in justice, the sense of suffering, will not be there once man transcends this mind of ego and desire

This Cosmic sense has been always owned even by persons in primitive socrities; especially when they develop a kind of deeper Consciousness

It is a power of transmitting pictures of no picture world soundless sounds, Conceptions of the deepest depth of the inner world; and even create living creatures from the mere imagination or what Moslim Mystics term "Al-Mshahid Al-Mithaliah".

The Cosmic sense is a power of Judgement and as it is owned by the whole human race, values should be the same, everywhere in the world.

justice in India or Amirca should be the same like justice everywhere in the world. love and beauty in Egypt should be the same as they are in England or any other country. what is Considered right at a place is right everywhere. What seems wrong and evil here is wrong and evil their.

In fact this cosmic sense can receive clearly the forms in which reality reveals itself.

The sense of justic; equality and the love of peace; the haterd of war are considered results of attaing such kind of the Mystical consciousness.

J. Trevor describes such a state of cosmic consciousness saying " I felt that I was in heaven, an inward state of peace and joy and assurance indescribaly intense accompanied with a sense of being bothevin a warm glow of light as thugh the externd condition had brought about the internal effect - a feeling of having passed beyond the body, though the scene around me stood out more clearly and as if nearer to me than before, by reason of illumination in the midest of which I seemed to be placed" (1)

No one can make himself perectly moral and of limtless knowledge This must be done for him through a flash of light in his heart; This state becomes possible when the seeker reachs this state of illumination

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1- William James; The varities of Religious Experience. Seventh impression, May; 1975. Great Britain, PP. 382, 383.

One of the most important results here is that in islamic Mysticism. Mystics of Islam look at "Music" as a divine stimulus that stirs heart to seek God.

Some Mystics had attained a high degree of spirtuality that they entered in a state of motion or dancing; It is spiritual movements and happens unconscioully.

Among the terms employed to explain the theory of the cosmic Conscousness are ecstatasy; passing away "fana"; the insight; the deeper sense; the Cosmic sense; the Cosmic consciousness; the universal self; and the exterm states of Mystical Consciousness.

This state is accomponied by :(1)

a– Amoral transformation of the soul.

b– Amental abstraction or passing away of the mind from all objects of pereception, thoughts, actions and feelings

c– The cessation of all conscious thought

1- The Mysties of Islam; P 60.

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تم البحث بحمد الله